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This dissertation begins with an exploration of a brand of dual
aspect monism and some problems deriving from the distinction between
a first person and third person point of view. I continue with an outline
of one way in which the conscious experience of the subject might arise
from organisational properties of a material substrate. With this picture to
hand, I first examine theoretical features at the level of brain organisation
which may be required to support conscious experience and then discuss
what bearing some actual attributes of biological brains might have on
such experience. I conclude the first half of the dissertation with
comments on information processing and with artificial neural networks
meant to display simple varieties of the organisational features initially
described abstractly.
While the first half begins with a view of conscious experience and
infers downwards in the organisational hierarchy to explore neural
features suggested by the view, attention in the second half shifts towards
analysing low level dynamical features of material substrates and inferring
upwards to possible effects on experience. There is particular emphasis on
clarifying the role of chaotic dynamics, and I discuss relationships between
levels of description of a cognitive system and comment on issues of
complexity, computability, and predictability before returning to the topic
of representation which earlier played a central part in isolating features of
brain organisation which may underlie conscious experience.
Some themes run throughout the dissertation, including an
emphasis on understanding experience from both the first person and the
third person points of view and on analysing the latter at different levels
of description. Other themes include a sustained effort to integrate the
picture offered here with existing empirical data and to situate current
problems in the philosophy of mind within the new framework, as well as
an appeal to tools from mathematics, computer science, and cognitive
science to complement the more standard philosophical repertoire.
Themes and Connections
(key on two pages following)
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the artificial neural network framework of Chapter 10 is the basis of
the self model circuitry we explore in Chapter 12
some example properties of self models from Chapters 5 and 6 are
implemented in Chapter 12
the schema of Chapter 13 offers a way of tracing self model circuitry
as a dynamical system and of relating the dynamics at this
implementational level to dynamics at the level of psychological
transitions
the schema of Chapter 13 offers a more formal framework for the
levels of description and points of view which were crucial to
Chapters 2 and 3
the possibility of chaotic dynamics was one motivation for the
schema of Chapter 13, and Chapter 15 offers an example of an
important X level influence on the \j/ level
the schema of Chapter 13 is a good framework for understanding
the argument of Chapter 14 and the defence against Smith
Chapters 13 and 15 each offer different arguments for problems with
\j/ level computability or determinism
Chapter 17 includes an analysis of predictability problems which
bear on indeterminism as discussed in Chapter 14
the artificial neural network examples of Chapter 10 feature some
characteristics of Edelman's perceptual categorisation work
our concern with evolutionary plausibility in Chapter 8 features
again in an example network of Chapter 10
in Chapter 8, some of the features of self models described in
Chapters 5 and 6 are justified in an evolutionary context
Chapter 7 explores some relationships between functionalism and
the self model properties of Chapters 5 and 6
v i i i
m— the notion of representation used in Chapters 5 and 6 is refined in
Chapter 19
n— the self model view is one approach to describing the third person
aspect of conscious awareness in the cybernetic realism framework
of Chapters 2 and 3
o— Chapter 17 offers a real example of the behaviour predicted in
Chapter 15
p— in keeping with the evolutionary emphasis of Chapter 8, Chapter 9
describes Edelman's biologically plausible account of perceptual
categorisation with "evolution" on a somatic time scale
q— Chapter 19 illustrates possible biologically plausible roles for chaotic
signals which are consistent with evolutionary constraints
r— Chapter 19 reveals the importance of points of view, so important
to Chapter 2 and 3, to evaluating complexity
s— Chapter 4 secures the approach developed in Chapters 2 and 3
against criticisms from quantum mechanics
t— given the importance of the conclusions of Chapter 15, Chapter 16
begins a three chapter defence of the relevance of chaos (for
simplicity, only Chapter 16 is shown connected to Chapter 15)
u— points about complexity and noise from Chapters 18 and 19 are
closely related to the definition of information which we explored
in Chapter 11
v— if Chapter 4 is wrong, the functionalism of Chapter 7 as well as the
advantages which the self model view has over it are in peril
w— the definition of information of Chapter 11 accommodates
distributed and functionalist notions of processing
x— Chapters 4 and 11 both appeal to a definition of information strictly
dependent on states of physical systems
y— the interactive decoherence of Chapter 4 bears on the limits to
intricacy in physical systems
z— the role of measurable information (Chapter 10) about a physical
system is crucial to understanding our points about infinite
intricacy in models and in the world
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At several points in this text, I have cited evidence obtained from
neurophysiological studies of animals. Often these studies have been
performed on primates or other mammals, and often they have involved
in vivo lesioning, ablation, or downright mutilation of the animals
concerned. Although the data obtained through some of these studies
have fuelled the development of my own theories, my referencing the
studies does not indicate that I support invasive in vivo procedures. In
general, I do not sanction such procedures, and I do not intend my work to
spur the collection of any other data in such fashion. Under the influence
of Singer, Regan, and others, I deplore this exploitation, even if the
relevant knowledge could not have been had any other way. Knowledge
that demands such abuse is, to my mind, not worth having.
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Introduction
To ask or search I blame thee not; for Heaven
is as the Book of God before thee set,
Wherein to read His wondrous works, and learn
His seasons, hours, or days, or months, or years.
Paradise Lost, Book 8
1.1 Science and the Loss of Mystery
One of the first philosophy texts I encountered as a first year
undergraduate was titled simply Metaphysics. There, Richard Taylor told
the story of a poor fellow called Osmo, who perished trying to run away
from a future foretold for him in a special book which described every
event in his entire life, from his birth to his death. Like the protagonist in
a Greek tragedy, Osmo could not escape his Fate: what was written in the
book always happened, and try as he might, his every struggle to forge a
different future served only to convince him yet more strongly of the
book's infallibility.
Taylor's point in telling the story, apart perhaps from terrorising
nascent young philosophers, was that if it were logically possible that such
a complete and true biographical book had already been written about us—
before we had got even a third of the way through our lives—then we
really oughtn't fret over any of those things in the book which it was
already true were going to happen to us anyway. That is, since all the
descriptions of future events in our lives are true right now, and since our
complete stories could already have been written in a book, we all should
be logical fatalists and stop worrying about a future which it is true now
will come to pass. Of course—despite Taylor's protests to the contrary—
the reasoning is modally fallacious. But then, as now, I can almost see
what made Taylor suggest the line of thought, despite his comprehensive
understanding of the logic of the modal fallacy. Most philosophers reject
Taylor's reasoning, yet somehow there is still something faintly disturbing
about the idea that somewhere there could be a book accurately foretelling
my every experience for the rest of my life. I suspect that peculiar
uncomfortableness might be akin to the distaste some people have for the
idea that human cognition and conscious sensation may one day be
explained by science.
Most of us cling more or less tenaciously to some idea of privacy of
our own innermost mental experiences, and the possibility of there being
a book which could parade about for everyone to see the every outcome of
every deliberation, the every reaction to every event in our lives—before
any of it has even happened—threatens that sense of a peaceful inner
retreat. Likewise, perhaps many abhor the thought of some brain
researchers invading this mind space, our last bastion of privacy, pushing
back the last frontiers of scientific inquiry and explaining how our
experience arises from the brain, the most complex object in the humanly
known cosmos. For centuries, humans have held to an ontology of strict
dualism which separated mind things from physical things, and while the
physical world yielded progressively more of its secrets to the piercing eyes
of empirical science, the world of mind and spirit lay safely beyond its
reach. Now our modern world is firmly in the grip of material monism,
and many I believe fear that it will banish forever whatever comforts
humans once took from their dualist paradigm, exposing life and human
experience as mere vibrations of particles in the quantum vacuum—and
as valueless. Scientific explanation, the unacknowledged suspicion seems
to say, goes hand in hand with the loss of mystery, the loss of wonder, and
the loss of some kind of value of whatever is being explained.
Yet a mind by any other name—or scientific description—is still as
wonderful a thing! A person still wonders, still hurts, still laughs, still
falls in love, regardless of whether those things all are achieved solely by a
brain made of particles vibrating in the quantum vacuum. Knowing what
chemicals make up the surfaces of the paintings in the Rembrandt room at
St. Petersburg's Hermitage renders them no less dark and brooding.
Indeed, perhaps a complete material explanation of the reflection of light
from a Rembrandt onto my retina and through the various pathways in
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my brain, culminating in my experience of the painting would offer an
even more amazing angle on the whole affair. If I really am just a
collection of vibrating particles, isn't it all the more incredible that I can
have my experiences at all, that I do see anything in the mix of colours,
that I gain some insight, imagined or otherwise, into the mind of an artist
who painted centuries before I was born? Far from the encounter robbing
us of the mystery and sense of privacy of mental experience, when
scientific explanation meets conscious experience, the mystery of the latter
is not eroded but is instead rendered all the more impressive. I believe a
purely material science of the mind/brain can do nothing but enrich that
experience and offer us the beginning of an integrated understanding of
ourselves and our place in the context of a material cosmos. It is to
furthering this cause of a purely material science of the mind/brain that I
am in this dissertation committed.
1.2 General Themes and Methodology
Our first aim is to explore a brand of dual aspect monism and some
problems deriving from the distinction between a first person and third
person point of view. We continue by outlining one way in which the
conscious experience of the subject might arise from organisational
properties of a material substrate. With this picture to hand, we first
examine theoretical features at the level of brain organisation which may
be required to support conscious experience and then discuss what bearing
some actual attributes of biological brains might have on such experience.
We conclude the first half of the dissertation with comments on
information processing and with artificial neural networks meant to
display simple varieties of the organisational features initially described
abstractly.
While the first half begins with a view of conscious experience and
infers downwards in the organisational hierarchy to explore neural
features suggested by the view, attention in the second half shifts towards
analysing low level dynamical features of material substrates and inferring
upwards to possible effects on experience. There is particular emphasis on
clarifying the role of chaotic dynamics, and I discuss relationships between
levels of description of a cognitive system and comment on issues of
complexity, computability, and predictability before returning to the topic
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of representation which earlier played a central part in isolating features of
brain organisation which may underlie conscious experience.
Some themes run throughout the dissertation, including an
emphasis on understanding experience from both the first person and the
third person points of view and on analysing the latter at different levels
of description. Other themes include a sustained effort to integrate the
picture offered here with existing empirical data and to situate current
problems in the philosophy of mind within the new framework, as well as
an appeal to tools from mathematics, computer science, and cognitive
science to complement the more standard philosophical repertoire.
The overall structure of this dissertation mirrors the suggestion I
make to students about good essay writing: tell them what you're going to
tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you've told them. The first
and the last bits correspond to Chapters 1 and 20, respectively; it's the other
chapters which take some time to get through, and it's the rest for which
I'll offer a sort of road map in the next section. Before moving on to a
quick summary of the individual chapters, however, it is first helpful to
make a brief note about methodology. In what follows, our strategy is to
sketch positions on a number of foundational issues and then try to
exploit those positions to understand something of the relationship
between the wetware of the brain and the experience of a conscious
subject. We don't engage in the Quixotic task of attempting to prove that
each of these positions is the one and only correct approach to the matter
at hand. Instead, we explore the prima facie plausibility of an approach,
treat it essentially as a fait accompli, and then get on with exploring what
philosophical problems might be made more or less palatable by the view
on offer. (This is not to say, of course, that we neglect altogether the task of
ensuring the frameworks within which our discussions and explorations
take place are coherent and internally consistent.) We may then look back
at the positions we have taken on foundational issues with a better
understanding of whether they are useful positions worthy of further
attention.
Our methodology is akin to that of the physicist who proceeds as
follows. Suppose the weak nuclear force were mediated by the exchange of
things I'll call w-particles... What would that supposition allow me to
explain? What would be the other consequences of positing ze-particles?
Is it reasonable to suppose ze-particles exist, given what I already know and
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given the other hypotheses to which I'm particularly attached? With what
existing data and hypotheses would it be especially important to check that
the supposition that re-particles exist is consistent? As more of these
questions are answered, the physicist learns whether it helps her
understanding of the world to suppose re-particles exist, and she learns
whether positing them requires modifying any other parts of her model of
the world. What she does not do is begin by attempting to prove from
existing data that re-particles must exist. Like the physicist, by the time we
have finished mimicking this process several times, we will hopefully
have made some progress toward understanding whether our initial
positions on foundational issues are useful.
1.3 Chapters Summary
This process begins with our adopting a brand of dual aspect
monism we dub "cybernetic realism". The central tenet of this line is that
within the context of material monism, we may still hold that there are
matters of fact about what it is like to be a given material thing which may
not be expressible purely in terms of the objective physical properties of
that thing. We introduce this view first with a brief reprinted paper
commenting on Nagel's famous question, "what is it like to be a bat?", and
then elucidate it in a followup chapter where two central themes
underlying the whole of this dissertation first emerge most clearly. The
first of these central themes is our concern for examining and modelling
cognitive systems at different levels of description and noticing what sorts
of properties may be observed at the highest, intermediate, and lowest
levels. The second theme is our emphasis on understanding cognitive
systems from both the third person point of view and the point of view of
the first person conscious subject.
With this brand of dual aspect monism to hand, we turn our
attention next to answering a side concern which might pose a problem
for materialism itself and especially for any theory of mind which is
couched strictly in the terms of materialism. This chapter is based on a
forthcoming Minds and Machines article designed to dispel the notion
that within quantum mechanics there is some essential hiding place for
an unexplained consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the
conscious observer is not indispensable for reducing state vectors in
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quantum measurement and that, for the most part, quantum mechanics is
utterly irrelevant to philosophy of mind. The chapter finishes with a
defence of the view on offer against some criticisms recently suggested by
Nobel laureate Brian Josephson.
Armed with a plausible basic angle on the mind body problem and
safe from a flanking attack from quantum physics, in Chapter 5 we outline
another foundational position. Our approach here is to view the
conscious subject as an abstract data structure instantiated by a material
substrate and to view the conscious experience of that subject as changes to
the data structure. We explore some of the ramifications of this "self
model" data structure view for the way we understand conscious
experience, and in the next chapter we see some of the low level
representational and information theoretic properties we should expect
the self model to exhibit. In the following chapter, our project is
examining the relationship between the self model view and
functionalism, and we see how some of the problems of the latter may be
overcome by self models.
In Chapters 8 and 9, we place the self model view in the context of
evolutionary biology and explore the neuronal group selection theory of
Nobel laureate Gerald Edelman. Understanding Edelman's account of
perceptual categorisation helps us to see what kinds of questions
neuroscientific theories must answer, and it helps situate our own self
model approach within a context of lower level cognitive neuroscience on
the one hand and higher level subjective mental experience on the other.
Chapter 10 draws on examples from the European Symposium on
Artificial Neural Networks to introduce the artificial neural network
framework which we use in Chapter 12 to explore ways of instantiating
materially the very basic properties of self models which we first outlined
in Chapter 6. In the intermediate chapter, we comment on our use of the
term 'information' and look briefly at how information may be processed
by neural networks. Finally, we target the supposed incompatibility
between the connectionist approach we have used and the classicist
approach to artificial intelligence and cognitive science and argue that
whatever criticisms the classicists may have of connectionism are not
dangerous to our own project.
Chapter 13 roughly marks the beginning of the second half of the
dissertation, both physically and conceptually. In the second half, our
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analysis tends away from the basics of self models and toward some of the
implications of understanding cognition through the dynamical systems
instantiating them. A major task in this second half is also to elucidate
the importance, if any, of chaotic behaviour in these dynamical systems.
We begin with the notion that dynamical properties of the low
level instantiating material structure of a self model may have interesting
effects on the higher level subjective experiences arising from it, and we
inaugurate a new representational schema for discussing the relationships
between these different levels. It is within this representational schema
that, in the next chapter, we defend an argument for high level
psychological indeterminism supervening on a deterministic low level
material substrate. Since the line of thought was first suggested at the July
1993 conference of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, it
has been the subject of an ongoing debate with Peter Smith, and this
chapter includes the latest volleys in that exchange.
Next we turn to exploring one possible consequence of instantiating
self models with an analogue material substrate such as neural wetware.
The chapter is based on my suggestion at the Russian International
Computer Systems and Applied Mathematics conference in 1993 that
analogue systems which are specifically chaotic may pose a problem for
Turing computability despite not violating the Shadowing Theorem. If it
should turn out that chaotic analogue systems—such as the brain arguably
may be—could behave noncomputably, and if higher level self model
features rely essentially on such behaviour, then human cognition may
not be modelled completely within the context of Turing computability
(and the success of so-called "strong AI" will be correspondingly limited).
The next three chapters are more philosophy of science than of
mind; here we engage Smith again over a series of arguments he has
offered which threaten to reduce to irrelevance (in our cognitive science
context) some of the points we have so far made about the role of any
specifically chaotic dynamics in the wetware instantiating self models.
First we defend our view of chaotic systems against the criticism that real
physical systems are categorically unsuited to the infinitely intricate
mathematical world of chaos theory. Next we clarify Smith's comments
on the predictability of chaotic systems and discuss the recent discovery of
physical models with so-called riddled attractor basins and their bearing
both on Smith's view and on our findings in Chapter 15 regarding the
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computability of chaotic analogue systems. (This recent discovery by
applied mathematicians appears to vindicate those findings.) Finally, we
offer a simplified approach to complexity which reveals some of the
shortcomings of Smith's argument that the complexity of real chaotic
systems may be essentially the same as the complexity of random noise.
The chapter includes the definition of a new measure of complexity
inspired by Bennett's pioneering work and intended to transcend the
shortcomings of that earlier measure.
In Chapter 19, we return to the topic of representation and finish
the analysis of complexity by observing some characteristics of its role in
representational systems. We note that the complexity of a pattern is
inextricably bound up with the representational system through which it
is viewed and that what is complex from a third person point of view may
be simple from the point of view of a system of which it is a part—and
vice versa. We conclude that the role of chaotic dynamics in the material
instantiation of a self model is for now an open question. In the last
chapter, we finally conclude our discussion and review the positions
we've taken, and the Appendix includes a statement on the authorship of
this dissertation and covers the legal bases associated with reprinting
previously published or forthcoming material.
1.4 What Isn't the LastWord—Return to Innocence
I have always suspected that at least something was wrong with any
philosophy book I have ever read, just as with Taylor's Metaphysics, and
this dissertation is a glimpse of the kind of view which has been
simmering away for so long and making me think some other approaches
were not quite right. I suspect that most of this book is not quite right
either, but it is one step in sequence of ideas which are hopefully
progressing.
For me, philosophy is and always has been a struggle to refine my
world view, to grasp what Heidegger calls my inneriveltlichkeit, to place
myself in a context and to understand how my physical and mental
existence relates to that of the rest of the cosmos. This dissertation is a
portion of what makes up that understanding just now, a slice of what has
come of a few years' proper research and a lifetime of philosophical
wondering and wandering. I don't expect anyone will buy into the entire
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picture on offer here—not even myself—but I will be satisfied if even a
few titbits make their way from these pages into someone else's struggle to
understand, that in another's struggle they may yet find more refinement
than they have in mine.
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2
What is it Like to be Nagel?
We start with a look at the distinction between the first person and
third person descriptions of sensation in intelligent systems; this
discussion will begin to establish the background for all our succeeding
explorations of the relationship between these two points of view. The
following is reprinted, with minor corrections and revisions, from
Mulhauser (1993a).1
It is meant as a very light introduction to the brand of dual aspect
monism which is central to much of what we will explore in coming
chapters. Thus, it is by no means intended as a thorough analysis of the
extensive collection of ideas which have grown around Nagel's views on
subjectivity. For the interested reader, several papers in this literature,
including Haksar (1981), Foss (1989), van Gulick (1985), and Pugmire
(1989), are in various ways particularly compatible with the position we
take here. Davis (1982a) and Flanagan (1985) are useful as attempts to
move beyond Nagel's kind of approach, and Kekes (1977) and Malcolm
(1988) attack Nagel's framing of the problem, while the sympathetic
McCulloch (1988) offers an interesting line complementary to Nagel's
own. We here make the initial case for a dual aspect monist approach and
then explore and elaborate on the idea more carefully in the subsequent
chapter.
2.1 The Subjectivist's Object
One objection to a physicalist account of cognition is the alleged
incompatibility between subjective phenomenological descriptions of
conscious "feeling" on the one hand and objective neurophysiological
descriptions of things like brain states on the other. We might think of
descriptions in roughly corresponding pairs, which are supposed to be of
1 Please see the Appendix for information on all articles reprinted in this dissertation.
entirely different types: sensation/neural activity, mental event/physical
event, mind/brain. In these pairs, the sort of description on the left is
supposed to match "having a point of view" from the first person, while
that on the right is supposed to correspond to the "scientific" perspective
of the third person. The critic of physicalism argues, in effect, that the
right hand can't know what the left hand is doing. That is, we can't know
someone's point of view by looking at their physical description; we can't
understand how an experience phenomenally feels in the terms of
neurobiology.
Our immediate task is to suggest that in cashing out the
subject/object distinction, we are left with dual complementary
descriptions of the same thing—two sides of the same coin, as it were—
and that both have a legitimate place in a comprehensive philosophy of
mind. I argue that no theory could explain away the privileged status of
the subjective point of view and that it should just be accepted as a
necessary fact about the things we call "beings". In the first half of this
section, we unpack some of the ideas behind the subject/object distinction
and discuss what might be the obvious point that we may only know
other beings from the third person. The second half introduces a thought
experiment to help show why, given this conclusion, we as possessors of a
subjective point of view still cannot help but accept that other beings have
a subjective point of view. We start with a look at Nagel's (1974) famous
question: "what is it like to be a bat?"
The question immediately tempts us to divide the world, rightly or
wrongly, into what Hofstadter (1981) has later called "be-able things", or
BATs, and non-BATs, or things to which it makes no sense to attribute a
point of view. We might list dolphins, rats, philosophers, and of course
bats in the first category and aqueducts, roundabouts, lumps of wax, and
hats in the second. Nagel's point in the original paper was that the
"subjective character of experience" cannot be captured by any reductive
physical account of a thing. In the case of a bat, or any other nonhuman
BAT, we humans can have no idea what it is like to be them because we
can have only physical descriptions which miss out the subjective quality
of their experience. Nagel is not after any physical description or
behavioural observation, but rather the ineffable feel of what it is like for
the bat to be a bat. Talk of enjoying hanging upside down, for instance,
tells us nothing of what bat enjoyment of hanging upside down could be.
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Nagel's argument is that I can't even conceive of bat phenomenology
because it is too alien to anything / have ever phenomenally experienced.
But if we consider other non-bat BATs—namely humans—we can
see that if anything, Nagel showed more than he said. What is it like to be
Nagel? I propose that no answer to this question can get off the ground
any better than any for the bat question. For even in the case where
observable qualities of our experiences are similar, I still cannot fathom
what it would be like to be Nagel. This doesn't mean it's not like anything
to be Nagel, but it means I could not understand an answer to the question
even if one could be given. Pretending, for instance, that I have some
particular memory which Nagel reports (pretending that I remember
going spelunking, for instance) is clearly not the same as having the
memory for myself (actually remembering going spelunking). Even
knowing something of Nagel's habits of thought or his heuristics for
solving certain kinds of problems is not the same as actually having his
habits of thought or using his heuristics.
Nagel tries to steer clear of the issue of communicating what it is
like for something to be itself, but my point is that Nagel's question could
have no other point. Let's look more closely at what it could mean for
there to be an intelligible answer to the question of what it is like to be
Nagel. Consider a hypothetical case in which I empathetically took on as
my own every single memory, habit of thought, and so on of the famous
philosopher. This comes much closer to being Nagel. Of course, I would
also need all Nagel's physical characteristics so I would know the
kinaesthetic feel of his physiology, and I would have to forget all my own
memories and habits of thought. In what (if any) sense, then, would I still
be me? I couldn't know I was me, because then I would know I wasn't
Nagel. But of course I would know I was me; I would be Nagel. The
entire notion wreaks havoc with ideas of self identity. While I was being
Nagel, where would ex-me be, and would I have two simultaneous points
of view, an old one and a temporary new one? What would be the point
of view of ex-Nagel, whilst I was borrowing his—the view from nowhere?
One is reminded of the Taoist who awoke from dreaming he was a
butterfly. He wondered to himself: am I a man who has just dreamt he
was a butterfly, or am I a butterfly who even now dreams he is a man?
(Graham 1981, p. 61)
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Nagel calls the ability to imagine being in the conscious state of
another being sympathetic imagination. What the above muddle suggests
is that we simply could not sympathetically imagine being someone else.
Nagel notes in passing that a kind of solipsism results if we confuse
sympathetic imagination with what he calls perceptual imagination, or
the capacity to put oneself in a state resembling the state one is in when
one actually perceives a thing. If we misinterpret sympathetic
imagination as if it worked like perceptual imagination, Nagel correctly
points out, it would seem impossible to imagine anyone else's experience
but our own. But Nagel neglects his own point: his argument suggests
that I might imagine what it would be like for me to have someone else's
experience, but I couldn't imagine what it would be like for me to be them
having the experience. As much as I might imagine what it would be like
for me to experience Nagel things or bat things or any other BAT things, I
couldn't imagine what it would be like for me to be Nagel or a bat or any
other BAT.
Although Nagel explicitly rejects the idea, perhaps what we are
really after is some sort of translation from Nagel's experiences into the
kinds of experiences I can understand (namely, my own) rather than
actual knowledge of being Nagel. We might consider someone's
explanation along the following lines: well, when Nagel gets up in the
morning, he feels like you do except that he starts thinking of scones
where you would think of muesli and toast, and scones taste to him like
croissants do to you...and so on. But what if there were experiences (and
there undoubtedly would be) for which I had no analogue? Moreover,
who could, even in principle, supply such a translation? What would it
mean for that person—who would know what it was like to be both of us
separately—to know what it is like to be either of us?
None of this requires that we be sceptical about it's meaning
something for other beings to be themselves; but we are faced with the
implication that we cannot have a public language description which
could make intelligible what it is like to be a thing being itself. To put it
tritely: we can't have a description and be it, too. That is, we can't be
offered a description and infer from it what it is like to be the object of that
description. Perhaps Nagel anticipates this when he says that we only
infer that other humans, for instance, have conscious experience. But
what kind of inference could this be? On the face of it it is not inductive,
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because no one is possessed of a sort of "phenomenon detector" which
could establish that all similar humans examined thus far have had
conscious experience. It does not seem deductive, either, since Nagel
himself denies the appearance of any physically or logically necessary
connection between observable behaviour or brain states and conscious
experience.
The view we shall explore here is that we cannot help but infer that
other humans have phenomenal experience on the basis of their
similarity to us, despite the fact that we cannot describe what it is like for
them to have it and despite Nagel's denial that there is any necessary
connection between brain states and mental states. The strategy of
avoiding a kind of phenomenological solipsism we shall call cybernetic
realism. (We adopt Wiener's term "cybernetic" to indicate that we are
concerned here not just with human BATs; but as it will emerge in
subsequent chapters, we are not committed to attributing experience to
anything close to Wiener's broad class of cybernetic systems.) Similar to
other brands of realism, cybernetic realism is the principle that there are
(objective!) matters of fact about the subjective experience of other BATs,
independently of our actual or potential state of knowledge of those facts.
Acknowledging that we cannot know anything about another BAT's
subjective experience doesn't mean there are no BATs. Despite it's
superficial similarity to Dennett's "intentional stance" (1987), cybernetic
realism asserts the reality of the subjective quality of experience, what
some call the qualia—that which Dennett explicitly wants to leave out
(1988).
So far, then, we've established the unremarkable fact that the first
person point of view applies only to the first person. Nagel was correct in
maintaining that any physical description of a system must completely
miss out the answer to the question of what it is like to be the system. But
the point is stronger: no description at all (physical or otherwise) could by
itself make intelligible what it is like to be another BAT, full stop. Of
course this is not to undermine the case for any kind of sympathetic
communication at all; it is only to say that some other ingredient is
required in addition to the description itself.
Is the physicalist, then, doomed? The physicalist is usually cast as
aiming for a complete reduction of all mental-speak to physics-speak. If
physicalism cannot provide a physical description which is provably
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identical to a given mental state (or from which the qualities of a mental
state may be logically inferred), has it failed its mission? The answer is no.
The domain of physicalism is the physical, the objective; we should not
ask that the physicalist—or anyone else—tell us how a given physical
description feels for the being doing whatever is being described, but only
what objective physical structures lie at the heart—or brain—of being that
doing being. Physicalism should give neurological descriptions of the
structures which enable particular cognitive tasks to be performed but not
of how those cognitive tasks feel when performed with those structures.
Moreover, no theory could in principle give us an account of how by
virtue of such and such a physical structure, this system is having such
and such an experience with this or that phenomenal quality. We turn
now to a thought experiment which may show why cybernetic realism
together with a physicalist account of the objective aspects of cognition
should be palatable to any philosopher of the mind, regardless of—or
perhaps because of—her own experience with a unique subjective point of
view on what it means to be.
2.2 The Objectivist Objects—Science to the Rescue
Suppose a lecturer from a far away land comes to visit a British
university and brings with her a strange device she calls a lanemonehp
mirror into which she claims she can look and, by studying someone's
reflection, see secret properties of their brains and tell whether they are
having phenomenal experience. The device supposedly cannot be fooled
by anyone's normally observable behaviour (internal or external) but
works only by sussing out secret internal properties. The lecturer has
made a name for herself as the "which-is-which" doctor (or "which"
doctor, for short) because of her claimed ability, with the aid of her
lanemonehp mirror, to tell exactly which brains are producing
phenomenal experience and which are not. She travels the world,
assisting psychologists with their experiments and delivering lectures to
Philosophy and Cognitive Science departments.
Like Santa Claus, who knows just who has been bad and good at
holiday time, the visiting "which" doctor makes a habit of announcing to
her class at the end of each lecture exactly which students have failed to
have conscious experiences during that day's talk. Her students make a
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sort of game out of trying to guess in advance which of their classmates are
having phenomenal experiences and which only appear to be having
them. They have learnt from the "which" doctor that even some of those
unlikely candidates who appear externally to be comatose are still having
conscious experiences. Likewise, a few students find that some of their
best friends are always, during lectures at least, devoid of phenomenal
experience.
What should we make of the "which" doctor's claims? Her alleged
ability amounts to being able to select from a group of people with similar
internal and external behaviour just those who have what philosophers
call absent qualia. Philosophers call such creatures zombies, and many
claim that there is nothing logically inconsistent about imagining a
zombie who has perfectly normal neuronal and external behaviour but
who nonetheless has no phenomenal experience whatsoever. If the
philosophers' claim is true, oughtn't we be suspicious of the lecturer and
her device? In particular, given the impossibility of knowing what it
would be like to be someone else (and thus, probably, whether their being
is conscious being), how could the "which" doctor's lanemonehp mirror
work?
Now suppose the doctor lets us in on her secret: it turns out that
her special mirror doesn't show any secret properties of brains at all; it
merely allows her to examine in great detail the overall functional
arrangement and activation patterns of a given brain. Her special talent
has nothing to do with hunting missing qualia—indeed, she steadfastly
insists that qualia go missing only when something has gone awry in their
neurophysiological homes. According to her, there is some kind of
limited logical connection between brain functioning and mental
experience. She says she is only examining phenomenal experience from
the reverse point of view to her subjects—the mirror image—and seeing
from the third person the objective neurological properties which
correspond to the subjective experiences of the first person.
When pressed for the details of how she could know about
conscious experience on the basis of the functional characteristics of neural
arrangements, she explains that after developing the technical pieces
which allowed her lanemonehp mirror to show neural behaviour in such
great detail, she used it first to examine herself. By subjecting herself to a
wide range of experiences while reflecting, as it were, on the patterns of
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neurophysiological responses in her brain associated with various kinds of
experiences, she discovered remarkable trends. In hundreds of trials, she
found the same kinds of neuronal responses always correlated with the
same kinds of phenomenal experiences. Eventually, she even took films
of the mirror's image while colleagues administered to her drugs which
induced episodes of unconsciousness or other impairments to her normal
mental life. In these cases, she discovered similarly robust correlations
between the lack of conscious experience on her part and fundamental
changes in the interactions between her neurons.
Eventually, she made similar tests with other subjects and
uncovered every time the same kinds of correlations between observed
neurophysiological activity and at least their reports of their experience.
Because she couldn't conceive of her qualia going missing while her
internal and external behaviour remained the same, she reasoned that
qualia weren't just in her head. By virtue of the similarity to her own of
their internal and external objective properties, she came to believe—
although she couldn't properly know—that the other subjects were
keeping qualia, too. It was her first step in becoming a cybernetic realist.
The argument which was the foundation of her belief extrapolates2 to
other BAT type animals whose brains might function similarly under the
light of her lanemonehp mirror. Arguments of the form are the logical
underpinnings of cybernetic realism.
2.3 Does it MatterWhat it's Like?
We've established, then, that Nagel's question about bat-hood was
even more significant for the distinction between subject and object than
he indicated. We've seen it is the very strength of the distinction which
renders it ineffective as a criticism of physicalist accounts of mind—
because the subjective point of view is so firmly anchored to the first
person, there could be no account of it, physicalist or otherwise. The
subjective and objective appear as two distinct aspects of the same thing,
and the subjective aspect is that which, like the image in an ordinary
(phenomenal, not lanemonehp) mirror, reflects our every objective
change, but which we still cannot approach objectively no matter how
earnestly we reach out for the mirror's image. We have seen reason to
2 We see in the chapter following some reasons we might believe this extrapolation.
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believe that internal and external behaviour which is observably similar
to our own is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a thing's being a
BAT. We should, in short, give up on zombies and other supposed
problems and get on with answering what questions we can in the style of
the "which" doctor and physical theories of mind.
In the next chapter, we expand on these ideas and come to a better
understanding of the brand of dual aspect monism which can answer the
kinds of difficulties to which Nagel's work seemed to point.
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A Rose, By Any Other Name
To be sure, Nagel's "what is it like..." argument doesn't exhaust the
set of approaches to questions about the alleged incommensurability
between first person subjective phenomenological descriptions and the
third person objective accounts of neuroscience.3 Indeed, there may be
considerable problems just trying to imagine what it would feel like for
ourselves to have an experience described in objective neuroscientific
terms,4 let alone trying to imagine what such an experience would feel like
from the point of view of someone we are not. If we are to establish the
plausibility of a kind of dual aspect monism to underlie our coming
discussions about how to locate conscious experience in a material
substrate, we must address other aspects of the claimed
incommensurability between phenomenology and the objective accounts
of the third person.
In what follows, we examine more closely the ideas which lead to
this claim of incommensurability and explore some ways in which they
may be confused or simply incorrect. We begin with the general notion
that from an account of the physical properties of an object, we cannot
understand what it is like as an object of sensation. The particular
example is concerned with understanding from its physical description
how a rose phenomenally smells. Building on a number of observations
about this case, we then move on to analyse similar examples about
neurological descriptions of experience both in ourselves (the first person
case) and in others (the third person case). The conclusion is an expansion
of the idea in the second chapter that correlations between neural activity
3 The present material also bears on Kripke's (1971) and Jackson's (1982) related arguments
and on Searie's (1992) summary (pp. 117-118) of these two kinds of positions together.
4 That is, it's often easy to imagine ourselves having an experience described in subjective
phenomenological terms—imagining smelling a rose, for instance—but not so easy to
imagine such an experience described in objective neuroscientific terms—imagining having a
pattern of activity across the olfactory cortex, for instance.
and sensation as well as the organisational patterns at the neural level
which may enable phenomenal sensation in the first place are legitimate
areas for systematic scientific inquiry and that claims of
incommensurability are singularly unhelpful.
3.1 Smelling As Sweet
Suppose for the moment that you have never before smelled a rose.
Maybe you've seen them on greeting cards or on the television, and maybe
you've heard romantic stories about passionate young men or women
exchanging them with the people they love. You might even have books
about botany and chemistry which tell you the structural and chemical
properties of different kinds of roses. Maybe you have dedicated your life
to understanding the physically describable properties of the flower, yet
somehow in all your studies you have neglected that one single thing:
you haven't a clue how a rose smells. In a moment, I will suggest that the
fact you can know all the properties of a rose but be ignorant of its smell is
nothing more than an accident of the neural structure of Homo sapiens
and that, had this neural make-up been slightly different, you could easily
have figured out how a rose smells just on the basis of all this objective
physical data about the flower. Moreover, I will suggest there is a
particular way in which even someone with Homo sapiens
neurophysiology could know the smell of a rose just on the basis of its
physical properties.
But first, let's note some of the implications which appear to follow
from the fact that on the one hand we could know all the physical
properties of the rose but on the other hand we might still not know how
it smells. On the face of it, it seems obvious that the smell of a rose cannot
be described in terms of the flower's physical properties. That is, a
description of the phenomenological quality of a smell sensation cannot
be logically deduced from a physical description of the object of that smell
sensation. There might be many ways to come to the knowledge of how a
rose smells, but learning all the physical data about a rose does not look to
be one of them. It is not a straightforward inference from this position,
but it does seem at least a plausible extrapolation from this position to the
notion that no phenomenological description of any sensation can be
derived from a physical description of the object of that sensation. There
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is a similar but weaker extrapolation which some might like to make to
the position that no phenomenological description of a sensation can be
derived from a physical description of the neurophysiological properties of
a system claiming to be having that sensation or, similarly, that no
phenomenological description of a sensation can be derived from a
physical description of the neurophysiological properties we might exhibit
if we actually were experiencing that sensation. But with these possible
implications in mind, let's for the moment return to the briefly stated
claim above that it is just a neurophysiological accident that we cannot
know how a rose smells just by learning its physical properties and that, in
fact, there is a special way to accomplish just that.
The justification for this claim actually derives directly from the
observation that there is after all a way to smell a rose just by learning its
physical properties. Notice that some members of the set of propositions
describing physical rose properties describe the physical effects of rose
chemicals on human nerve cells. Granted, this goes beyond the kinds of
properties of roses which normally come to mind such as colour,
anatomical structure, and molecular structure of various constituent
chemicals. Yet, on the face of it, anyway, there is nothing to prevent our
allowing this set of physical properties of a rose to include its physical
effects on a human nose (or on dead skin cells, or lumps of wax, or ski
mountains, or cloves of garlic, or any other physical thing). But even so,
says the proponent of the incommensurability claim, knowing how a rose
affects nerve cells is no help in knowing how it feels to be a human being
whose nerve cells are responding to a rose and who is actually smelling a
rose.
3.1.1 Smelling a Rose in Three Easy Steps
Let's make a brief note about the word 'information'; we'll return to
the topic briefly in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 11, but it is important
for the moment to clarify the word before we continue. In particular, our
application of the word 'information' is based strictly on correlations or
lack thereof between the states of physical entities. Thus we may say of
someone who speaks English and only English that "reading" a sentence
in French still conveys information. In our use of the word, what is
printed on the page still conveys information even if the reader only
recognises characters and word endings and so forth (or even just lines
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and curves). Now, if our English speaker also understands French, then
reading the same sentence conveys information in the manner of the
original example and more by virtue of the correlations between the
words read and words the reader has already learnt to recognise. Just to
anticipate the forthcoming discussion a little, it is useful also to notice that
the same physical object may pass on information in more than one
modality and at more than one level: the same French newspaper may be
read or smelt or tasted, and the same newspaper may again be perused by
an English-only speaker (who takes in information at a low level, by
recognising characters) or by a French speaker (who takes in information
also at a higher level, by recognising entire words and their meanings).
With these comments in mind, we can see that there are many
different ways to take in the physical information about roses and
especially about their effects on human nerve cells (and we can address the
point which ended the previous section). We might read the information
printed in books in Roman characters, or we might hear it in lectures or
when someone reads a book to us, or we might feel it in books printed in
Braille. Or, particularly in the case of the effects of roses on nerve cells,
instead of taking in the information at such a high level with sight or
hearing or touch, we might artificially stimulate the nerves leading to our
olfactory cortex, or we might even stick a rose under our nose and let it
stimulate nerves leading to our olfactory cortex. We might even read
information about how the rose excites human noses and then use that
information manually to artificially stimulate our noses! We are still
taking in physical data, but those data are entering our system at a different
level than with simple reading. (See Marr 1982, Horgan and Tienson 1993,
and Chapter 13 for more on levels.) Instead of exciting nerve cells in our
retina (when we read the data) or nerves whose efferent signals go to the
auditory cortex (when we hear the data) or some such, they are exciting
nerve cells whose outputs go to the part of our brain which processes
smells. So perhaps there is a way, after all, to know the smell of a rose just
on the basis of its physical properties, as long as the information about
those physical properties is made available at a level where it can do some
good.
This way of approaching the problem is analogous to what I might
observe if I typed into my computer a book all about the way my
computer's disk drive works. I might include detailed specifications of the
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exact electrical signals which activate the disk drive to perform particular
functions. I might even include some specific examples of the signals
which would be sent inside the machine to, for instance, format a disk.
Yet no matter how I typed into the machine these descriptions of the
computer's internal signals, I could never get it to format a disk.
Descriptions of chip-level disk interface signals have no effect whatsoever
on my computer's actual chip-level disk interface signals, and they cannot
make it format a disk. Yet, if I got into the machine's insides and found
the appropriate control lines and imposed my own signals on them, I
could cause the machine's disk drive to do just that. Likewise, if I selected
an appropriate operating system level option to format a disk—which in
this case is analogous to shoving a rose under my nose—presto! the disk
gets formatted, on the one hand, or I get to smell a rose, on the other. Yet
just because I cannot activate my computer's disk drive by typing into it a
detailed description of the internal electrical signals which operate it does
not mean that such a detailed description "misses out" some important
feature of the way the disk drive works.
Now, it is purely an (intentional!) accident of the design of the
computer that I cannot change it's internal chip-level signals by typing
into it a description of what I would like those chip-level signals to be. But
we can easily imagine a computer which did allow direct manipulation of
some subgroup of its chip set by simply typing in a description of what
signals chips in that subgroup should send. Likewise, it is purely an
accident of neurophysiology (an "accident" which occurred, no doubt, for
good evolutionary reasons) that we cannot change the output of nerve
cells leading to the olfactory cortex by reading or hearing or touching a
description of how those cells zuould fire if there were rose chemicals
directly stimulating them.5 That is, there is no neurophysiological reason
why we couldn't, in principle, stimulate our own nerve cells where
olfactory information is processed in a fashion similar to the way we
stimulate our own nerve cells which activate our various muscle groups.
5 In a way, the computer example is slightly misleading, because selecting an operating
system level option for "format this disk" is still possible from the keyboard, whereas
apparently there is nothing we can do by reading or listening or touching which gives us the
effect of smelling a rose. But the disanalogy can be remedied just by supposing the computer
has a special "format button" or "format switch" instead of a keyboard command, such that
we could type anything we wanted and still not get the drive to format a disk without
pressing the special switch.
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(Indeed, as it will emerge later in our discussions of self models, I believe
something like this is the basis of imagination.)
At this point two important notes of logic demand clarification.
First, we are not yet arguing for a particular position on the mind body
question. The present picture makes sense under any view which allows
that a physical interaction with something is the cause of a sensation.
That is, the pin-prick causes the pain, the empty stomach causes the
hunger, the Union Jack causes the sensation of red and white and blue.
What happens after the initial physical interaction can, for the moment,
be almost anything: there could be a bunch of neural firings culminating
in a Cartesian communication with the mind realm, or there could be
some of Sir John Eccles's psychons collapsing wavepackets at synaptic
junctions, or there could be a little conscious homunculus sitting inside a
head watching neural signals appear on tiny monitoring screens.
Secondly, the present position is no argument against anyone who
supposes that there is some extra property or spirit which somehow gets
passed on from rose to neuron or that there is more to the interaction of a
rose and a single neuron than can be described in physical terms (although
probably other damning arguments could be mustered against such a
position, and it is hard to imagine what non-physical element there could
be to such an interaction, especially given that mind predicates, for
instance, don't normally get applied to the likes of single neurons or
olfactory cortexes). The point is only that if we allow an exhaustive
description of how a rose affects a single neuron into the set of
propositions about physical properties of roses—which seems perfectly
straightforward—and if we believe physical interactions are the cause of
sensations, then we must question the logical force of the claimed
incommensurability between objective physical descriptions and
subjective phenomenological ones.
Strictly speaking, denying the incommensurability claim does not
amount to asserting the claim that phenomenological descriptions can be
logically derived from physical descriptions. Under the usage adopted
here, information is conveyed by correlations between the states of
physical entities, and these correlations are typically established causally.
Thus, a description of rose chemicals may not logically entail a rose smell,
but that doesn't imply that rose chemicals or even just a thorough
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description of them may not pass on the information required to
experience the smell.
To use a related example: if you are offered a physical interaction
(information) in the form of a pin-prick, you cannot logically infer that
you are about to feel pain, but given the pin-prick, you can—at least in part
because of the way the nervous systems of human beings are structured—
come to know that it hurts. The connection here is empirical, not
logical—indeed, it is causal—but few people experienced with pin-pricks
would deny that there is rational force to the proposition, "if I prick you
with this pin, then it's going to hurt". Likewise in the case of the physical
description of the rose, except that here we must be more careful in
characterising the connection. Given appropriate use of physical
information about the rose, we may come to know how it smells. (And
given a different neurophysiological make-up, even with single-modality
access to physical information through Braille reading, for instance, we
might still come to know how it smells.) If the rose information is made
available directly to the appropriate modality (by sticking the flower under
the nose), this interaction initiates the same kind of causal chain as the
pin-prick. If it is made available to a different modality (enabling us to
undertake artificial stimulation of nerve cells or, if we were "wired"
differently, enabling us to provide these data to the right nerve cells), then
it facilitates our own initiation of such a causal chain in the same fashion
that someone offering us a pin facilitates our pricking ourselves and
feeling pain. In this case, few people experienced either with using an
artificial apparatus to stimulate their nerves or with shoving flowers
under their noses or even (if they had odd neurophysiology) with making
cross-modal use of information at an appropriate level would deny that
there is rational force to the proposition, "if I give you this information
about the physical properties of the rose, then I'll enable you to work out
how it smells".
3.1.2 A Tasty and Melodious Side Note
The tentative conclusion that no phenomenological description of a
smelling sensation could be derived from an objective physical description
of the object of that sensation is, on this account, more a matter of
physiology than of logic. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that if
humans were wired in such a way that read descriptions of rose chemical
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properties automatically brought about the appropriate kinds of firings in
the olfactory cortex (perhaps by way of some high level linguistic to low
level olfactory "short circuit"), then humans might well believe that rose
smell is logically entailed by descriptions of rose chemicals. It is worth
reflecting on the degree to which our natural understanding of P from (P
& Q), for instance, might be predicated on the neural circuitry of our
brains. It would not be at all surprising to discover some defect in some
humans whereby they were incapable of recognising P from (P & Q), and
for such humans P would clearly not follow obviously from (P & Q). It
might be objected that such humans don't properly understand correct
usage of a sentence like P or a sentence like (P & Q), but it is arguably the
case that the reason everyone else does understand the sentences is a
result of their having "normal" neural circuitry as compared to the
"abnormal" circuitry of those who don't understand.
In fact, rather than wondering about humans who might fail to
recognise something as "simple" as the P in a (P & Q), we might instead
get at the question by considering some whose associative connections are
a superset rather than a subset of these kinds of logical connectives. For
about ten adults in one million, sensory input in one modality regularly,
uniformly, and involuntarily invokes sensation in a second modality. For
someone with synaesthesia (Cytowic 1989, 1993 for an introduction; see
also the rare 1992 book by psychedelic theorist Terence McKenna and
Timothy Ely), the word 'logic' might be a deep blue colour, and for
another, a middle C might taste slightly of grape.6 The phenomenon has
fascinating implications for creativity and perceived metaphor (O'Malley
1964; Ralston 1976; Marks, et al 1987), and it suggests limitations in
standard views of how blind people might understand colour (Wheeler
1920, Wheeler and Cutsforth 1922). (Note that positron emission
tomography reveals cross-cortical blood flow, indicating activity in the
visual cortex, for instance, even when a synaesthetic subject is blindfolded
and her primary stimulus is auditory.)
Suppose now that synaesthetes were the norm and "normal"
people the exception: then the colour orange might be just as obvious an
6 Indeed, I had until very recently assumed most people would agree with me that the
number 5 is scratchy and the number 9 sharp, while 4 is soft and comfortable, almost fluffy.
My own experience with such associations, however, is nowhere near as vivid as that
described by people like Michael Watson (discussed by Cytowic), who feels shapes when
he tastes.
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implication of (P & Q) as most of us consider P to be, and those who
couldn't "see" the orange in it would be thought of as just as
impoverished as we might consider those who don't see the P. (In fact,
while individual synaesthetes are remarkably self consistent in the
associations they report, there is rarely agreement in the associations
reported by different synaesthetic subjects; thus, our example requires a
small cheat to ensure that the hypothetical synaesthetic norm is uniform.)
Indeed, we might think of the P from (P & Q) connection as a kind of
"single modality synaesthesia" with which we are almost all affected.
Perhaps, after all, the great foundation of logic on which analytic
philosophy is built is itself empirical, a product of the conceptual
connections we involuntarily experience when we read a sentence like (P
& Q) but nothing more. Probably most "normal" people will insist still
that there is something about seeing the P in (P & Q) which makes it
different to the synaesthete's experience (apart from being in a single
modality), and we won't here belabour the discussion, but it is no easy task
to pin down exactly what it might be that makes logic seem necessary apart
from arguably contingent perceived connections which might perhaps be
traced merely to the way "normal" brains are put together.
There are titillating implications here from the idea that the
rational force of connections between sets of propositions may stand or fall
according to empirical facts about human brains and the empirical uses to
which physical information may be put, but our point in exploring the
issue has been merely to suggest that any suspected impossibility of
experiencing a smell sensation, for instance, on the basis of a written
description is chimeric.7 For now, we shall leave the exploration of the
other interesting implications for another time and return to the
remainder of the tentative extrapolations from incommensurability
which we noted above.
7 Of course, in the case of synaesthetes, it is the words themselves which have smells and
not descriptions, but our point is merely to note the neural plausibility of cross modal
induction of a sensation. There is every reason to believe that if synaesthesia is possible,
then it would also be possible for words or combinations of words (like descriptions) to be
systematically correlated in such a way that the induced sensations matched those which
would be caused by the object of description.
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3.2 Smells and Other Good Sensations
First was the extrapolation from the idea that no phenomenological
description of a smell sensation could be derived from an objective
physical description of the object of that smell sensation to the idea that no
phenomenological description of any sensation could be derived from an
objective physical description of the object of that sensation. We have not
taken any great care to define 'sensation', and there may be some use just
in keeping it as an undefined term, but for the moment let's restrict
ourselves to whatever brand of such things may be the immediate result
of sensory interaction with the physical environment. That is, I mean the
pain feeling and visual quality of encountering a flying mallet, but neither
the physical damage of such an encounter nor the abstract perceptual
categorisation of a visual pattern as a mallet;8 and I mean the
bewilderment of seeing a flying mallet but not the feeling of anxiety or
paranoia of wondering if someone might in the future throw a mallet at
you. At least when we restrict ourselves to these kinds of sensations, then,
the same kind of argument we've applied above applies here: it is a mere
accident of human neurophysiological design that we are incapable of
bringing it about that the relevant nerve cells are stimulated except by
actually experiencing the event in such a way that those nerve cells get
stimulated by the environment. That is, we can't get the afferent signals
in any way save by actually having someone throw a mallet at us. If we
could—for instance, if we had special "mallet nerves" which could excite
other nerve cells in just the same way a mallet would, or if we had some
variety of mallet-specific synaesthesia—then there doesn't seem to be any
reason to think that we wouldn't experience just the same feeling (but not
the same physical damage) as actually encountering a flying mallet.
(Again, this is unless we believe there is some special non-physical
element of mallet-nerve interactions.)
The other two extrapolations described above fall to a similar kind
of analysis. I suggested first that someone might like to argue that no
phenomenological description of a sensation can be derived9 from a
8 This is true except insofar as perceptual categorisation contributes to the visual quality of
the mallet; I take it that neither implies the other.
9 As before, we are concerned with what information may be passed on to a specifically
conscious audience by a physical description, which is arguably a superset of the set of
propositions which may be logically deduced from that same physical description.
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physical description of the neurophysiological properties of a system
claiming to be having that sensation. In the sequel, we shall refer to this
as the third person problem. The first person problem is the similar
position that no phenomenological description of a sensation can be
derived from a physical description of the neurophysiological properties
we might exhibit if we actually were experiencing that sensation.
3.3 What's a Little Description Between Friends?
First we must be clear on one key to unravelling both these
positions: sensations belong to conscious beings—to selves—and not to
such things as descriptions, say, written in a book. Thus, by a physical
description, we mean a physical description as read or felt or heard (or
whatever) by some conscious self, who may be, for the sake of simplicity,
just an ordinary human being. The suggestion is not that a book of the
complete physical properties of a rose smells like a rose, or some such
absurdity. We mean merely that such a book may capture perfectly well
all the physical information there is about the rose10 but that until that
book is read—and appropriate use is made of the data therein—there is no
rose smell to be had. This is no more mysterious than saying of sound—
qua a sensation of conscious selves who possess the appropriate hearing
apparatus—that there is no such thing when a tree falls in the forest and
there is no one around to hear it. It is no more mysterious than saying no
one has learnt the story of Alice in Wonderland until they have read the
book or than saying a photograph of my mother contains all the colour
information about how she looked on a particular occasion, even when
the photograph is in a completely dark room where there is no colour to
be found.
For anyone still not convinced, consider what it would mean if
there were some other additional special property which somehow could
be added to a description which would then make anyone immediately
sense the object being described. Would it be any kind of objection that an
ordinary video camera, when pointed at this new fortified description,
isn't compelled to have the same kind of sensation we do? Likewise,
would it be any kind of objection if we found that the same video camera
10 Under our use of 'information', this suggests that the book represents physical states of
the rose in a systematic way; see also Chapter 11.
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couldn't smell the rose we've shoved first under our nose and then under
its lens? Of course it wouldn't be an objection at all. Whenever we
concern ourselves with questions about physical descriptions and what
may or may not be missed out by them, we mean descriptions as
interpreted by someone or something for which it is possible that a
description may have missed something out.
3.4 The First Person Problem—Whichy Mirror on the Wall
Now, let's examine the second of the two positions described above,
what we have called the first person problem. The lynchpin of our
analysis of learning how a rose smells on the basis of information about
the physical properties of roses was the observation that information must
be made available at the right level, to a part of a system (such as a human)
capable of using that information in the right modality. This is again
crucial in understanding the first person problem: just as the book must
be read to understand the story—and once it is read, in the right language
and so on, it may be understood—so, too, must the description of my
neural behaviour allegedly correlated with my having a particular
sensation be experienced in the correct modality in order to be convincing.
Let's suppose I am equipped with the cybernetic realist's
lanemonehp mirror of the previous chapter. Let's say I have collected a
huge database of different kinds of sensations and my corresponding
neurophysiological activity while I experienced the sensations. My
database is so large that for almost any sensation I can ponder, I have data
which indicate what kind of neurophysiological activity is generally
occurring during the sensation. If I were the betting sort, I would probably
put my money on the proposition that if anyone offered me a description
of one of my possible patterns of neurophysiological behaviour, and the
pattern offered matched one in my database, I could guess (on the basis of
the recorded correlations) what my sensation would be like if my brain
were exhibiting that pattern of behaviour.
I might have no deductive logical grounds whatsoever for believing
I could know what my sensation would be if my brain were exhibiting a
particular pattern of behaviour, but I would still feel justified in betting
because of the data I had collected previously. Likewise, I might have no
logical grounds for believing the sun will rise tomorrow, but I would still
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feel it a pretty safe bet if someone wanted to bet it wouldn't. Just like the
"which" doctor of the previous section, on the basis of experience I might
find it inconceivable that my neurophysiological behaviour could be the
same as that which in the past correlated with a given sensation and yet I
could feel a different sensation. (Of course we mean "inconceivable" not
in the sense that it is logically impossible, but in the sense that it is
inconceivable that, ceteris paribus, being pricked with a pin right now
would not cause me pain.) Even so, there might still be no deductive
logical reason to deny that tomorrow the neural reactions caused by
encountering a flying mallet suddenly might become strangely
pleasurable, or might make me hungry, or might make me feel like doing
arithmetic or going skiing.11
Just as in the previous section, I would suggest that indeed there is
no logically necessary connection to be inferred from the kind of database
of "mere" correlations I described above. Yet, I also suggest that these
correlations are reason to suppose not some kind of putative cause and
effect relationship between neural behaviour and phenomenal experience
but instead to suppose that the phenomenal experience just is the
subjective aspect of the neural behaviour. That is, by the phrase "pain
caused by a flying mallet", we mean not some kind of cause-effect
relationship between the firing of nerves in my head and a resultant
(perhaps epiphenomenal?) sensation of pain; nor do we mean the "pain
just is this firing of nerve cells in response to a flying mallet"; we mean
instead something along the lines of "the pain just is what it is like when
nerve cells are firing thus and so in response to the impact of a flying
mallet". That this subjective aspect of our own objective neural
behaviour is "real" is analogous to the fact that a cause of an effect or an
effect of a cause is "real": we cannot infer it, we can only observe it...over
and over again.
3.5 The Third Person Problem—A Tale of Two Arguments
Let's turn now to the most difficult question, that of the third
person problem: the position that no phenomenological description of a
11 Our later discussions of self models, however, suggest that such a change taking place
would require a change in the functional role of those neural reactions to flying mallets and
a subsequent alteration to the dynamics of the data structure instantiated by the brain of
which the relevant neurons are a part.
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sensation can be derived from a physical description of the
neurophysiological properties of another system (such as another person)
claiming to be having that sensation. (Put this way, the third person
problem is closely related to the host of problems often grouped under the
heading "problem of other minds".) With respect to the first person
problem, we explored the case for at least believing that specific neural
activity patterns in my own body would feel like particular sensations by
appealing to the possibility of establishing a large database of correlations
between previous sensations and the simultaneous neural activity in my
own body. Now, with respect to the third person problem, we can first
observe that again there almost certainly could be no logical inference
from observed neural activity to phenomenal sensation. And insofar as I
cannot be anyone save who I am, and I cannot logically infer what the
sensation of another individual feels like for that other individual (the
point of the previous chapter), I cannot build a database of correlations
between their neural activity and my experienced sensations.
Moreover, in the first person case, the difference in neural activity
between, say, seeing red and seeing blue, might be localised in a small area
of the visual cortex; but in the third person case, while differences in
neural activity between that third person's sensation of red and blue may
be relatively localised, differences in neural activity between my
sensations compared to the other person's sensations might involve
much larger areas. If our two systems were coincidentally wired in just
exactly the same way, a case might be made (without necessarily taking on
board any kind of type-type or type-token identity theory) for suggesting
that the other's experiences were just like mine, but the more different
they are, the less plausible such a case may be.12
We have made much of the point that information about objective
physical properties can be introduced into a system in a number of
12 Since the human brain contains a number of neurons on the same order of magnitude as the
number of stars in the Milky Way Galaxy, the idea of two brains physically being wired
"identically", to within even a moderate degree of error, is absurd. We might, however,
view the footnoted sentence as a variation on the correlation database example for the first
person problem. We might say that our own systems at different times constitute different
systems with very similar structures and that the reliability of past correlations between
states of these different systems and experienced sensation is the basis of an inductive
inference that future patterns of neural activity similar to those in the past will
phenomenally feel the same as they have in the past. But to use an analogous argument to
address the third person problem is, I think, cheating, on the grounds that it may beg
important questions about identity over time.
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different ways and at a number of different levels. Here again, the point
applies, but in a more problematic way. In the third person case, not only
can we not build up a database about neural activity and the corresponding
sensations (although we could build up a database of corresponding
reported sensations), but for the most part we cannot make information
about the objective physical properties of another system available to the
appropriate level of our own systems. As we alluded to above, we cannot
take on all the necessary neural characteristics of another individual in
order to see what sensations they are experiencing. If all we have to go on,
even in the best case, is the kind of set of correlations we posited in the
analysis of the first person problem, then it might seem there is no way to
"get out" of our first person and say anything at all about the sensations of
others on the basis of their neurophysiological characteristics. But all is
not lost.
3.5.1 On a Bad Argument from Science
Against those, such as myself, who would argue that it is legitimate
to extrapolate from characteristics of our own sensations to characteristics
of another's sensations (or, for that matter, from the existence of our own
minds to the existence of other minds), it is often objected that we are
never permitted in science to extrapolate from the observation of a single
case to all similar but unobserved cases. It is only after many observations
of many independent cases that we are allowed to conclude anything at all.
But this is not strictly true, and the sense in which it is not strictly true is
just the sense we need to rescue from scientific incredulity the
extrapolation I would like to make.
In scientific investigation, we expect the explanation of any single
occurrence of an event to be consistent with the explanations for all other
previously observed events, whether or not these past events are directly
related to the event in question. For instance, insofar as we have
confidence in the relative correctness of quantum electrodynamics (i.e.,
the congruity between whatever predictions we might make with QED
and our subsequent observations), we do not expect our explanation of
gravity or our explanation of snowfall in the Alps to contradict it either
explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, we expect the explanation of one event
to apply to other relevantly similar events. We don't expect all
experiments with water to be explicable under a certain theory, except for
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one particular kind of water available from a Fountain of Youth
somewhere in South America. That is, we expect explanatory theories to
be both time-independent and location-independent.13 So suppose there
is some class of theories to explain why my sensations are correlated in the
way they are, ex hypothesi, with my neural activity. Far from resigning
ourselves to scientific impotence on the grounds that we've really only got
one experimental situation before us, we should be happy to conclude at
the least that some of these theories are going to apply similarly well to
other similar neural systems. (In the following section, we discuss what
might make systems relevantly similar.) Just as in the case of any
scientific endeavour, we should expect that the correct explanation of a
single observed phenomenon—whatever that explanation might be—
does its job for more than just the single observed phenomenon at hand.14
Indeed, that an explanation does have a wider applicability than some
special single case is one of the criteria for deciding it is a good explanation.
Moreover, let's consider an argument similar to this one turned on
its head. Suppose there is some class of theories to account for all there is
to know about all the other brains and minds—if the latter exist—in the
entire cosmos except mine. (Hopefully this is a fair supposition, although
some might of course suggest that the class of theories accounting for all
the other brains and minds is empty or that all the theories account for
minds entirely separately and independently from brains.) Insofar as my
brain is similar to the other brains, we should expect that I also have (or
lack) a mind in accordance with the same explanatory theory which
accounts for all the features of all the other organisms with brains. And
since the other organisms' lacking a mind would imply my lacking a
mind, and since I know that I have a mind, we can immediately infer that
the other creatures possessed of similar brains also have minds.
Notice that all these characteristics of explanatory extrapolation in
scientific investigation are independent of whether, for instance, in the
13 Of course we needn't exclude something like the possibility that the gravitational
constant might change over time or the reality that people can run a marathon in air in a
couple of hours but they can't do the same under water. Well formed theories take these
factors into account as independent variables.
14 Equivalently, when extrapolating accounts of unobserved systems on the basis of
observed systems (or the single observed system, in our case), the scientist expects continuity
over at least some surface in the variable space of the type of system under study. That is,
the expectation is that a single theory will do for all systems more or less similar to the one
under study.
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end our preferred explanation of the correlations in the first person case
(or the third, as in the second argument) happens to involve resorting to
Cartesian dualism or whatever. These observations do not presuppose
anything about materialism: if we are happy to incorporate Cartesian
dualism or any other ad hoc premises into our understanding of the
relationship between neural activity and sensation in the first person (or
the third), then we ought to be perfectly happy to extrapolate it to our
understanding of that relationship in the third person (or the first). As
long as we're willing to grant that there is some theory to account for the
correlations—whether or not we know that theory—then we ought to be
happy with the extrapolation.
3.5.2 On a Good Argument from Science
So, what can this tell us about the third person problem, the notion
that no phenomenological description of a sensation can be derived from
an objective description of a third person system claiming to be having
that sensation? Given that we cannot make the details of the complete
neurophysiological behaviour of another system available to the right
level of our own systems, what extrapolations can we make from the
correlations between our own neural activity and our own sensations to
the claims of a third person? (I deliberately use the noun 'claim' here with
the heterophenomenological15 detachment popularised in Dan Dennett's
work.) Just as in the first person case, we shouldn't look for any kind of
deductive logical derivability here, but if the above account of
extrapolation is correct, at least to a first level of approximation we should
be able to correlate our own experiences with those of a third person to an
extent determined by the degree of relevant similarity between our own
and that third person's neural activity. I have argued above, contra most
commentators, that some kind of extrapolation from our single observed
first person case to the case of third persons is perfectly legitimate in the
context of scientific inquiry. The problem now is to investigate what
makes cases relevantly similar.
First, I suggest we are justified in limiting the scope of possible
relevantly similar characteristics to the physical observables (in the
quantum mechanics sense—see the chapter following) at the lowest level
At ten syllables, 'heterophenomenological' wins first place on my list of longest useful
terms in philosophy and cognitive science.
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and whatever other organisational features may derive from the physical
observables at higher levels. While this is a highly significant move, it
may be be undertaken for no more obtuse a reason than that this is the
scope of relevant similarity for all other current scientific accounts—with
which we may expect a good explanation of neuron-sensation correlations
to cohere. (It is here that our hitherto accommodating attitude toward
alternative, nonmaterialist, accounts of sensation begins to show signs of
fatigue.) Given the types of explanations with which we've been happy in
science so far, we should be no more concerned to incorporate
nonmaterial factors into our understanding of sensation than we are to
incorporate them into our understanding of the electroweak force.
Second, I suggest that given our apparent utter insensitivity to the
activity of single neurons, relevant similarity is probably to be found at no
lower level than that of the organisational structures embodied by
neurons (or whatever information transforming elements happen to
make up the system in question). While we will have much more to say
on this topic in the coming chapters on self models (see also the chapters
on levels of description in cognitive systems), for the moment suffice to
say that it would seem peculiar in the context of other scientific theories to
need recourse to information about specific individual neural activity in
order to explain such an apparently high level feature as sensation.
Although it is necessary to understand what enables fusion between two
or three atomic nuclei in order to understand an account of supernovae,
for instance, it is only necessary to appeal to much higher level features of
structures made partially of nuclei undergoing fusion in order to give a
comprehensive account of what can make a star explode. Likewise, it is
reasonable to think that whilst we will need to understand what makes
individual neurons fire and interact the way they do, a complete account
of what makes someone specifically capable of sensation probably (only?)
can be given at a much higher level of description.16
Given these two restrictions on what makes systems relevantly
similar, and keeping in mind the initial observations about extrapolation
and continuity, a sharper outline of a response to the third person
problem comes into focus. Above we wanted to say that we should be able
to correlate our own experiences with those of a third person to an extent
16 And it's a good thing, too, lest we find our sensations constantly disturbed by the effects
of cosmic rays passing through our brains and the ongoing death of our nerve cells.
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determined by the degree of relevant similarity between our own and that
third person's neural activity. Now this can be rephrased as the response
that the claims of another system to be having sensation can be evaluated
by comparing the organisational structures physically embodied by the
other system to those embodied by our own. Where those organisational
structures are quite similar (as in the case of humans), we may be justified
in understanding the third person's sensations to be quite similar to our
own; where they are quite different but not altogether alien (as in the case
of bats), we may be justified in understanding the third person as probably
having sensations but of some quality of which we cannot be certain; and
where the organisational structures are entirely alien or—perhaps more
importantly—vastly simpler (as in the case of my notebook computer
running its standard operating system), we may in the first instance be
unable to judge, or in the second we may be justified in understanding the
third "person" to have no sensations whatsoever. (A better specified
account of some particular kinds of organisational structures which may
support finer distinctions than these is on offer in the coming chapters on
self models.) That this is a sort of ultimate hermeneutische zirkel I
believe is inescapable: we can never see or even evaluate the sensations of
other systems save through our own eyes and the backdrop of our own
complete systems. Yet this is no criticism of the approach I've outlined, at
least not any more than it is a criticism of, for instance, scientific inquiry in
general that we construct explanatory theories always in a form consistent
with the logic we ourselves find in our own minds (perhaps after some
reflection) compellingly rational.
3.6 The Rose Named
To sum up, we saw first that much of the confusion over what is
"missed out" of physical accounts of objects of sensation or even physical
accounts of neural systems experiencing sensations comes down to a
confusion over the levels at which physical information may be processed.
We observed how appropriate use of physical information about objects of
sensation may lead us to empirical discoveries about how those objects
smell, look, or whatever. Use of the identical information in other ways
may not lead to any discoveries at all about their role in subjective
experience. That these two observations can each reflect true
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characteristics of the world appears to be an accidental property of human
neurophysiology.
In terms of what we have dubbed the first person problem and the
third person problem, we've returned to the kind of position favoured at
the end of the original discussion of Nagel's "what is it like..." argument.
The fruitful approach is one in which objective properties of systems are
open to investigation and the correlations between these objective
properties and subjective sensation are, in the first person, matters for
empirical study. In the third person, the temptation to scepticism because
of the impossibility of experiencing someone else's sensation is pacified
and the matter is again open for empirical study and legitimate
extrapolation from the first person case.
It is worth noticing that in terms of empirical investigation of the
relationship between particular organisational structures and sensation,
instead of asking why particular neural activity feels the way it does, we
should just accept that it does and get on with the task of exploring how
this or that perception or sensation is enabled by such and such an
underlying organisational pattern. As suggested in the second chapter, we
should be concerned with giving neurological descriptions of the
structures which enable particular cognitive tasks to be performed but not
of why those cognitive tasks feel the way they do when performed with
those structures. Although it is an elementary point of philosophy of
science, it is rarely acknowledged in this context that every scientific
inquiry must at some point pass from trying to explain the why of
observed phenomena to explaining the how of the phenomena at a lower
level of description. That is, we may give a reductive account of observed
phenomena in terms of (perhaps unobserved) lower level features, but at
some stage those lower level features themselves cannot be accounted for
by appeal to yet lower level features and must simply be described as
matters of fact.
Indeed, the reason the reductive accounts of science work as they do
in the first place (and not in some other way) is not given a why account
but is merely described. For instance, we can answer the why of many
features of chemical reactions by appeal to characteristics of atomic
structure, and we can answer the why of many features of atomic structure
by appeal to the electroweak force, and perhaps some day we will be able to
answer the why of many of the features of the electroweak force by appeal
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to some lower level characteristic of reality which might unify the
electroweak force with the strong nuclear force and with gravity. But first,
at no stage of the game does science offer an account of why it is that the
electroweak force explains in the way it does (instead of in some other
way) features of atomic structure—it only describes the way in which it in
fact does—and second, at some point (perhaps even in the unlikely event
it should turn out that a Grand Unification Theory or a Theory of
Everything is a necessary truth of logic) science becomes simply a
description of the way the world works.
Science may offer a sort of promissory note, which says in effect that
the necessity of a given relationship or explanation between levels will
become clear as soon as other features at a lower level are elucidated fully,
but at some point that promise becomes as empty as that on the front of a
banknote: "The Royal Bank of Scotland pic Promise to Pay the Bearer on
Demand Twenty Pounds Sterling at Their Head Office Here in
Edinburgh". Although an entire economy is built upon sterling, just as an
entire physics is built upon the electroweak and other elementary forces,
the lowest level banknote cannot be redeemed at a bank for anything
except another banknote.
I suggest than in questions of mind, we have already reached that
point of "mere" description for the simple reason that at the macroscopic
levels of description usually appropriate to cognitive science, there is
much less ground to cover. That is, we have already reached the point
where we must simply acknowledge that particular organisational
structures enable conscious perception or sensation and that this just does
feel some particular way. The project then is to describe what structures
do enable perception or sensation and even how activity in those
structures correlates with particular perceptions or sensations. But asking
why it feels the way it does, or ivhy it feels any way at all, is on this account
akin to asking why there is something which leads to the appearance of
the strong nuclear force (or something which leads to the something
which leads to the appearance of the strong nuclear force...) and is no more
liable to be answered than the question "why is there something rather
than nothing?"
In this same scientific vein, we make a brief side trip in the next
chapter into the realm of quantum physics before proceeding with an
exploration of the self model approach to understanding the subjective
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aspect of experience. Our foray into physics is motivated by the need to
guarantee that it is not the haven for old-fashioned mind body dualism
which some fancy it to be. With this established, we may then continue
with the more immediate matter at hand: the matter underlying the self.
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Materialism and the "Problem" of
Quantum Measurement
We have so far made a case for a brand of dual aspect monism, and
shortly we will be prepared to advance to an exploration of a particular
way of seating the subjective aspect of sensation within the objective
context of a material substrate. But at the same time as we embrace the
framework of modern physics as the foundation of our monism, we must
guard against a popular flanking attack on this foundation which arises
from within the very same physics. In particular, we must be sure that
there is not yet some room for the old Cartesian dualist to slip in with an
argument from the state vector reduction of quantum mechanics.
The following is reprinted, with minor changes, from Mulhauser
(1995 in press).17 The material is occasionally technical, but in the interest
of thoroughness I have elected to preserve its original form as much as
possible. For the sake of the general philosophical payoff and the value of
the points here in ensuring that we are on the right track in keeping our
account of the subjective experience of sensation within the realm of the
material, I hope it is not unreasonable to ask for a little patience with
subject matter largely couched in terms of quantum mechanics.
For nearly six decades, the conscious observer has played a central
and essential role in quantum measurement theory. We here outline
some difficulties which the traditional account of measurement presents
for material theories of mind before introducing a new development
which promises to exorcise the ghost of consciousness from physics and
relieve the cognitive scientist of the burden of explaining why certain
material structures reduce wavefunctions by virtue of being conscious
while others do not. The interactive decoherence of complex quantum
systems reveals that the oddities and complexities of linear superposition
17 Please see the Appendix for reprint information.
and state vector reduction are irrelevant to computational aspects of the
philosophy of mind and that many conclusions in related fields are ill
founded.
4.1 Quantum Measurement—The Ghost in the Mechanics
Consider how different life would be if we found ourselves in a
world where macroscopic objects like bats, cats, lumps of wax, and even
people evolved in time the way sub-microscopic objects like electrons and
pi-mesons do under the Schrddinger equation of quantum mechanics. My
friend might admonish me, "Hey, I saw one of your state vector
components out with that MacLean woman last Saturday—I thought you
had better eigenvalues than that!" I might justifiably retort that I was also
in my flat doing work, and he should localise his wavepacket elsewhere
and stop interfering with my superpositions.
The standard account of why we never see objects in states of linear
superposition is that the very act of observing a quantum system
precipitates a discontinuous jump in the system's state from what might
have been a superposition into a single determinate state. In the Hilbert
space framework of quantum mechanics, wavefunctions are represented
as vectors, and maximal quantum observables correspond to operators.
For each of these operators, there is an associated basis, a set of
orthonormal vectors which spans Hilbert space and represents the
eigenvalues of that operator. For our purposes, these eigenvectors can be
thought of simply as the real states in which it is possible for an observed
system to exist. According to the projection postulate, originally due to
von Neumann (1932), when a quantum system is observed the system's
wavefunction, its state vector in Hilbert space, is projected discontinuously
into an eigenstate of the appropriate observable. The probability of the
system's being found in a state corresponding to any given basis vector is
simply the square modulus of that vector's coefficient when the state
vector is expressed as a linear combination of the basis vectors. The set of
probabilities corresponding to the eigenvectors when a given operator is
applied to a wavefunction is called that state vector's reduced density
matrix. The process of state vector reduction when a quantum mechanical
system is observed—"collapsing the wavepacket"—has excited the
attention of philosophers both because of the indeterminacy the reduced
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density matrix brings to physics and because of the high stature it is
understood to give to the consciousness of the observer.
Under the projection postulate, it is irrelevant to the statistical
predictions of quantum theory at what point state vector reduction is
taken to have occurred—as long as it is some time before the outcome of a
measurement enters the conscious mind of an observer. That state vector
reduction could take place after a quantum system interacts with a
macroscopic measuring apparatus but before a conscious observer has
noted the state of the apparatus is the basis of the well-worn thought
experiment about Schrodinger's cat. The example includes some device
meant to poison a cat (who is taken, perhaps wrongly, not to be
conscious18) if and only if a detector measures a certain event in a
quantum system such as the decay of a nucleus in a radioactive sample.
According to the laws of unitary evolution (i.e., evolution in accordance
with the Schrodinger equation), a system like this which is appropriately
shielded from the environment—more on this later—must evolve into a
superposed state representing both the case where the atom decays and the
cat is poisoned and the case where the atom does not decay and the cat
lives. It is supposedly only the act of observing the system—opening up
the box and peering inside, if you will—which brings it about that its
wavefunction description reduces to a single eigenstate in which the cat is
either determinately alive or determinately dead. As someone has said of
the latter possibility, "curiosity killed the cat".
Because interaction with a conscious mind bounds the time by
which state vector reduction must occur, and because physicists have
understood to be unverifiable any prediction that it occurs earlier, some
physicists (perhaps Wigner 1962, 1967 most famously) and many
philosophers have taken consciousness itself to be the mechanism which
brings about wavepacket collapse.
Even in Everett's (1957) many worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics, in which state vectors are never reduced, consciousness
nonetheless plays a central role. Under his account, the consciousness of
observers remains responsible for the perspectival nature of experience—
the fact that observers only ever experience one of the many components
of the superposition of states through which the cosmos is continuously
evolving.
18 As the "Wigner's friend" thought experiment shows, this is not crucial.
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However we interpret quantum measurement along the traditional
lines, we seem faced with an unexplained consciousness phenomenon
which somehow makes everything go. Next I outline some of the
problems this ghost in the mechanism creates for materialist accounts of
cognition.
4.2 Problems for the Materialist
By the term 'materialist', I mean to include all monists who hold
that only physical things exist, that there is no separate realm of mind
things with positive ontological status, that the world is not instead purely
ideal. I mean also to include dual aspect monists, who maintain that there
are matters of fact about what it is like to be a given material thing which
may not be expressible purely in terms of the objective physical properties
of that thing.
Regardless of the particular brand of materialism we are concerned
to defend, maintaining that consciousness is a physical phenomenon
while allowing that it plays the unique role in quantum measurement
theory it has hitherto been accorded means giving an account of how it is
that conscious material arrangements reduce state vectors while other,
perhaps equally complex but nonconscious ones, do not. For instance, a
materialist who is a functionalist must explain what particular types of
information processing arrangements are capable, all by themselves, of
reducing state vectors. (This might lead to something as peculiar as:
applying function /c to datum x brings it about that x has become
conscious—and the state vector thereby has been reduced of the entire
composite system consisting of both that of which x is a measurement and
whatever is doing the calculating—whereas applying any function Z1.../1
does not.) More to the point, we must answer the question of why some
physical systems are, by virtue of the functional arrangements they
embody or whatever, prohibited from existing in states of linear
superposition while other similar ones apparently are not. But the
problem is worse.
Indeed, if the source of consciousness is to be found in functional
arrangement, quantum measurement theory implies that we should be
able to pin down the exact spatio-temporal location in an information
manipulating process where a given piece of data becomes conscious. The
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projection postulate does not require that state vector reduction take place
at the terminus of what has come to be called the von Neumann chain,
the chain of interactions from quantum system to conscious mind which
constitutes an observation. But it does require that there is a terminus,
such that if state vector reduction takes place after that point, then an
experiment could be devised to show it. If consciousness can be described
in functional terms, then so must be the location of this terminus.
Aside from the bizarreness of effecting state vector reduction of
quantum systems by applying functions to data about them, pinning down
an exact location where a piece of data becomes conscious should be
unacceptable to any materialist who wishes to describe consciousness in
terms of processes which are not necessarily functions.19 In this case, there
might not be any well defined time at which a piece of data enters
conscious awareness.20 But we are then left with a clumsy notion difficult
to reconcile with the mathematical elegance of the rest of quantum theory:
an ill defined terminus to the von Neumann chain itself. Moreover, with
an ill defined terminus to the chain, it is awkward to accommodate the
fact that we are still guaranteed some time such that it could be
experimentally verified if state vector reduction occurred after it but not
before it.
A similar line of thought leads to the unappealing conclusion that
consciousness cannot be a vague phenomenon: it must be an altogether
all or nothing affair. This is because while the predictions of state vector
reduction are probabilistic, that it occurs is not. Either interaction with a
given physical system forces state vector reduction, or it does not. There
can be no fuzzy area in between. Indeed, we could imagine a sort of
"consciousness detector" which exploits the familiar behaviour of the
double slit experiment. Given a "sufficiently shielded" system akin to
Schrodinger's cat arrangement, we might fit an electron measuring
apparatus with a (nonconscious) device to convert information about
electrons before they've passed through the slits into an appropriate form
19 This might be the spread of an activation pattern across a network, for instance. While
all (recursive) functions can be thought of as algorithms, not all algorithms are
mathematical functions. Functionalists are typically concerned with the broader class of
all algorithmic processes. Fortunately, however, something like the more descriptive but
awkward "algorithmism" has never entered use.
20 As an aside, Lockwood's 1989 relativistic argument for a precise physical location of
mental "events" rests on the assumption that such events have a precise location in time—
an assumption which is untenable on any sort of connectionist or distributed view.
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and pass it on to whatever possibly conscious system we're wishing to
analyse. We may then simply run the electron gun for awhile, and when
we examine the photographic plate, we'll find an interference pattern if
and only if the subject of the experiment did not consciously process
information about the electrons. If the pattern corresponds to that
predicted by classical mechanics, then it was because the state vector
descriptions of the electrons were reduced as a result of information about
them becoming conscious.
Finally, accepting that state vector reduction occurs as a result of
interaction with any and only those material arrangements with some
special material property that makes them conscious even has curious
implications for the way we think about the evolution of conscious life. If
conscious life was not present when the cosmos began, then the universe
could only have evolved (in the mathematical sense) in a state of
quantum linear superposition until the first conscious organism evolved
(in a biological sense) and observed it, thereby collapsing the wavefunction
of the entire cosmos and making determinate that single path of history
which made the organism's own existence possible! We might of course
posit a (material?) divine being who frequently observed the cosmos and
prevented its ever evolving into a superposed state. Since the
phenomenon whereby frequent observations of a quantum system keep it
from evolving into a superposed state is often called the "watchdog effect",
we might name the divine observation hypothesis the "watchgod effect".
But in any case, without such a "watchgod effect", it would appear that the
first conscious organism was its own efficient cause.
Fortunately, all these strange problems with including
consciousness in quantum measurement theory apparently never need
arise. While it is always dangerous to speculate on anything's being "an
answer" in physics, it appears that the quest has ended for a theory of
quantum measurement which discharges consciousness from its central
role. The best thing about the new view of quantum measurement is that
it requires no new premises: it falls out of a careful reexamination of the
problem and numerical analysis of the evolution of complex systems
described under existing theory.
46
4.3 Interactive Decoherence—Ghostbusting
The current description of interactive decoherence21 was originally
motivated by quantum cosmology and both benefits and is benefitted by
research in the physics of information. Quantum cosmology (see, for
instance, Coleman, et al 1991) seeks to understand the entire cosmos as a
quantum system. This approach can accommodate neither an arbitrary
Copenhagen-style distinction between microscopic and macroscopic
worlds nor an unexplained consciousness phenomenon driving state
vector reduction. The quantum cosmologist must ultimately be able to
derive a description of a quasi-classical world from the laws of quantum
mechanics. From a quantum description of the world, we must be able to
predict the existence of "correlations" between macroscopic coordinates
and momenta which approximately obey the classical laws of motion, and
we must be able to account for the fact that interference effects between
different classical states are never observed. (Paz and Sinha 1992) The
relevant aspect of information theory is the growing conviction that
information cannot be abstracted away from a physical substrate (Landauer
1991) and how that fact bears on what can be said about natural laws,
observers, and the interactions between subsystems of the cosmos.
The most important step in the development of decoherence theory
was the "re-realisation" that no system but the entire cosmos is closed, or
perfectly isolated, and that the environment will thus always contain
some amount of information about the state of a system. The Schrodinger
equation is meant to apply just to closed (or very nearly closed) systems,
and for the sake of computational simplicity absurd degrees of isolation
are often tolerated in examples of the Schrodinger equation's application.
(This is the point of the extremely well-shielded box in Schrodinger's cat
example: no information about the coherent superposed state of the
system must exist in any external system, for then observation of this
external system would collapse the wavefunction of the entire composite
system.) But numerical analysis of systems which preserve some of those
complications abstracted away in the idealised example systems—
21 In the physics literature, this phenomenon is consistently referred to as "spontaneous
decoherence". However, as will become clear, the phenomenon is not spontaneous in the
strict sense and occurs always as a result of information-carrying interactions between
subsystems. Thus, with apologies to the physics community, I have opted to use this more
accurate term throughout.
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essentially much greater internal and external degrees of freedom—
reveals that correlations between the state of a quantum system and its
environment or even correlations within itself are sufficient to break the
coherence of what might otherwise be an incredibly complex
wavafunction.
These correlations are understood as records, or information, about
the system, information which Wojciech Zurek (1991), a leading
researcher in interactive decoherence at the Santa Fe Institute, insists is
entirely independent of the presence of any conscious observer. The
buildup of nonseparable correlations between the system and its
environment (which could be little more than cosmic background
radiation) causes a very rapid decrease in the possible superpositions of the
system which can be distinguished through their effect on the
environment. As Paz, et al (1993) put it, "this results in a negative
selection which leads to the emergence of a preferred set of states...which
remain least affected by the 'openness' of the system in question." (p. 488)
It is these preferred states, sometimes called the "pointer basis" (a term
coined by Zurek, alluding to the pointer of a garden variety measurement
apparatus), which, conveniently and unsurprisingly, correspond closely to
those of the observables we encounter in the quasi-classical world.22
(Albrecht 1992b; Paz, et al 1993) The cosmos is watching! While the
dynamics of the system determine the "options" for a system's evolution,
it is the correlations between the system and its environment—rather
than the intervention of any conscious observer—which determine the
probability of the system's being in a given state.
It is important to stress that while analysis of interactive
decoherence provides the reduced density matrix, or set of probabilities for
each of the possible states "allowed through" the nonconscious
environmental record-keeping, it is not, as one researcher has called it, a
mere "calculational tool" (Kiefer 1991, p. 379) with which we duplicate the
predictions of consciousness-driven wavepacket collapse while never
essentially erasing consciousness from the picture. In effect, decoherence
supersedes the wavepacket collapse of traditional quantum measurement
theory by offering an alternative account of what is mathematically the
22 Note, incidentally, that this doesn't imply nil large systems decohere: as Paz, et al
(1993) and Zurek (1991) point out, even a very massive—on the order of one tonne—cryogenic
Weber bar, by virtue of its extremely low temperature, must be treated as a coherent
quantum harmonic oscillator.
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same process, free of the superfluous and unexplained consciousness
factor. Indeed, the equivalence of results provided by the two mechanisms
leads some researchers to apply the older term explicitly in referring to the
replacement process. (Albrecht 1992a; Paz, et al 1993) To apply the point to
Schrodinger's thought experiment, decoherence tells us that the cat is
already either alive or dead long before anyone opens the box—with a
probability given by the appropriate reduced density matrix—but not as a
result of a von Neumann chain-style interaction with consciousness at the
terminus.
Finally, in the interest of thoroughness, I should mention that
while the description I have given of decoherence is based purely on
existing theory, there is another formalism known as the "consistent
histories" approach which does rely upon a "decoherence functional"
(Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990) which has not yet been fully defined. It is
related to the sum over histories formulation of quantum mechanics and
is used to determine whether one can attribute well-defined probabilities
to different possible histories of a given system. (When this is possible,
the histories are called "consistent", or "decohering".) However, this
second approach in its present form allows through as "consistent" sets of
highly non-classical histories. For this reason, the environment-induced
superselection I have described is preferable. (See Paz and Zurek 1992 for
one comparison of the two formalisms.)
4.4 Quantum Mechanics is Irrelevant
We can see from this description of interactive decoherence that the
consciousness of an observer is no longer essential to the theory of
quantum measurement. As Zurek puts it,
"Conscious observers have lost their monopoly on acquiring
and storing information. The environment can also monitor
a system, and...such monitoring causes decoherence, which
allows the familiar approximation known as classical
objective reality—a perception of a selected subset of all
conceivable quantum states evolving in a largely predictable
manner—to emerge from the quantum substrate." (Zurek
1991, p. 44)
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As it stands, even in the absence of a conscious observer, the
wavefunction of any quantum system with sufficient complexity and
energy will decohere. Thus it seems that apart, perhaps, from theory
concerning very low energy computation, quantum mechanics is utterly
irrelevant to computational aspects of the philosophy of mind. None of
the problems I outlined for materialism in general, functionalism in
particular, or even the origins of conscious life arise under this new
picture of quantum measurement.
Likewise, many interesting results in the philosophy of mind and
related fields which have derived from the assumption that macroscopic
objects can exist in superposition until they are observed have lost their
theoretical underpinnings. For instance, Deutsch's (1985b) "universal
quantum computer", whose capabilities are a superset of those of the
familiar Universal Turing Machine or Bernoulli-Turing Machine, seems
destined to exist only in the world of theory. The eventual application of
other research in quantum computing (for instance, Margolus 1986, 1990)
inspired by Deutsch or Feynman's (1986) efforts is unclear; what is clear is
that any quantum computer of even rudimentary complexity must
operate at extremely low temperatures in order to preserve the coherent
wavefunction description on which such devices rely for their special
properties. (Indeed, the information processing nature of such devices
might, in itself, create such internal correlations that coherent unitary
evolution cannot be sustained.) Because the operating temperature of the
human brain is many orders of magnitude higher than what is required to
sustain prolonged unitary evolution these special properties of quantum
computers are almost certainly irrelevant to brain research.
Unfortunately, it seems also that in light of interactive decoherence,
Deutsch's (1985a) description of an experimental test of Everett's
interpretation (a suggestion contradicting the conventional wisdom that it
is indistinguishable from rival interpretations) using nonconscious
automata is also unworkable. This should not be too surprising, however,
since Everett's theory stipulated that state vector reduction never actually
took place. While it is certainly no trivial project, we might anticipate that
some or all elements of Everett's view will soon be proven inconsistent
with decoherence theory.23
23 Since this paper went to press, it has occurred to me that Everett's theory mightn't be
inconsistent with interactive decoherence after all: the cosmos might simply "auto-select"
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Albert's (1983, 1987, 1990) work showing that a specifically
nonconscious automaton could make privileged predictions about itself by
measuring quantum observables which for any external observer would
be incompatible appears similarly incompatible with interactive
decoherence. Although arguments from dual aspect monism indicate a
necessary subjectivity to the point of view of an observer (see Chapter 2
and Mulhauser 1993a), and Mackay (1971, 1980) has argued for an
observer's "logical relativity", Albert's arguments for subjectivity fail
because they require complex automata fitted with quantum mechanical
measuring devices to themselves exist in states of linear superposition.24
Finally, the new view of quantum measurement does not mix well
with the mind-brain interaction theories of Sir John Eccles, Nobel
prizewinning neuroscientist. Eccles, a self-avowed dualist with respect to
the mind body problem, has described a scheme (1986, 1990; see also
Popper and Eccles 1977) in which a nonphysical consciousness collapses
the state vector descriptions of the pre-synaptic vesicular grids which
release neurotransmitters at neural junctions. He proposes that states of
columnar bundles in the cerebral cortex thus become correlated with the
causally prior mental "psychons" with which they are paired. But not
only is consciousness itself superfluous in decoherence theory, the high
operating temperature of the human brain again guarantees decoherence
of the wavefunctions of these structures as a result of internal and external
correlations, independently of any mysterious causally prior mind entity.
In addition to neutralising all these interesting results which come
from allowing nonconscious macroscopic objects to exist in superposed
states until they are observed, interactive decoherence appears also to have
solved the preferred basis problem. This is the question of why Nature
has chosen for macroscopic objects a set of basis vectors which correspond
to the eigenstates of macroscopic observables. (Why not a basis
corresponding to some other set of operators, such that the eigenstates we
observe are actually superpositions of the eigenstates of the macroscopic
observables? Out of the infinity of ways of decomposing state vectors,
what makes the basis corresponding to the set of macroscopic observables
so special?) The emergence of a preferred basis simply as that basis which
its states every so often in a way so as to reduce periodically its infinite class of superposed
states predicted by Everett to a smaller class corresponding to the preferred basis states.
24 The failure of Deutsch's and Albert's work as physical possibilities also casts some
doubt on the practical feasibility of quantum cryptography.
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is most immune to the openness of macroscopic systems is at the heart of
decoherence theory.
Thus Lockwood's (1989) approach to the preferred basis problem
through an unexplained consciousness phenomenon in a reincarnated
relative state view is as unnecessary as it is implausible. Interactive
decoherence suggests a similarly dim view of Deutsch's (1985a) interesting
but apparently only partially successful (Foster and Brown 1988) attempt to
solve the preferred basis problem. Other approaches either to removing
consciousness from quantum measurement altogether or to solving the
preferred basis problem are now also unnecessary. These include Davies's
(1981) and Penrose's (1985, 1986, 1989) quantum gravity state vector
reduction and Nicholas Maxwell's (1988) propensition theory positing
state vector reduction in the wake of sufficiently energetic inelastic
collisions between particles.
Overall, the mechanism of interactive decoherence appears to solve
a host of problems without creating very many new ones. But the
question lingers: is this really the way it happens (or at least a reasonable
approximation), or is it just a parallel account of the observed phenomena
which offers no particular verifiable advantage over the standard
consciousness-driven wavepacket collapse? Without entering a
prolonged discussion of the philosophy of physics, there are a few
illuminating things which we can say about this.
Insofar as both decoherence theory and the standard view yield the
same reduced density matrix for the quantum systems so far studied, the
huge body of positive experimental evidence for the accuracy of quantum
mechanics as a predictive theory tends to confirm both views equally well.
Yet, the mechanisms which precipitate interactive decoherence come for
free as consequences of other elements of existing theory. The same
cannot be said for the standard view, which relies upon the superfluous
phenomenon of consciousness to terminate the von Neumann chain. In
that sense, interactive decoherence is a more parsimonious theory. For
that reason alone, independently of possible experimental verification, the
standard view may eventually be replaced as interactive decoherence
theory becomes more widely understood.
However, at least in theory, it is possible to distinguish
experimentally between the two accounts. I have said that they give
identical predictions for all quantum systems studied so far, but so far not
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all imaginable quantum systems have been studied. Specifically, the two
accounts predict different outcomes for experiments with the fanciful
"consciousness detector" I described above. If such a system—consisting of
a standard electron gun and diffraction grating setup, together with an
"observer"—could be shielded from the environment, decoherence theory
predicts that the consciousness detector simply would not work in the way
I outlined under the standard view: the correlations between the states of
the electrons, the measuring apparatus, and the "observer" (conscious or
comatose) would cause decoherence and yield a classical distribution
pattern on the photographic plate every time. The problem here, of
course, is that such an experiment requires a fantastic degree of isolation
far beyond the technological capabilities of today or the foreseeable future.
Probably well before such isolation becomes possible (if it ever does),
theorists will determine how better to quantify the amount of information
which must be carried in inter-system correlations to guarantee interactive
decoherence. In that case, a similar test could be carried out by replacing
the "observer" with any system capable of interacting with the electrons to
the required degree. Until this necessary degree of interaction is
quantified25 (or ridiculously thorough isolation becomes a reality),
experimental discrimination between the two accounts will remain
practically impossible.
Decoherence theory does not answer all the interesting questions
about quantum mechanics—such as why linear superposition ever occurs
at all or why experimentally verified nonlocality is an apparent feature of
reality. It also raises at least one intriguing new question: could the state
of the system's environment, considered in all its detail, influence which
eigenstate a system's state vector jumps to? My own suspicion is that a
new non-local but deterministic picture of quantum reality, more
satisfying than Bohm's (1952) and incorporating a fuller description of
interactive decoherence, may be forthcoming. But for now, the cognitive
scientist and philosopher of mind can rest assured that the burden has
been lifted for giving an account of material consciousness capable of
25 Early indications are that the time required for decoherence, and perhaps the degree of
necessary interaction as well, are very small indeed. Although he doesn't include the
technical details, Zurek says that a rough calculation reveals that for a room temperature
system with a lgm solid mass, quantum coherence is destroyed in less than 10~23 seconds.
(Zurek 1991)
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playing the state vector reducing role hitherto supposed necessary in
explaining the observed quantum mechanical phenomena.
4.5 Interactive Decoherence—An Afterthought (?)
Soon after making available on the International Philosophical
Preprint Exchange26 a preprint of the Minds and Machines article from
which this chapter is taken, I received some interesting objections from
Nobel prizewinning physicist Brian Josephson, of Cavendish Laboratory at
the University of Cambridge, on positions I have taken on points which
really sit at the very centre of present debates about decoherence. As he
suggests, there does often seem to be some sleight of hand at work in the
decoherence literature, although he concedes that the merit of my own
account of interactive decoherence may be that it goes through the
argument sufficiently clearly that perhaps we can see where the sleight of
hand occurs! (Josephson 1993b) With that thought in mind, then, let's
address his concerns directly and try to be sure that we have discharged
any sleight of hand from important roles in the argument (or any roles at
all!).
The point of the main objection lives in the straightforward
question about Schrodinger's cat, "how do we go from the mathematical
property of decoherence to the assertion that 'the cat is already either alive
or dead long before anyone opens the box'?". (Josephson 1993a, quoting
me) As he indicates,
"The nub of the matter is that ordinary physics implies a
deterministic correlation between whether the particle
decayed and whether the cat is subsequently alive or dead,
plus the fact that owing to the linearity of the Schrodinger
equation, once a superposition always a superposition.
...Decoherence implies [only] that the two dead/alive
components are entangled states [i.e., that the system is in a
mixed state—G.R.M.] rather than simple product states."
(Josephson 1993b)
26 This service, at phil-preprints.l.chiba-u.jp, is generously provided by the Cognitive
Science Department of Chiba University, Japan and is mirrored by dozens of gopher and
FTP servers across the world.
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In an example later, he clarifies with an indication toward what may be
the real question, which is whether we can have "continued
superposition" when coherence has been lost (Josephson 1993c), and he
objects that "the idea that the system is actually in one of the... [basis]...
states is put in as an ad hoc axiom, justified by its consistency"27
(Josephson 1993d). In other words, decoherence may provide a basis, but it
doesn't provide any argument why the system must be in one and only
one state corresponding to an eigenvector in the basis. Josephson is
concerned that the system's actually being in one of these basis states is
merely added into the account as an unargued afterthought.
The insistence that "once a superposition, always a superposition"
(shared, incidentally, with Wigner) is one with which we won't here
quarrel, because as we will see momentarily it probably can be sidestepped
with the same kind of friendly verificationism to which we appealed with
the consciousness detector above. That a system may objectively exist in a
superposed state after coherence of the wavefunction has been destroyed is
a possibility not even entertained by any of the physicists on whose work
this present view is based, but perhaps that is due to "sleight of hand", an
assumption that the system is actually in one of the provided basis vectors.
So, the central question does come down to whether this assumption—
that the system is actually in one of the interactively decohered states—
really does amount to an afterthought.
Let's consider what might be the experimental difference between
the proposition that a decohered system has actually "collapsed" into an
eigenstate and the proposition that it exists still in a superposed state,
except that the superposition is now (on account of decoherence) a linear
combination of the vectors describing only quasi-classical basis states. The
first option offers a theoretical account of the system's evolution which
proceeds through interaction with an environment and ends with a
description of the eigenstates in which it is possible that the system may be
found upon observation, together with a prediction of the probabilities of
finding the system in any one of the eigenstates. Crucially, the
27 As an aside, Josephson also objects that this consistency is not exact, because we are
assuming off diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix are zero, when in fact they are
only vanishingly small. A question related to the off diagonal terms in the reduced density
matrix was also raised by a woman attending an April 1993 presentation of this material at
the University of Edinburgh, but as we didn't follow up the thought at the time, her
identity unfortunately remains unknown to me.
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probabilities describe the chance that the system will have already
"collapsed" into one of these states—although, until the observation is
made, we remain ignorant of which of the states is real. The second
option offers a theoretical account of the system's evolution which
proceeds through interaction with an environment and ends with a
description of a superposition of eigenstates into one of which the system
may be forced by conscious observation, together with a prediction of the
probabilities of the system's being forced into any one of the eigenstates.
Crucially, the probabilities here describe the chance that the system will
"collapse" into one of these states—since before the observation is made,
the system has not yet collapsed into any of them.
In both cases, of course, the probabilities sum to unity, so the
prediction is that the system zoill be found in precisely one of the
eigenstates. In thousands of experiments, these predictions have been
amazingly accurate: indeed, the precision of these predictions is far higher
and far more thoroughly verified than the precision of any other physical
theory ever humanly known. But the problem is that either account
above can get us from start to finish in an experimental observation, and
either is consistent with the enormous body of experimental evidence for
the accuracy of the resulting probabilities. In other words, there doesn't
appear to be any experimentally verifiable difference between the two
accounts. If this is true, has the advocate of interactive decoherence
succumbed to the afterthought interpretation and simply opted for the
new view over the established one for no sound reason?
We are now in position to answer this question in the negative. If
we begin from the standpoint of the quantum measurement theory which
has been accepted for the last six decades, then "adding in" a proposition
that a decohered system is actually in an eigenstate before an observation
is made does look like it is unfairly putting consciousness on the dole. But
if we return to the original projection postulate and the von Neumann
chain from above, we may take an alternative view. Recall that
consciousness terminated the von Neumann chain; that is, the
observation was the latest time by which the wavepacket could collapse—
and recall our note that it is apparently unverifiable whether collapse
actually takes place sooner. Interactive decoherence now offers us an
account—which follows from existing elements of quantum theory—of
the actual "collapse", although we still don't know the outcome until the
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von Neumann chain is terminated. But this is hardly mysterious! We
don't know the state of anything until we observe it or observe some
consequence of it. We now apparently have an account of the emergence
of the basis vectors—as Josephson concedes—but it is perhaps confusingly
obvious that we can't expect to knozv the actual eigenstate until we
observe it. If we accept the above account of interactive decoherence, we
are left needing only to answer the question of whether the system is
actually in an eigenstate before observation. But as we have seen there is
no experimentally verifiable difference between the two alternatives, and
on this view it is the proponent of accepted quantum measurement theory
whose "sleight of hand" is adding in a consciousness phenomenon which
has no explanatory value. Consciousness is redundant. As far as I can see,
on this particular matter of interpretation, the matter—and the mind—is
settled.
4.6 Interactive Decoherence—After Afterthought
In fairness to the issue, it is worthwhile to note that still all the
questions haven't been answered. In particular, as Josephson has
wondered in passing (Josephson 1993d), and as many people may wonder
when analysing the account of interactive decoherence here on offer, isn't
there some problem in just using the same old reduced density matrix to
extract the predictions from decoherence theory? That is, mightn't there
be some hidden assumptions in using the matrix which make it altogether
unremarkable that quasi-classical basis vectors are automatically accounted
for? Is it just a case of the snake biting its tail, without real explanatory
value? Unfortunately, this is an issue which I have not yet been able to
pursue, and I am unaware of the work of any other theorists who may
have answered the question. Hopefully it can be answered by a
straightforward reexamination of how we get the reduced density matrix
in the first place. As I understand it, there are actually no hidden
assumptions in deriving the reduced density matrix in the first place, but
whether there is some unexplained element to its connection with
decoherence theory remains to be seen. Although everything looks good
for the moment, we are still well served to remember the admonition




To Be or Not to Be, That
is the Data Structure
It is time now to refine our formulation of the kind of dual aspect
monism which we dubbed "cybernetic realism" in the first two chapters
on objectivity and subjectivity. I would like especially to distance the
present position from the naive notion that there is a mental aspect to
every material entity or process. We will not suggest that it feels like
something to be any material substance at all (however impoverished that
feeling may be, like the photon who perhaps feels either up or down and
nothing more); instead, we will examine the idea that it feels like
something to be particular kinds of materially instantiated dynamic data
structures which we'll call self models.28 (Presently we'll have more to say
about what constitutes a data structure.) This is a refinement on the
cybernetic realism position, where we indicated that it was like something
to be particular kinds of material entities; now we are suggesting that it is
like something to be particular kinds of materially instantiated data
structures. To put it very crudely, the / does not lie in the material entity
per se, the I lies in the self model which may be instantiated by the
material entity.
Whether, from a linguistic point of view, this is a legitimate point
of departure for trying to get an empirical grasp on the subject of conscious
experience is a matter which we shall not debate. I eschew entirely
ridiculous arguments of the form, "I have a pain in my tooth; instantiated
28 I am grateful to Sue Blackmore (University of the West of England) for the conversations
which first inspired my exploration of self models. The basic idea of locating consciousness
in such models originated, in its present form, with her, and appears very sketchily in
Blackmore (1993). See especially her Chapters 7, 10, and 11 for applications of the self
model idea to explaining problems in psychology at a higher level of description than we
address here. The idea has also been taken up by the mutual friend Thomas Metzinger
(Zentrum fur Philosophie und Crundlagen der Wissenschaft der Justus-Liebig-Universitat),
who has made some initial attempts at formalising self model descriptions. (Metzinger
1993)
data structures do not have teeth; therefore I am not an instantiated data
structure". Someone sympathetic to this argument must work harder
than that to convince me that I don't know of many examples of
instantiated data structures with teeth, including myself. (Of course, I also
know of many instantiated data structures without teeth, including some
boxers, some old age pensioners, and the list of phone numbers I keep on
my computer.) For the most part in this dissertation, we shall be
concerned with getting at "what makes a system go" and not with sorting
out how to fit our language to that reality or why our pre-theoretic
applications of language might be misleading, and we certainly won't
engage in prejudging central problems of philosophy with linguistic tricks.
Linguistic smoke and mirrors, after all, do not make for good
philosophical reflections.
We can hardly pretend that the word 'I' or the word 'self' is sharp
and well understood by linguists, philosophers, or psychologists, and we
will not here tilt at the windmills which may emerge out of confused and
perhaps inconsistent sets of propositions about what makes a self. Instead,
I hope the picture which will emerge from this way of viewing the self
may improve our understanding of the sense of the word itself. Perhaps
under this approach the concept of self will be both better defined and
different in some key respects to how it might have been seen before.
Given more space, we might begin to explore the many implications of
locating the self in an instantiated data structure, but for now it will do
simply to examine some basic rationale behind it and some of the
cognitive neuroscience to which we may appeal to render the idea
attractive as more than just a philosophical ruse.
5.1 If Not a Data Structure, Then What?
Having said that, it is useful at least to situate the data structure
view of selfhood within a rather meagre context of other possible views of
the self which might grow out of the dominant approaches to philosophy
of mind. The classic approach, of course, is mind body dualism, and at
first blush it offers the clearest idea of what it is to be me: the self is simply
a non-spatial ethereal spirit "inhabiting" a material body with which it is
for now somehow linked. This view packs all the interesting questions
about conscious subjects into a nonmaterial spirit beyond the grasp of
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objective third person empirical inquiry and, while intuitively appealing,
it does less to answer questions about the self than it does to cordon them
off into an unbreachable fortress of mystery.29 Curiously, materialist
views often have more in common with this dualist tradition than most
hard-headed cognitive scientists like to admit. (And the self model
approach is no exception, although we will be more up front about our
own "dualist" leanings!) Both so-called "strong AI", for instance, as well
as the bulk of functionalist approaches to mind, emphasise the importance
of what a material substrate is doing over the material substrate itself. In
strong AI we are concerned with what algorithm is being instantiated, and
in functionalism we are concerned with what functional relationships are
being maintained in a complex input/output system. In both cases, the
approach amounts to a sort of hardware/software dualism. Within these
approaches, questions about the self are rarely broached, but when they
are, they ought to be addressed with analytical tools from both the
hardware and the software side of things. So far, however, neither camp
has mobilised these tools to produce any profound comments on what it
means to be a subject of conscious awareness.
Presently we will engage these problems head on. Our approach is
not that of either strong AI or functionalism or even of Cartesian dualism,
but in making sense of self models there are lessons to be learnt from both
the successes and failures of the other approaches. Exploring the self
model approach requires bringing the self out of the Cartesian closet and
digging through the technical flash of functionalism and related areas of
cognitive science, where all too often neurophysiological and
psychological data paired with a little computer programming may numb
an audience into an overly optimistic impression of the progress being
made on really tough philosophical questions. Whatever conception of
the self we bring to the discussion must be temporarily set aside so the self
model picture can be brought into focus without undue influence from
other (underdeveloped) views. In what follows, it may be useful even to
pretend for a moment that we have encountered some human who has
for all his or her life thought of the self as an instantiated data structure.
Where our philosophical intuitions clash with those of this hypothetical
29 While it is hardly necessary to offer references for such a vast literature as that
surrounding the dualist approach to the mind body problem, its thorough and systematic
destruction of dualism from the inside out merits Smith and Jones (1986) special mention.
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individual, what questions would we ask of them to see where they might
have gone wrong? How would we convince them that our way of
thinking, whatever it might be, is better? What, if anything, is wrong
when they say, "I am a data structure"? The Birmingham philosopher
and computer scientist Aaron Sloman is fond of saying that people who
refuse to accept something like a functionalist approach to cognition are
simply in need of long term philosophical therapy. Appropriating his
saying, perhaps in the end we will have some opinion on whether it is
our hypothetical self model individual or someone with a more standard
view who might be in need of such therapy.
In what follows, I have adopted the strategy of first describing in
broad strokes what kinds of things we mean by self models and what some
of the immediate consequences might be of seating experience in them.
We discuss some ramifications of the self model view as if a full
understanding of their material instantiation were a fait accompli. I ask
for a little philosophical indulgence to explore the explanatory power of
the idea and some of its consequences before fully fleshing out how we (or
a brain) would go about implementing such structures. I hope the sceptic
will not abandon the project in the early woolly stages and will reserve
judgement at least until some of the more detailed technical explorations
to follow!
So, before embarking on an exploration of the particular neural
mechanisms which may be involved in the material implementation of a
dynamic data structure called a self model, let's take a tour through some
of the characteristic properties of such data structures and make some
slight refinements to the sense in which we above located the / in the self
model.
5.2 Self Models Have More Fun
It should be clear from our discussions of the cybernetic realist's
brand of dual aspect monism that many questions remain unanswered
concerning the relationship between the activity of material structures and
the subjective experiences with which such activity may be correlated.
One central question, of course, is how sensation itself arises: how is it
that the subject of conscious experience has any experience at all? What
makes the human experience of a flying mallet different than a table's
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experience of the same? Moreover, why does a subject experience a sense
of colour or of taste or of smell rather than a sense of, say, neural firings in
the neocortex? And along the same lines, how can a sensation be
continuous when neurons are discrete units? Secondary questions, barely
less baffling, concern the process of learning to categorise perceptions in a
world free of a priori labels, the development of sensori-motor
coordination in somatic time, and the role of imagination and procedural
memory in the experiential landscape of a conscious being.
We may illuminate all these kinds of questions by appeal to the
concept of self models which we have just introduced. Centrally, we can
interpret sensations (or other conscious experiences) as changes to the self
model data structure. That is, to say that I am seeing red is to say that my
self model is undergoing a change brought about by neural responses to
certain radiation impinging on the retina. Cognition can be understood in
the same way, so that to say I have just mentally added five and seven is to
say that my self model has undergone a certain transformation brought
about by changes in the firing patterns of my neurons. We shall outline in
the next section some of the crucial features of self model data structures
which distinguish them from other data structures, but for the moment,
just to get a handle on what we mean by 'data structure', we may appeal to
a digital computer example.30
One data structure which is found in one form or another in almost
all modern computers is the stack. In the abstract, a stack is a linear
structure where pieces of data can be "pushed" one after another for
temporary storage; later, they can be "popped" into a central processing
unit register according to the LIFO (last in, first out) protocol. The contents
of the stack may be changed directly by the programmer by means of
instructions which push and pop data; alternatively, they may be changed
by the central processing unit itself when, for instance, it encounters a
branch or interrupt to a subroutine. In this second case, the processor
pushes a note of the next memory location to process for instructions after
the subroutine is completed. To return from the subroutine, the CPU
30 It will become progressively clearer that the self model view on offer here is in no way
wedded to the classical computing paradigm and is in many ways incompatible with it;
despite the use of the 'data structure' moniker, the view does not rely on the data processing
or so-called instructionist paradigm, and our data structures needn't have any resemblance
at all to the well-defined symbolic data structures of classical computing. (See also
Chapter 11.) Nonetheless, the field offers a wealth of examples for thinking about the
general concepts to which we appeal.
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pops the memory location back off the stack and resumes taking
instructions from that point. /4s a data structure, the stack is acted upon by
the "external" influence of the CPU. Although the stack is of course a
seriously impoverished example of a complex data structure, the example
illustrates the sort of thing we mean when we say a dynamic data structure
is undergoing a change.
Notice that as a data structure, the stack may be implemented in any
number of different ways on any number of different hardware
architectures. If we look inside five different makes of computers, we may
find the stack implemented in five entirely different physical locations
and by altogether dissimilar types of hardware componentry. At a higher
level, the organisation of the pointers or handles which are part of the
instantiation of the stack—and which themselves might be thought of as
an even more impoverished kind of data structure—may also be very
different on different machines or under alternative operating systems.
Notice also that as a data structure, the stack is ignorant of details of the
activities of the CPU (although it is altered by it), and it is ignorant of all
the low level aspects of the machine's hardware such as the physical
placement of memory chips and the flow of electrons through flip flops.
We will soon see in more detail how both these characteristics are shared
with self model data structures. Having just appealed to a digital
computer example to elucidate the idea of a data structure, however, let's
first make some brief notes about consciousness and data structures from
the vantage point of what will be an ongoing theme of this material:
explanation of observations at various levels of description.
5.3 Self Models on Top
One of the most important points to keep in mind with respect to
the present kind of analysis of consciousness is that by seeking to
understand high level features of consciousness through reductionist
methodologies, we are not seeking somehow to reduce the features
themselves. By locating consciousness in data structures and examining
the properties of those data structures, we are just trying to see how the
higher level features emerge from lower level interactions and not trying
to show that the higher level features have no real existence or
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importance apart from being a handy way of describing a host of lower
level interactions. An example from mathematics is useful here.
Suppose we would like to understand the process of raising a
number to the power of a real number exponent. There are many
observations we might make about exponentiation and the relationships
between different exponentiated bases and about the role of
exponentiation in other kinds of mathematical processes. But the most
straightforward way of understanding the mechanics of how to compute
the result of raising a base to a real number exponent requires an
understanding of logarithms. Understanding the mechanics of computing
logarithms (as opposed to understanding how to use them in other
processes) again requires understanding the mechanics of multiplication,
which in turn requires understanding the mechanics of addition. Yet real
number exponentiation is an important abstraction in its own right, and it
is a process which does not emerge at all without a sufficiently complex set
of (at the lowest level) "mere" additions. The complexity of real number
exponentiation is not identical to the complexity of addition; it is an
emergent feature—which is "more than the sum of its parts"—of multiple
additions put together in the right way.
Something very similar, I would argue, is true of consciousness.
While it may be implemented at the lowest level by neural interactions,
that does not mean it does not have important features at higher levels of
description which really wouldn't make any more sense if expressed at a
lower level than, say, a complicated real number exponentiation would
make if expressed at the level of repeated additions. Moreover, in the case
of something like a self model instantiated by a brain—and this is slightly
different to the mathematical example, where often a theorem may be re¬
cast as an axiom and the original axioms proven again as theorems from
the new axioms—there may be features of the dynamics of low level
structures which only make sense when they are seen as elements of a
higher order structure. This notion invokes no spooky downward
causation or some such: it is simply akin to the fact that atoms within a
molecule, for instance, may evolve over time through paths which they
would never take (or, at least, would be very unlikely to take) if they were
not parts of the molecule.31 The molecule "abstraction", although it
31 This statement is meant to be taken at face value for the present context and not as a
substantive comment on the relationship between physics and chemistry.
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ultimately comes down to organisations of atoms, is a useful higher level
of description which may be applied in explaining observed behaviour.
The same is true of a binary star system: we don't observe lone stars
moving in the kinds of orbital patterns through which stars in a binary
system move. The two levels of description ("binary star system" and
"this star here" together with "that star over there") offer complementary
vantage points from which to explain observed astronomical behaviour.
Indeed, it is difficult and uneconomical to try to understand everything
about the observed stellar behaviour without knowing something about
each of at least these two levels of description.
With this caveat in mind, we may shortly move on to
characterising features of the self model data structure. First, however, we
explore briefly two consequences of taking the data structure as a point of
departure for understanding conscious experience. These relate to
ubiquitous questions about qualia and to the "blindness" of the self model
to the substrate (neural or otherwise) which may instantiate it.
5.4 Tiresias was a Self Model
It is significant that in seating experience in the evolution of a data
structure, we have linked the phenomenal quality of an experience to the
capacity of the object of experience to bring about change in the data
structure which is the subject. Given the extent of the debate in
philosophy of mind over the existence of non-relational qualities of sense
experience, or qualia, and given the importance of this point for
understanding the thrust of cybernetic realism, let's take a closer look at
what this means. For the moment, let's assume that any change in the self
model as a data structure is functionally relevant to the system
concerned.32 (That is, changes to the data structure are not gratuitous from
the vantage point of the system, just as changes in the stack are not
gratuitous from the vantage point of the computer.) This view then
suggests that if the functional role of a given experience were different—
i.e., if the object of experience changed the self model data structure in a
different way—then the quality of that experience would be different. And
32 This is not to say that every change in the material instantiation of the data structure is
functionally relevant. The point is just that, as we see in the following chapter, the self
model typically reflects evolution of functionally important subsystems; thus, it follows
that changes in the self model typically indicate changes in such subsystems.
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the relationship works the other way as well: if the quality of the
experience is different, so too must its role in the system be different.
(After all, to say the self reacts to something differently is in this context
just what we mean when we say the quality of an experience is different.)
Since the quality of experience is, on this view, a property of the change in
the data structure—and given the restriction that any change to the data
structure is functionally relevant—there is no sense in speaking of the
quality as something unrelated to the functional role of the experience.33
Thus, on this view, qualia are not non-relational. (Or, equivalently, if we
understand qualia to be strictly non-relational, then qualia do not exist.)
We can elucidate the point with a line of thought similar to
Dennett's (1988): could we conceive of our pain qualia suddenly changing
and being more like our pleasure qualia (perhaps with the two changing
places, as in "inverted qualia" examples)? Perhaps we could, but on the
present view, this would require that there was also a change in the
functional role of pain. The reason is simple: regardless of the quality we
might like to imagine being associated with pain, if pain still fulfils the
same role, then we must still find ourselves reacting to it in the same way
(disliking it, wanting to avoid it, associating and comparing it in the same
way we always have with other sensations, and so forth). Conversely, if
we find ourselves reacting to pain in a different way (liking it, seeking it,
associating it differently with other sensations or previous pain
sensations, etc.), then not only is it no longer pain, but clearly its role in
the data structure is also different. It does not make sense to speak of the
quality of pain turning to the quality of pleasure, if we still don't like it and
still respond to it in exactly the same way as ordinary pain! (Consider: "I
have agonising chronic pain in my back, but it's alright, since I've had a
special operation so that I rather enjoy agonising chronic pain.") This is
akin to Dennett's coffee taster who doesn't know whether coffee tastes the
same as it used to but he now no longer likes that same taste, or whether
the taste of the coffee is actually now different and he doesn't like the new
taste. Apparently it is not only true that we could not verify an answer to
33 Of course, a given cognitive system might go on functioning in just the same way,
regardless of some tiny difference in the "quality" of two possible stimuli, but if that
system were able to report this tiny difference, then it would be functioning differently
with respect to the two. (It's challenging to search for ways of saying anything meaningful
about such differences, or even about a single stimulus, without appealing to some kind of
ultimately relational description. I, for one, am at a loss.)
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such a question if one were given, but it doesn't even make sense to ask
the question. Notwithstanding Puccetti's (1993) criticism in a related
context that Dennett (1991) misunderstands verificationism and offers a
poor justification for his verificationist tendencies, we can at least be sure
that it doesn't make sense to speak of there being any difference between
the two possibilities in terms of the coffee taster's experience. Is his
experience the result of a taste bud change or a preference change? There
might be a matter of fact as to whether the coffee taster's taste buds have
changed or whether something else in his brain has changed, but if his self
model data structure changes the same regardless of whether the taste
buds are different or the brain is different, then there is no difference to
experiential quality.
Thus, with the cybernetic realist line developed earlier, we are not
in the business of trying to attribute some kind of epiphenomenal quality
to the experience of systems with brains or other appropriate material
structures. Cybernetic realism merely allows us to attribute experience to
the kinds of data structures we are presently exploring. It is the position
that there is a quality of experience to changes in certain data structures,
even if that quality can only be described relationally, and even if the
"feel" of that quality cannot be logically deduced from objective
descriptions of the material substrate instantiating the data structure.
Without such a position, we would still be stuck in the first person
wondering if other data structures just like our own felt anything at all.
With respect to qualia, like Dennett I am not suggesting that there are no
qualities of experience but only that these qualities of conscious experience
remain relational. This coheres with Shoemaker's (1975; see also Davis
1982b) early analysis of qualia which suggested that if experience devoid of
qualia (zombies again!) were empirically indistinguishable from
experience with qualia, then qualia would have no causal role, and we
could not be introspectively aware of them. Along the lines of Carleton's
(1983) analysis, this view is probably essentially correct, despite Block's
objection (1980; see also Shoemaker's 1981 reply) that qualia could play a
causal role which was independent of the functional description of a given
subject. (See Tye 1993 for an interesting but probably inadequate comment
on evidence from neurophysiology and "absent qualia".)
On a similar note, in seating experience in the evolution of an
instantiated data structure, we have eliminated any relationship between
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the quality of that model's experience and qualities of the material
substrate instantiating it—except for the extent to which properties of that
material substrate affect the evolution of the data structure. Just as the
stack as a data structure is blind to the peculiarities of the hardware
implementing it, so too is the self model blind to the properties of its
material substrate. If something makes no difference to the evolution of
the self model, then it makes no difference to the experience of the self
model. If the same data structure could be instantiated by two systems,
then neural wetware would feel just the same as silicon hardware! (see
Cuda 1985)
Further observations about the consequences of the self model
approach, including important conclusions for the so-called grain problem
(how is continuous conscious experience implemented by discrete
neurons?) and a variety of the frame problem (how do we know what
pieces of data are relevant to completing a task at hand?), must await a
more detailed explanation of the actual mechanisms we would expect to
see in self model data structures. Moving in that direction, in the next two
chapters we examine in more detail some characteristics of the data
structure itself, see how it may be distinguished from other data structures
which may be implemented by the same underlying material structures,
and compare the self model view to functionalism.
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6
How to Find a Self Model
in a Crowd
Perhaps the most noteworthy property of the self model data
structure is that it is a functional representation of the entire system of
which it is itself a part. Exploring this idea will be the central task of the
next two chapters. We will also explore the role of compression in such a
data structure and the notion of a "virtual window" which comes from it.
We will see that a self model couples the loss of information about low
level process with the emergence of new information about higher level
processes, and we will note the importance of the polymodal associations
this makes possible and give a sneak preview of the architectural
reentrance which implements them. The place of environmental
feedback in such associations and the significance of the self model's
nearly arbitrary combinatorial capacity will become clear. Finally, we
prepare the way for the next chapter's exploration of the relationship of
the self model view to the broad class of theories of functionalism and
discuss what we are not saying about the merits of such theories.
Incidentally, we omit here a number of basic properties which are fairly
obvious characteristics of the kinds of systems we are concerned with. For
instance, the material instantiation of a self model must have a degree of
plasticity, since otherwise it could not "remember" or change with respect
to its environment or its own internal factors. I trust it will not be a
criticism of the view on offer that such basics are missed out entirely for
the sake of devoting our attention to more interesting material!
6.1 The Self's Self Reference
The basic property of the self model, from which the name derives,
is its functional representation of the entire system of which it is a part. By
a 'functional' relationship, we mean that the self model is not merely a
picture of the system, but that it is something like a small copy of the
system which preserves a close resemblance with the functional
relationships between various components of the entire system.34 Most
importantly, the functional relationships between components in the
model may be activated with all, some, or no activation at all of the
represented parts of the system. In other words, the self model needn't
always mirror the exact current state of the system; the self model may
become temporarily "disengaged" from the reality of the actual system of
which it is a part. It is this property which allows the self model to
simulate various actions of the system without requiring the whole
system to participate in the exercise. Under the direction of the self model,
an action may be "tried on for size" without actually engaging in it, and
the information stored in the relationships of the self model may provide
a rough indication of the effect on the system itself of actually performing
the action. We will examine these two properties of the self model—
functional representation of the system and differential activation of
represented componentry of the system—each in turn.
The representation of the system itself can be understood through
an analogy with cartography. One type of flat map of the surface of the
Earth, called a Mercator projection, is made by a process something like
placing a light source at the centre of a transparent globe on which the
Earth's surface is painted. If we place a cylinder of paper over the globe,
tangent to it at the equator (or, a related scheme, two cones of paper,
tangent at 45° north latitude and 45° south latitude), we may trace on the
paper an outline of the map painted on the globe. By increasing the
diameter of the cylinder of paper, we can get a larger and larger scale
representation of the map on the globe. In the case of the self model, we
are doing something like the reverse process: we are shining a "light"
(through what might be a very large cylinder in the map example) from
the outside, through the various sensory modalities of the system, on to a
representational data structure of the entire system contained inside.
Significantly, the self model represents additional features which don't
exist in the reverse Mercator projection example: it also represents the
activity of internal structures. There are of course no functional
34 Much later we will see how the notion of representation given here may be misleading,
but for now it will do no harm to use the term, as long as we don't try to read implications
into the discussion apart from what we explicitly address. (See also Chapter 11.)
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relationships between curves painted on a globe (or between them and
anything internal to the globe), so the analogy breaks down again there; in
the self model, the "projected" ("injected"?) representation preserves the
relationships which exist between components—both internal and
sensory—of the system being represented. (Later we will discuss the extent
to which the model may also add to the relationships being represented.)
The self model may represent sensori-motor relationships as well as
associations between sensory input or motor output and the states of other
internal components.
The second property of the self model representation of the entire
system of which it is itself a part concerns the activation relationship
between components of the representation and components of the system
represented. The key idea is that the functional relationships which exist
between components of the entire system also exist between components
of the representation. Moreover, activations at the self model level may
remain correlated with activations at the level of the system, even if
activation at the self model level has originated at that representational
level rather than coming from system input. Thus, ignoring the system
itself for a moment, we may get an indication of the response of the entire
system to a given set of conditions by activating components of the self
model in a way similar to that in which they ivould be activated if the
system itself were actually in that set of conditions. With respect to the
two-way relationship between system and self model—for the self model
is again no mere epiphenomenal image—the response of the self model
may even induce a response at the system level. This capacity for
differential two-way activation of model components by system
components and vice versa, allows for a complex class of overall states
displaying mixtures of environmental and internal input/output activity
throughout the system.
To illustrate with an implausibly simplified human example, my
visual field might actually be filled (for our purposes, at the system level)
with the hill and flowering trees out my window, yet I could be visually
imagining (for our purposes, at the self model level) a vegetable stir-fry
which causes my mouth to water. My stomach might even begin to
grumble in anticipation of food at the same time that I shift in my seat
because of an association with sore legs the last time I walked up the hill I
see in my visual field. In this case, perhaps, the "attention" of the self
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model is split between two visual images, and two different reactions are
arising in the system, one as a result of direct visual input and the other as
a result of imagined visual input. Here both the direct system level
stimulation of the visual field with the hill and flowering trees and the
stimulation at the self model level with the imagined visual input of a
vegetable stir fry have an effect at both the self model level and the system
level. We will have much more to say on this topic later; for now,
however, the important point is just that correlated functional
relationships may exist at both the self model level and the system level as
well as between the two levels.
6.2 Compression—Fitting it All In
One feature of the self model's system representation which is
present also in the reverse Mercator projection analogy is compression of
information about the system. That is, relative to what is being
represented by the self model, the actual representation is denser. Unlike
the reverse Mercator projection, however, we are here dealing with
discretely instantiated projections, and the compressions are what
information specialists term Tossy'—i.e., there is a loss of information as
we move from the original to the compressed representation. In other
words, given only the compressed representation, we cannot reconstruct
precisely the source object of the representation. This is not to say that the
original cannot be reconstructed at all, but only that some of the finer
details may be lost. (Indeed, we shall see later that real self model
representations are rarely, if ever, actually "reconstructed" at all.) What
exactly we mean by this in terms of neural organisation will become
clearer in our later discussions of actual architectures for implementing
self models, but for now we can say that the activity of highly correlated
areas of a system may be represented by a single smaller area of the
representation.
This is roughly akin to a way of representing a crowd of football fans
which we might use if we were only interested in how noisy they were. A
single measure of increasing volume in terms of decibels or even a
simpler scale of 'raucous', 'very raucous', 'obnoxiously raucous', and
'English' might serve as a lossy representation of the whole lot. From the
decibel measure or from the raucousness measure, we could not
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reconstruct detailed information about what each individual football fan
was doing or how they sounded, but we would have an indication of their
overall level of noisiness.
A key property of the self model is the capacity selectively to
"decompress" this kind of representation of a given area of the system.
This is not true decompression in the sense of recovering something like
an original image from a smaller representation of it; instead, this
decompression amounts to the self model's "looking" through the
representation more closely at the actual system level activity being
represented. This is best understood with a preview of the architectural
implementation of the idea: when the attention of the self model is
directed towards the activity of a particular part of the system available in
lossy form in a representation, the output channels of the actual
components of the system are disinhibited so that they, rather than the
lossy self model representation, provide afferent signals to the rest of the
relevant parts of the whole system. Thus, no representation is decoded
into any "display space": the functional arrangement of the system is
simply altered slightly so a different set of neurons (with the "original",
more complete, information) is providing data. This is roughly akin to,
say, being aware of an apple sitting on the table directly in front of you but
not being able to report very much about it until you deliberately pay
particular attention to extracting the details of its shape and colouring.
Of course, there is a limit to the extent of the area over which this
pseudo-decompression can be carried out at a given time; the finite
number of components implementing the self model places an upper
bound on the number of afferent signals which can be meaningfully (in
terms of functional effect on the self model data structure) processed at a
given time. Such a bound on the size of the "virtual window", or
"abstraction window", through which the system may be seen, however,
does not by itself preclude the selective decompression of any arbitrary
sequence of areas of the system in turn. This is akin to scanning an entire
horizon through a pair of field glasses: although we can extract detailed
information about any area of the horizon, we cannot see it all at once in
such detail because we don't have enough "space" in our visual field.
(The self model is lacking in "space" in the sense that it has limited
componentry.) But by sweeping the field glasses across the horizon,
however, we can eventually see all of it in great detail.
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What may place a second limit on the self model's capacity for such
selective decompression in the human, however, is the actual physical
bound on dendritic arborisation, which is closely related to the number of
relevant afferent signals a single neuron is capable of receiving. Although
it is possible in principle that a diagram of all the connections in a brain
might form what mathematicians call a connected graph35—that is, a
diagram of nodes and connections in which it is possible to travel along
some series of connections between any two arbitrary nodes—
neurophysiological considerations make it highly unlikely that this is the
case. Thus, there may well be a limit to the system area decompressible
(even indirectly, with the intervention of a number of intermediate
neurons) by any finite set of neurons implementing an area of a self
model. In practice, this limit may be more theoretical than practical, since
the sparse activity distributions of real networks of neurons indicates that
the sheer number of neurons involved in implementing an area of a self
model may generally be well in excess of the number required for
reasonable decompression of any of the system areas to which it is
functionally related. (We will revisit something like this kind of
redundancy later when we discuss neuronal degeneracy.)
In any case, the main point for the moment is that components of
the self model are lossy representations of the system, but some amount of
the detail of the activity at levels lower than the representations can be
extracted by looking through a "virtual window", or "abstraction
window", and selectively disinhibiting the outputs of the actual
components of these areas. This loss of information as we move from the
system level to the self model with only selective and limited recovery of
the original information is counterbalanced, however, by the emergence
of higher order information within the self model, and it is to this idea
that we now turn our attention.
6.3 Tricks with Information
As we noted above, through higher level representation in the self
model, there is a loss of immediate information about the actual activity
35 In fact, the graph would need to be directed and weighted as well, since neural signals
travel in only one direction and since edges, or connections—which here correspond to
synapses—have differential capacities for carrying signals (i.e., different efficacies).
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of individual lower level components. This is not unlike the loss of
information which goes on unavoidably in an ordinary digital
computer.36 A flip flop (occasionally called a bi-stable multivibrator or,
more often, simply a bi-stable) is a lossy representation of the states of the
individual transistors which make it up, just as the individual transistor
states of the flip flop are lossy representations of the states of the electrons
flowing through them. Subsequent logic operations lose information
about the states of the individual flip flops which preceded them, and
outputs are many to one logical operations on sets of these input states, so
the output here is again lossy. This loss of information proceeds up
through various software levels as well.
However this loss of information at each level in an actual system
with a self model—as each node or neuron loses information about the
individual activity patterns behind its afferent signals and outputs only its
own particular spiking behaviour derived from them—is coupled with
the emergence of new information at higher levels. It is at these higher
levels where information-carrying correlations may be set up between
nodes which are abstracting the information fed to them. In other words,
the self model may lose information about the lowest level neural
happenings while extracting higher level information about correlations
between different parts of the system and relationships between different
more detailed feature maps.
By way of analogy, we might consider the kinds of comparisons
which could be drawn between trees. With very detailed information
about the molecular structure of leaves, for instance, we could identify the
presence of common organic molecules. By moving our observations up
a level, we might notice what leaves look like, and we might be able to see
the similarities between different kinds of leaves from different kinds of
trees. Notice that these things don't appear if we're looking only at
information about molecular structure. Moving up to a still less detailed
36 I am aware that it was established more than two decades ago (Bennett 1973) that
computation does not require this kind of information loss and that a substantial literature
has developed around the idea of reversible computing. This literature includes computing
designs of both a classical (Fredkin and Toffoli 1982) and quantum nature (Benioff 1980,
1982; later Deutsch 1989 and others) and Bennett's (1982) own Turing machines, not to
mention comments on the implications of reversible computation for the second law of
thermodynamics. (See Leff and Rex 1980 for Maxwell's Daemon; Zurek 1989 for one thought
on the daemon and reversible computation.) However, we are concerned with finite living
biological organisms for whom the annihilation of some information—the energy costly and
irreversible part of computation—is a precondition of adaptation and selection.
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level, we might lose all idea about molecular structure, but we could
observe that the gross shapes of many different trees are very similar to
one another, and moving up still another level, we could even begin to
make observations about forests. If we had some huge data collecting
apparatus which could take in information about an entire stand of trees
right down to the molecular level, all of these observations could be made
starting with the same data set, but to avoid missing the forest for the
trees, so to speak, we would need to deal with abstractions extracted from
the data. That is, we would have to throw out some of the detail in the
original information, representing some groups of data all together; only
then could we see how the groups of data relate to each other.
It is just this same kind of emergent information which occurs in
the digital computer—where coherent data structures can be formed out of
a high level representation of a bunch of whizzing electrons whose
behaviour would actually look stochastic and bizarre if we peered in on
them closely enough—and which, I suggest, occurs in a system possessed
of a self model. It is only at the level of representation—which for our
purposes presently we can read as "level of abstraction"—available to the
self model where functionally relevant information37 can appear about
relationships between various parts of the system and between the system
and its environment. Indeed, in keeping with the notion that all
information is and can only be physical (Landauer 1991), it is almost self
evident that these relationships between various parts of a system can
only emerge in a functionally relevant role when there is this kind of
hierarchical abstraction and the loss of information which accompanies it.
Next we shall explore the meaning and significance of anatomical features
of reentrance and heterarchical organisation as they relate to the
formation of polymodal associations from this emergent higher level
information.
6.4 Associations upon Associations
The kinds of information emergence which we discussed in the
previous section are of course not limited to cases where a single body of
37 This qualifier is added only in view of the fact that although correlations already exist
between components at the lowest levels of the system—just as the forest is already there in
the mountains of molecular structure data—until they are extracted by some other
component the correlations themselves can have, as such, no functional role.
76
data are being processed, as in observing forests and trees and the
molecular structure of leaves. Rather, it is entirely likely that in biological
systems, we will observe the extraction of information about correlations
between groups of data available to two different modes of input. That is,
we may see two parallel hierarchies of abstraction from two different data
sets—perhaps gathered in two different modalities—coupled with the
extraction of information about correlations between the two hierarchies.
Something like this kind of multimodal association may occur, for
instance, when objects recognised from visual cortex data are correlated
with odours recognised from olfactory cortex data. Almost as if it were a
degenerate example of classical conditioning, we may then observe the
learned association of the visual appearance of a food with its smell.
Looking ahead again to the more detailed architectural descriptions
to come, we can see that such an association might develop easily when
adaptive mechanisms ensure the effective mutual exchange of excitatory
neurotransmitters between two groups of neurons which are each
primarily responsive to the activation of particular representations from
different modalities. Where activity in the groups being represented is
correlated, so, too, may the activity of the representing groups become
correlated and mutually reinforcing. Even with activity inhibited from
the array to which one of the groups normally responds, the excitatory
input from the other group responding to its own preferred inputs may be
sufficient to drive the activity of the first to significantly above the base
level.
The anatomical features which enable the development of these
kinds of associations are bound up with three characteristics known as
reentrance, recursivity, and heterarchy. The first is a broad term referring
to axonal arborisation from, say, a feature map, into the input areas of
another feature map (or even back into the dendritic areas of the feature
map from which the reentering neuron itself took its own input).38 In
other words, it is a way for two usually separate groups of neurons to share
their outputs. The majority of central nervous systems in the vertebrate
world are structurally reentrant, either locally or across wider areas.
(Brodal 1981) Recursivity is the term used in artificial neural network
design to denote the powerful technique of using feedback from the
38 Alternatively, the term may refer to dendritic arborisation into the appropriate
efferent areas.
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output layer of what would otherwise be a feedforward network back to
the input layer, and it can be understood in our context as the special case
of reentry noted parenthetically above. The last term, heterarchical
organisation, refers simply to an hierarchical structure with any kind of
interlevel feedback. Later we shall explore in more detail the role of these
kinds of organisation—particularly of reentry in general—in enabling the
development of polymodal associations in the self model. For the
moment, however, there is more to say about why these associations are
important at the level of the self model.
These cross-modal associations are important in the self model not
only for the establishment of such basic abilities as visuo-motor
coordination, but they also may well be an enabling factor in the
development of language abilities. Contra Lieberman (1984, 1985, 1989), I
agree with Wilkins and Wakefield (forthcoming) that the development of
an "association cortex" in the so-called POT (parietal-occipital-temporal)
and Broca's areas of the human brain was the anatomically necessary
evolutionary precondition (which first appeared in Homo habilis some 2.5
to 2 million years ago) of language use, rather than the emergence of the
modern vocal tract, which apparently (Arensburg, et al 1990) came much
later. Wilkins and Wakefield, however, suggest that "by the time sensory
information is transferred to the POT, it has already undergone higher
order processing and relinquished its uni-modal character; POT
representation of sensory input is therefore entirely modality-non-specific,
or modality-free". (See Pandya and Yeterian 1985 for more specific
cytoarchitectonic features of the POT which bear on its integration of data
from the three primary neocortical sensory association areas.) The
conclusion of this sentence appears to be a non sequitur, and the
conclusion in general is, I believe, deeply misguided. The
cytoarchitectonic properties of the POT to which Wilkins and Wakefield
point do suggest the emergence of polymodal associations, but getting
from there to amodality is another matter.
Unfortunately, I do not have the opportunity for an extended
engagement on this issue, but the basic point can be made very easily:
Wilkins and Wakefield give too little consideration to the fact that
neurons always get their inputs from somewhere. Their theory of
association in the POT and Broca's areas is meant to be compatible with
Jackendoff's theory of conceptual structure (see, for instance, Jackendoff
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1983, 1987, 1990), but I believe the anatomical price is too high for the kind
of rendition Wilkins and Wakefield are seeking. Specifically, we should
not give up the anatomical grounding (for entry into the growing
literature on the symbol grounding problem, see Harnad 1987, 1990, 1992,
1993; Harnad, et al 1991; also Ford and Hayes 1991) of association symbols
in polymodal data for the sake of achieving abstraction.
That is, I believe it is a grave error to suggest that representations in
a real biological organism (as opposed to, say, representations in a book)
could be abstracted completely away from some kind of modal input. This
is to say that any abstract representation must be applicable to some kind of
(perhaps polymodal) input and, moreover, that it must similarly have
arisen from such input. To put it still another way, a representation may
get farther and farther away from the sensory inputs, but it cannot exist in
a functionally relevant role in complete isolation from the world.39
We will examine later the possible role of representations of the self
model itself, a purely internal set of structures, yet even in this case—
insofar as the self model itself is a model of a system and its sensory
windows on the environment—any purported complete divorce from
polymodal input remains an illusion. Indeed, it may be the very efficacy
of polymodal representations in language itself and the relative strength
of associations between representations partly abstracted from polymodal
data as compared to the strength of the associations between the
representations and the polymodal data themselves which is responsible
for this illusion of amodality. For the moment, I leave the idea as
speculation, but there may be considerable mileage in the notion that this
illusion of amodality is even at work in persuading us of the prima facie
plausibility of the general existence of non-relational qualities of
experience, or qualia. The same kind of illusion might occur with respect
to abstractions arising from a single modality; thus our capacity to name
some abstraction common to all varieties of a particular kind of modal
experience but allegedly independent of the particular relational qualities
of any of them (the "redness" of the red, for instance) may lead us to
39 Lest this be confused with the incorrect assertion that signals from a representation
might somehow flow "backwards" to those groups which activated it, notice that we are
saying only that representation is responsive to polymodal activations; this doesn't imply
that activation of a polymodal representation need directly cause the activation of
anything in neural assemblies dedicated to those modalities which activate it.
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believe that such associative abstractions accurately reflect real properties
of our experience.
In the present context, however, we must leave such interesting
questions to the side and continue with our tour of basic properties of self
model data structures. Before turning to features of self models related
more to their interactions with the environment, we next consider
another property closely related to the emergence of the kinds of higher
level information and polymodal associations which we have just been
exploring.
6.5 Building on Associations upon Associations
This property derives again from the emergence of higher level
information and the extraction of polymodal associations by the self
model. Specifically, we are concerned with the capacity for applying new
(i.e., not previously experienced) combinations of associations which this
enables. That is, we should expect in the self model a capacity for
"connecting" previously independent areas of activity and for building
new correlations where before there may have been none. This robust
combinatorial capacity is of course significant for a variety of endeavours,
but arguably one of the most important and sophisticated of them is in the
kind of linguistic application of polymodal associations which we
discussed above.
In the first instance, this capacity will be limited in the human case
by the dendritic arborisation of candidate neuronal groups (or sets of
groups) which may be available to represent a particular combination of
other groups. That is, in the first instance, we should expect there to be no
immediate combinatorial capacity where we find an empty set as the
intersection of the sets of neurons taking afferent signals from those
neuronal groups active in the representations we might want to combine.
However, this limit is mitigated both by the capacity of biological networks
to grow new connections and—recalling the previous note on
heterarchical organisation—by the fact that a given neuronal group may
be active in two or more distinct representations occurring at two different
levels of abstraction. The role of the first capacity is obvious; the
significance of the second is that even if there are no direct connections
between sets of neurons taking afferent signals from different groups,
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there may be interlevel connections which could ultimately be
strengthened enough that the functional outcome would be similar to or
identical to the straightforward availability of the kind of "linking" group
indicated as a non-empty intersection of relevantly input-connected
groups.
Likewise, new correlations might be extracted when two neuronal
groups whose afferent signals come primarily from widely separated areas
are themselves physically near enough to form reentrant connections.
Without the hierarchical organisation which provides these two proximal
groups in the first lace, of course, association between physically separated
processing groups might never occur. To simplify greatly, the deeper the
hierarchies in place for any two areas of processing, the greater the
potential for forming complex associations between the two.
We will return to this last idea when we discuss selective
advantages of self models, but for now with these limits and mitigating
factors in mind, we can see that whatever area is responsible for the
emergence of polymodal associations active in language use must be
highly structurally reentrant, and the dendritic arborisations of distinct
neuronal groups must often overlap a great deal. Both the capacities we
have described for the linguistic application of polymodal associations and
the limited conclusions about the cytoarchitectonic features of an area
capable of this kind of associative integration are consistent with the
neuroscientific data. (Geschwind 1964, 1965; Pandya and Yeterian 1985;
Greenfield 1992) This is especially true with respect to the input to the
parietal-occipital-temporal area (and, obviously, its internal
connectedness), which integrates information from the three neocortical
association areas dedicated to audio-visual convergence, audio-somatic
convergence, and visual-somatic convergence. (Pandya and Yeterian 1985;
see also Ingvar 1985 for comments on integration and temporal processing
in the prefrontal cortex.) These observations are also consistent with data
(Humphrey, et al 1979; Wagner, et al 1981) concerning the "metaphorical
mapping" capacity of human infants to form concepts more abstract than
the data on which they are based. Indeed, given this kind of capacity,
Wilkins and Wakefield suggest that it is specifically the POT and Broca's
areas which are not only a necessary precondition of language acquisition
but which are uniquely responsible for the general ability to abstract
properties. It would be premature to jump in with Wilkins and
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Wakefield and conclude, essentially, that the association abilities of the
POT and Broca's areas, coupled with certain evolutionary changes in the
premotor cortex, are both necessary and apparently sufficient for language
acquisition, but this kind of position at least serves to illustrate the
importance for linguistic abilities of the kind of combinatorial capacity we
are addressing.
Yet again, however, we must leave further exploration of this area
for another time and turn to what is perhaps the less exciting feature
foreshadowed previously by the comment on symbol grounding: the role
of environmental feedback loops for self models in real biological systems
forced to compete for survival in the world.
6.6 Feedback
For the context of our present explorations, we take it as given that
the original evolutionary purpose of a mind—and, thus, the purpose of a
self model—is to help an organism get on in the world. Thus, whatever
areas of the brain or other self model substrate may be dedicated to higher
order processing of polymodal associations, such processing demands first
the direction of enormous resources towards basic mapping of the
environment and the relationship between the environment and the
organism as they both change through time. Apart from the sets of
sensory receptor sheets serving each modality which act as the first stage
for feature extraction, this requires in the first instance tuning of the
sensory systems themselves. This depends upon close communication
between the systems which control the physical states of the organism's
sense organs—or at least those which control the states which make a
systematic difference to the efferent signals from the relevant sensory
systems—and those systems which take their afferent signals from them.
(In the human, these sensory systems are primarily but not exclusively
controlled by the motor cortex.) That is, the system must use
environmental feedback to develop coordination between sensory and
motor systems.40
40 Here and elsewhere, it is important to bear in mind that feedback may be either
positive or negative. In the first case, feedback helps to select by reinforcement those
neural groups which contribute to desirable or efficacious actions, increasing the chance of
those groups firing on the next relevant occasion. (At a higher level of organisation, this is
something like learning that eating chocolate is pleasurable.) In the second case, feedback
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In the human, for instance, we require close connectivity between
the occulomotor system and at least the primary visual cortex, if not most
of the rest of the visual processing system as well. The reentrance between
the two systems allows the two to work together in a coordinated fashion
for the purpose of providing data to the rest of the organism. (Of course,
the reentrance needn't be direct; such coordination may also be subserved
by feedback mediated by other processing arrays, as in the second example
network of Chapter 10.) This general observation is consistent with
anatomical data, which indicate the relevant architectural features in
callosal connections, thalamocortical and corticothalamic radiations, and
various other links between sensory and motor areas. (Zeki 1975, 1978;
van Essen 1985) Contra Edelman, however (see Chapter 9), who makes
much of the requirement that reentrant signalling of this type be phasic, I
suggest it is not necessary that the activity of the connected maps be
temporally linked in a linear fashion. Instead, all that should be necessary
is that there be a continuous and consistent functional relationship
(perhaps even a nonlinear one, nonphasic but also not chaotic) between
the activity of linked areas.41
Such basic bimodal coordination, however, does not by any means
exhaust the role of environmental feedback in the self model. There are
two primary reasons why this is only the beginning. First, it is clear that
the organism requires much more complex global mapping between two
or more modalities to perform even the most basic tasks. For instance,
reaching out to grasp an object requires, among other things, complex
mappings of relationships between motor output and visual input
(something like hand-eye coordination, necessary so the object may be
brought within the organism's grasp), between motor output and other
somatosensory input (something like "knowing one's strength", necessary
so the object may be grasped but neither crushed nor dropped), and even
helps to damp out the activity of neuronal groups which contribute to an undesirable or
ineffective action, making those groups less likely to fire on the next similar occasion. (At a
higher level of organisation, this is something like learning that touching a hot iron is
liable to make a painful burn on one's hand.)
41 This is because there is not, at least prima facie, any reason to suppose that the system
could not still function even if the relationship between any two arbitrary systems requiring
coordination was altered according to almost any continuous function. (By this we may
mean not only that the relationship is phase shifted, but that it might even be phase
shifted by amounts varying according to the underlying activity.) As long as the function
may be learned by a neural network, there is every reason to think that a human system, for
instance, ought to adapt to such an alteration in somatic time.
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between visual and somatosensory input (which enables the system to
"know" that it is indeed its own hand, for instance, which is grasping an
appropriately shaped object which it sees in its visual field). We may
expect that at the level of the self model, these mappings must typically
incorporate all sensory modalities plus the motor systems so that the
model of the organism is a completely polymodal one with continuous
relationships between a continuous range of possible combinations of
sensory input and motor output. That is, the model of the self is not a
model of what it looks like or how it may move; it is a complete model of
(among other things!) how its movements and sensory modalities are all
related.
The second reason we've really only scratched the surface of
environmental feedback in our discussion so far is closely related to this
last point. Specifically, the basic low level bi- or trimodal coordinations
we've posited are unlikely to feature in the higher level self model. That
is, the self model itself is unlikely to have "direct access" to the
information establishing this coordination and is likely instead simply to
call on it through something akin to the "abstraction windows", or
"virtual windows" we discussed earlier. In other words, actions might be
initiated at the level of the self model which require this kind of low level
coordination to be in place, but for the most part we should expect this
coordination to be assumed by the self model (once it has emerged
developmentally and epigenetically, of course). Normal adults, for
instance, are capable of reaching out to grasp an object, but it seems likely
they could not immediately provide any information at all to describe the
specifics of how their various visual and somatosensory feedback was
related to their motor actions. They might be able to construct such
descriptions through conscious effort—something like looking through
the abstraction windows in a systematic way to learn at a higher level
something about the mappings already in place at a lower level—but we
should expect the actual connections between the relevant sensory
receptor sheets and so forth to be at a much lower level than that of the
self model.
With this in mind, then, we can see that the primary importance of
environmental feedback for the self model is in the availability of systems
to subserve the self model's need to model the interaction of the system
with its environment. That the self model even requires such systems is
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actually a substantive statement about the minimum requirements for
being a self. Expanding on the notion with which we opened the
discussion of environmental feedback, we here take the position that a self
is a situated self whose activities, pace Harnad, are grounded in a real
world. Motivation for such a view comes from common sense about our
own conscious existence as well as from both evolutionary imperatives—
selves developed under pressure to survive in an environment—and
general considerations in the philosophy of mind which have sought to
replace naive mechanistic cognitive scientific accounts with more
advanced teleofunctional frameworks. Here is unfortunately not the place
for a discussion of all the issues surrounding the context in which a self
may be situated, but it is worth noting that the view we have touched
upon here is particularly complementary with the position taken on
meaning by the likes of Putnam (1975, 1988) and Burge (1979, 1982, 1986)42.
(Also see Stalnaker 1993 especially.) We will return to this matter briefly
when we turn to consider more carefully what we mean by change in a
self model.
Having explored the role of environmental feedback, the last of the
basic properties of self models we will examine for the moment, we now
move on to some brief comments on the relationship of the self model to
functionalism. This is followed by a quick rundown on the selective
advantages of organisms equipped with self models and the evolutionary
emergence of consciousness. Finally, we move on to somewhat more
technical discussions of embedding self model data structures in real
neural networks.
42 I would certainly want to distance myself from some of the stronger conclusions drawn by
these authors and their commentators, yet it is interesting to notice the complementarity at




This view we have been outlining, which relates sensation to
changes in an instantiated data structure called a self model, is
complementary to a functionalist approach to cognition but is by no
means identical to it. Above we have occasionally referred to functional
relevance relative to the self model, but this is different to functional
relevance in the system itself; it is now time to clarify what we mean by
this and to pin down more carefully how self models are related to
functionalism.
7.1 Hunting Self Models
First, it is important to be clear on how we discern the self model
data structure and distinguish it from other data structures which might
be implemented by the same material structure. Notice that the same
material structure may be interpreted from the outside—that is, from the
third person point of view—as instantiating any number of different
functional relationships and data structures. This is trivial: for any
functional description of either the relationship between different
material components of a system or the relationship between different
bodies of data in a data structure, we can conjoin to this description an
infinite class of additional functional descriptions of counterfactual
conditions which in practice fall outside the domain of the system in
question. This is analogous to the observation that there is an infinite
class of functions which pass through any finite set of points.
Someone might object that we could pare down the class of
functional descriptions of a material system or of the data structures it
might be instantiating by providing our own class of counterfactuals
covering areas outside the domain of the system in question. That is, we
might say that given some state the system in which the system will never
be, if the system were in that state, it would evolve exactly thus and so.
But this is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, not the least of which
being that this absurdly makes understanding the experience of a self
model operating over a given domain contingent on the provision of
descriptions of behaviour otherwise utterly irrelevant to the self model.
This is akin to providing many other points to restrict the class of possible
functions describing a curve through some small set of points in which we
are actually interested. Perhaps more importantly, such logical jumping
through hoops is simply unnecessary. The relevant class of data structures
(or functional descriptions) can be extracted from the infinite class by
appeal to the system itself.
That is, we are concerned with the data structure implemented with
respect to the structure itself; we are interested in the data structure
incorporating a coherent high level model of the system itself and which
displays the kinds of properties we have previously been outlining. That
there may be more than one such data structure which could be attributed
to a given material arrangement is, for our purposes, irrelevant. This is
simply a fact of life in trying to describe all interactions of material things:
even the laws of quantum mechanics are not the sole functional
descriptions of all hitherto observed phenomena! We merely choose the
most parsimonious descriptions which cover the relevant domain and
leave it at that. It is no different for the self model: we simply choose a
functional description with respect to the system itself and which fits the
domain in which the system may find itself and stop there. As long as we
understand how the model changes in that domain, we have satisfied our
needs.
We might notice, incidentally, that none of these observations are
in any way incompatible with an entirely deterministic material
implementation of the self model. The self model is an abstract data
structure, and—unlike the simple stack example, in which the data in the
stack can be read off from the states of microcircuits—it may include in
itself functional descriptions of how parts of itself relate to each other or of
how parts of the system relate to each other (in terms of how the organism
uses it, this is indeed largely the point of the self model!), and these
functional descriptions can be just as plural in broader (and irrelevant)
domains as any scientific law might be.
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7.2 Hunting Functional Relevance
Having noted the subtlety of relating data structures to the
functional arrangements instantiating them, we can now say something
about functional relevance relative to the self model. This idea becomes
clear as we pin down the relationship between mental experience as
viewed as changes to a data structure and mental experience as viewed as
the existence of a material structure in a particular functional state.
Although there are many things to be said on this topic, perhaps the most
significant is that we really do mean to link mental experience to change
in an instantiated data structure and not just to causally efficacious states
in some functional assembly. That is, sensation is a process of change in a
data structure; it is not merely the existence of a particular data structure.
Where there isn't this change, there isn't experience: thus if we were to
"freeze" a self model in time, it would cease to be a subject of experience.
On this view, talk of a "mental state" makes sense only in the
context of a temporally evolving self model data structure. A "mental
state" in this context is something like the derivative of a function
describing a curve at a particular point: there is an instantaneous rate of
change for a function only because there is some quantity undergoing
change. A point on a curve has a slope only because it is a part of a curve.
Likewise, there is an instantaneous "mental state" only because there is a
changing data structure. This is in contrast to the functional view of a
mental state, which corresponds to a functional state. The difference is
that for the functionalist a static functional state still apparently qualifies
as a mental state, whereas on the self model view there is no such thing as
a static state with qualities of experience.
Another consequence of the self model view is that if a self model is
being instantiated by a particular functional substrate which is in fact
changing, perhaps in order to, for instance, maintain synchrony with a
changing environment, but if the data structure is rendered static by this
functional change, there is no experience. This relationship is simple to
quantify: the functional system may change without changing the self
model data structure and thus without giving rise to any conscious
experience, but the data structure may not change—and thus conscious
experience cannot occur—without change in the functional system. Thus
our use above of the notion of changes which were functionally relevant
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to the self model was meant to pick out those changes both functionally
relevant to the system and capable of bringing about a change in the self
model data structure.
7.3 Self-Centred Change
There are two more points to explore with respect to change in the
self model before we move on to evolutionary considerations. One is
rather simple but carries significant implications, while the second is more
complex but is perhaps not as significant. The first concerns what we
mean by change in the data structure. It is simply this: by change, we
mean change relative to itself. While it is a basic point, this fact actually
has powerful consequences. Recall from the discussion of environmental
feedback that the view on offer considers selves in an environmental
context in which their actions and their internal representations are
grounded. We noted that this is nicely complementary to points made by
Putnam, Burge, and others. However, it is here that we must be very
careful about how much we read into this complementarity. Because we
are linking sensation to change in a self model relative to itself, we are
divorcing experience from changes in the environment which don't bring
about such change in the self model relative to itself. More to the point,
changes in the environment which bring about a change in the
relationship of the self model to that environment but which do not effect
a subsequent change in the relationship of the self model to itself are
irrelevant to the experience of that self model. We can see this more
clearly through another way of looking at Putnam's own Twin Earth
example.
The point of the original example was that two otherwise identical
people, both thinking about "water", could each be referring to different
things, on account of the fact that one of them lives on Earth, where water
is H20, and another of them lives on Twin Earth, where water ("twin
water") is actually something else. Therefore, reference—and meaning—
can't be just "in the head". Now on one way of viewing the twin people as
compared to the people, a way presumably more friendly to Putnam's
preferences, their self model data structures must actually be different—
since the latter contains data about water and the former data about twin
water—even if their physical structures are very similar or even identical.
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When we consider any single self model on this view, we can see that any
change in the world which "shifts" the reference of some element of data
in the self model actually brings about a change in the data structure.
(This would be akin to, for example, the world changing in such a way that
all water became twin water, thereby changing all people into twin
people.43)
But on the present view, the self model is a data structure defined
with respect to the system, and change in the self model refers to change
with respect to itself. In information theoretic terms, the self model data
exists in correlations between states of whatever is instantiating it and
states of the system as a whole (or, more precisely, correlations between
functional relationships in whatever is instantiating it and functional
relationships in the system being modelled). While large parts of what is
being modelled in the self model concern the relationship of the system to
its environment, that relationship is always understood through the
sensory inputs to the system. That is, the data structure models the
environmental interactions of the system by modelling the interactions of
the system and the system's sensory inputs. Thus, a change in the
environment which does not bring about a change in the system's sensory
inputs (or a change in how those inputs relate to the activity of the system)
does not bring about any change in the self model relative to itself. It has
no effect on sensation.
Thus, the self solipsistically survives without change any changes
in the environment which have no functionally relevant effect on it. The
meaning of representations in the self model, as understood from the
outside, the objective point of view, may be changed without there being
any change whatsoever to the role of those representations "on the
inside", from the subjective point of view. Meaning, then, may be
different between the objective and subjective perspectives. Of course,
none of this is to say that there mightn't be some great change in the self
model when it learns that there has been a shift in the world which has
43 This is a debatable point, whether such a change from water to twin water would in fact
change all people into twin people, since arguments might be mustered to the effect that if
all the (twin?) people could somehow be informed that the reference of their word 'water'
had actually changed to some other substance than they thought, then they could object
that they actually meant the other kind of water. But the mechanics of this particular
change do not concern us so much: we are only seeking to clarify the simpler point that there
may occur changes in the world which alter the "meaning" of data in the data structure but
which still do not count, on this view, as bringing about a change in the data structure.
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changed the reference of some one or more of its representations, but of
course this learning of the shift amounts to a change in the self model data
structure; this lack of awareness before we have learnt about something
coupled with awareness when we have learnt about it is obviously exactly
what we should expect. That it requires us to deviate from what the likes
of Putnam might prefer is perhaps a criticism of Putnam's overall
approach, but it is no criticism of the present view, which remains entirely
in line with common sense.
7.4 Good Vibrations (Oscillations)
The second of the two final points to be explored on the topic of
functionalism and change in the self model concerns implications for the
kind of low level dynamics in the brain (or whatever) this view requires
to support continuous sensation. Recall that above we distanced
ourselves from the functionalist's equation of mental state with
functional state and noted instead that the idea of a mental state at a given
moment makes sense only in the context of a continuously evolving self
model data structure. A straightforward implication of this view is that if
it is possible for a self model to exist in a state of unchanging sensation for
more than an instant of time, then that state must actually correspond to
some kind of continuous change in the self model. In the apparent
absence of convincing reasons why it should not be possible to experience
such enduring states of sensation44, it is worthwhile considering the
relationship between a continuously changing data structure and
unchanging sensation.
We begin by noting that rich neurophysiological evidence indicates
oscillatory spike frequency activity in cortical areas associated with the
recognition of particular stimuli presented to an organism. Decades of
extensive research by Freeman and his colleagues (Freeman 1964, 1972,
1975, 1979, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b; Freeman and Skarda 1985;
Skarda and Freeman 1987; Yao and Freeman 1990; Eeckman and Freeman
1991) into the olfactory system, for instance, indicate not only the
44 Notice, however, that the reasons why we should be able to experience enduring
sensation are far from obvious: after all, most of the time we are experiencing some
continuous sensation in one or more modalities, our mental state is still apparently
changing, as we silently talk to ourselves or subtly shift the sensory receptors giving us the
sensation or even as we become aware of the passage of time.
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importance of the overall dynamical character of large collections of
neurons in recognising odours (as distinct from the particular behaviour
of individual neurons or of smaller groups of them) but also the
preponderance of theta (roughly 5 Hz) and gamma (roughly 40-70 Hz) local
field potential oscillations. Many suggestions have been offered as to the
functional role of such oscillations, including improving the exchange
and recall of information between the primary olfactory bulb and the
olfactory cortex. (Ambros-Ingerson, et al 1990) Others (Li and Hopfield
1989) have proposed that oscillations may help amplify weak signals and
enhance response time, while Wilson and Bower (1989) believe
oscillations in feedback loops could help a system compare afferent signal
patterns with stored patterns. Gamma rhythms are proving an
increasingly popular object of study, especially in experiments akin to
those of Gray, et al (1989) which indicate the apparently stimulus induced
appearance of such oscillations in the visual cortex of the cat. They have
fuelled the development of accounts by Nobel laureate Francis Crick and
others which apply the oscillations to the so called "binding problem"
(related to Hamad's symbol grounding problem) or even to the emergence
of consciousness itself. (Crick 1984, 1994; Crick and Koch 1990, 1992) Data
also indicate that abnormally low availability of neuromodulators such as
acetylcholine (and/or an overabundance of acetylcholinesterase?) is
correlated with memory impairment in Alzheimer's disease. (See
Liljenstrom and Hasselmo 1992 for one entry into the relevant literature.)
The robust evidence concerning the presence of such cortical
oscillations suggests they are not merely epiphenomenal artefacts of
neural dynamics but are instead a functionally relevant emergent feature
of the collective activity of large groups of dynamically correlated neurons.
(See Wright, et al 1993, for instance.) Their role in the present context, I
suggest—admittedly, rather speculatively—may be in effecting the kind of
change in the self model data structure which is necessary for continuous
sensation. That is, such oscillatory activity may bring about a cyclic change
in the functional relationship between components of the data structure
such that continuous sensation may emerge. This suggests, again along
the lines of our original observations about functionalist renditions of
mental state, that a given quality of continuous sensation does not
correspond to the existence of the data structure in a particular state but
that it corresponds instead to cyclic activity through a continuous set of
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closely related states. (On this view, it is useful to note, the sensation of
recognising a particular pattern of stimuli changing in relation to a
background pattern corresponds to a cyclic change in a part of the data
structure which is gradually changing with respect to other parts of the
data structure; this, in turn, corresponds to quasiperiodic activity at the
neural level as the location in phase space of what would otherwise be, for
instance, a stable limit cycle, is gradually shifted.45) We can see that on this
account, mental states may correspond to something like attractors in an
abstract phase space describing the time evolution of the self model data
structure, rather than corresponding to points or neighbourhoods in such
a phase space. Of course, there needn't be a straightforward relationship
between dynamics at this level and dynamics at the actual neural level.
(We will discuss such points in more detail in the second half of this
dissertation.)
As we noted earlier, this final observation about change in the self
model is somewhat more complex than the first point about the notion of
change being always relative to the self model itself, but perhaps in the
end it is not quite as significant. It is, after all, in line with what we might
expect: the view of a continuous mental state corresponding to some sort
of static functional state is somewhat naive, and it is rather unremarkable
to suggest that there is still something changing in a systematic way
"behind the scenes" to enable continuous sensation to take place. That we
have maintained compatibility with the neurophysiological data is
likewise a significant but unsurprising feature of the self model view: on
the naive functionalist view, we would have either to deny the possibility
of continuous sensation or to deny the functional relevance of cortical
oscillations in any neural process which could give rise to sensation,
thereby uncoupling the subjective character of sensation and the
functional state of the instantiating structures.
With these observations to hand about the relationship between
functionalism and the self model view, we may now move on to consider
conscious sensation from an evolutionary perspective.
45 For instance, we might observe a robust gamma oscillation whose phase is continually
shifting. We might graphically depict something similar to this with a wheel skidding
along a horizontal surface: the wheel might spin at a fairly constant speed, with all its
different parts maintaining the same relationships to each other, while the centre of the
wheel gradually shifts along horizontally. Such long term quasi-periodic oscillation could




For the present context, we shall accept without argument the
evolutionary biology originally inspired by Charles Darwin (1859, 1872) as
the framework into which our understanding of the development of self
models and consciousness must fit. No philosophical theory of
consciousness or cognition should proceed without an awareness of the
biological realities in which conscious organisms live. However we
understand the emergence of the self model, it must confer on the
organism one or several advantages which improve its chances of
producing viable offspring and maintaining or increasing the
representation of its genes in future generations. If they fail this test,
while self models might be an interesting exercise in theoretical cognitive
science, they can hardly be a biologically plausible account of the
emergence of sensation.
It is not our project to show either that the self model is the only
possible architectural development which could have endowed organisms
with the kinds of selective advantages we shall discuss or, alternatively,
that the self model is even the most likely or most advantageous
architecture which might have evolved. We shall merely explore
whether the self model does indeed offer appropriate selective advantages;
in the absence of convincing biological reasons why the self model
architecture should not have developed (because the architecture is
incompatible with what may be instantiated by the neural wetware or
whatever other reason), we shall take this as establishing, at least prima
facie, the requisite degree of biological plausibility for self models.
8.1 Who Needs a Self Model?
In terms of improving behavioural efficacy and survivability—and,
thus, selective advantage—the self model has much to offer. We will here
concentrate on only the simplest but also the most significant of the
relevant self model features. The most important feature is of course the
self model's capacity to model possible repertoires of behaviour in advance
of actually performing them and the kind of sophisticated deliberation
over the best course of action in a real or imagined situation for which this
is arguably a precondition. This capacity carries important implications for
communication between organisms and the development of social living.
Also significant is the improvement in response time made possible by
the fact that the self model need deal primarily just with "compressed"
representations of more elaborate systems, without losing the ability to call
on those more elaborate systems when their full capabilities must be
exploited. Closely related to this feature is the ability of the self model to
take high level "short cuts" which bypass slower but more complete low
level processing. Finally, since there is in real biological systems an actual
physical limit to axonal and dendritic arborisation, use of a self model
allows the development of more and more complex relational structures
while maintaining a coherent higher level organisation capable of taking
advantage of them. This also enables a kind of "top-down" learning in
which skills might be learnt between compressed representations at the
self model level and then "pushed down" into lower level connections.
We shall discuss each of these features in turn. First, however, let's take a
brief detour to note a few points we should keep in mind about applying
the evolutionary framework in this context or in any other.
8.1.1 Before the Chicken and Before the Egg
Most importantly, while the information that may be preserved
about successful individuals in a population is passed on through the
genome, and the gene is arguably the fundamental unit of selection, we
must remember that in a sense natural selection acts on the phenotype
and not on the genotype. This is for the simple reason that it is
phenotypes who do the reproducing in a population: organisms do not
spring fully formed from a genotype, in some biological equivalent of
Athena's emergence from the head of Zeus. Ontogenetic development is,
then, just as much a part of the evolutionary picture as lower level
phylogenetic change. Thus, understanding fully the genetic distribution
in a population at a particular time requires understanding the interaction
between, on the one hand, the low level mechanisms of crossover or
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recombination and mutation and, on the other hand, developmental and
epigenetic processes which take place in somatic time and which are
determined by a combination of genotype preconditions and
environmental interaction. In what follows, we shall leave to the side the
lower level questions and devote our attention to the part of the picture
concerned with ontogenetic change and the selective advantages conferred
on an adult organism by the emergence of the self model. Again, this is
not to say that the developmental and epigenetic processes responsible for
the appearance of the self model are not in large measure enabled by (or
even partly "hard wired" by) the genome—far from it—but, as Changeaux
and colleagues point out (Changeaux and Danchin 1976; Changeaux, et al
1984), at least in the case of humans the complexity of the genome is
insufficient anyway to account for the connectional complexity of the
nervous system of an adult of reproducing age. With these basic
observations safely stowed in the background, we continue with our
discussion of the relevant advantages of self models.
8.2 Language and the Self's Self Modelling
As we noted above, the most significant capacity enabled by the self
model is the modelling of possible behaviours in advance of physically
engaging in them. Consider a less developed organism capable of
reinforcement learning but devoid of a self model. In response to each
change in the environment, the organism's behaviour is moulded
primarily by genetically determined tendencies and reactions learnt from
previous encounters. While there might be competition within the
system between two or more different possible behaviours, each of which
might have proven similarly favourable in other similar situations, in the
end the organism simply responds with one of the available behaviours
(or perhaps some combination of them). At first blush, anyway, there is
no reason to suspect that the organism has undertaken any kind of
sophisticated comparison of the behavioural repertoires apart from some
comparison of what has worked for it in the past. Contrast this with an
organism equipped with a self model, however, where we may expect not
only a comparison of the past behaviours but perhaps even an actual
"imaginative" simulation of possible behaviours resulting in predictions
about how this or that behaviour may work in the future with respect to a
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new and perhaps previously unexperienced situation. Of course, these
kinds of descriptions needn't imply any sort of computationalism:
comparisons and predictions may be implicit, and, as Edelman might be at
pains to point out, they may derive from very non-computational
instantiating structures.
The self model accomplishes this feat by using, among other things,
its fundamental feature: a complete polymodal representation of the
entire system and its relationship to the environment. By way of the
polymodal associations linking motor actions of the entire system and the
sensory features of the environment, the self model might, without
activating actual motor units or receiving actual sensory input
corresponding to a given situation, "imagine" the outcome of a particular
behaviour in a given situation. While the information which enables this
sophisticated modelling is based on the previous experience of the system,
it in effect allows predictions to be made about combinations of sensory
input and motor output not necessarily experienced previously. (This
predictive capacity relies just on the continuity of the various sensori¬
motor relationships.) Significantly, this "open" nature of the simulation
process may result in the selection of a novel behaviour with which the
system does not have any actual (i.e., non-simulated) direct experience.
Given the fact that environmental situations may change
enormously over the lifetime of a single individual and certainly over the
course of phylogenetic development of a species, and given that
information coded in the genome cannot (save accidentally) anticipate all
the possible novel environments in which a phenotype may find itself,
the immediate and direct survival value of this capacity can hardly be
understated.46 Any organism with the capacity to compare various
possible responses to a new environmental situation must, ceteris paribus,
have a considerable selective advantage over a similar organism lacking
such a capacity. But the advantages of this capacity extend beyond the
direct improvement in response to novel situations immediately at hand.
The ability to model the self in different situations without actually
being in those situations may also be crucial to the development of the
kind of highly flexible linguistic communication which features in the
46 This capacity might also allow an organism to "practice" a particular behaviour
without actually performing it, allowing mental "rehearsal" during safe times, for
instance, to improve its response when next threatened.
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social interactions of higher mammals such as humans.47 I wouldn't want
to suggest, as some have (Barlow 1980, Humphrey 1984), that the very
purpose of consciousness is to enable social communication. But it is
certainly biologically plausible to suggest—here following roughly the line
of Wilkins and Wakefield discussed earlier, with respect to the POT area
and the development of "amodal" representation coupled with premotor
changes in response to selective demands on manual dexterity—that the
architectural preconditions for the development of the self model's
polymodal mappings of organism and environment interactions were
appropriated for use in the kind of polymodal linguistic representations
essential for such complex communication.
Moreover—and more interestingly, in our context—the modelling
ability of an organism with a rich self model data structure may enable the
organism to conjecture about the mental state of another organism by
"imagining" itself in an environmental situation similar to that in which
it observes the other organism to be. In other words, the self model
equipped organism may place itself "in the other's shoes", so to speak, and
so perhaps come to "empathise" with the other organism. Unless
language is genetically hard wired, as it might well be in the case of social
insects, for instance (see footnote preceding), this capacity to empathise
would surely be of no small help in the development of symbolic
language. An organism without a self model might, for instance, on
repeated contact with another organism uttering some particular sound or
making some particular gesture, come to associate that utterance or
gesture with some kind of pending behaviour on the part of the other
organism or even to correlate it with some other environmental factor.
But an organism with a self model might learn to correlate the utterance
or gesture not only with observed changes in behaviour or environmental
features from the "outside" point of view but also with mental changes
modelled from the "inside" point of view. That is, the organism could
correlate the utterance or gesture with the experience it might be having if
it were in an environmental situation similar to the one in which it
observes the other organism.
47 Here I mean to distinguish human-style flexible linguistic communication with
astronomical capacity for the formation of meaningful symbol strings from the rigid
communication systems of, say, the social insects.
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Insofar as a capacity for complex communication is an advantage to
an individual, and insofar as complex communication is a precondition
for the kind of social living observed in the higher mammals (and insofar
as that is advantageous for the individuals involved), this furthers the
case for the selective advantage of organisms equipped with a self model.
The case is even stronger when we consider the species advantages central
to population biology's phylogenetic emphasis.
Finally, we might also wonder, more speculatively, about the purely
internal advantages for an organism which has developed this kind of
symbolic language capacity. Given the noted relationship between the
emergence of sophisticated polymodal associations and the development
of symbolic language, perhaps a symbolic linguistic capacity could improve
an organism's ability to "remember" low level associations at a higher
level. In particular, high level linguistic representations of lower level
cross modal relationships might be "rehearsed" and committed to
memory more efficiently, since "learning" a relationship with a higher
level lossy linguistic representation might require the modification of far
fewer neural connections than learning the same at a lower level. If this is
so, we might expect a linguistically competent organism to engage for a
significant amount of time in constructing linguistic symbol strings purely
for its own benefit as a means of raising up the contents of lower level
associations into the higher self model level (where they might be
analysed or just committed to higher level procedural memory): we
would expect the organism to "talk to itself". That humans, anyway, do
arguably spend a huge amount of time with this internal dialogue of
course doesn't imply that this view is correct, but that it appears to be a
likely consequent of the view on offer at least provides an encouraging
compatibility between informed speculation and introspectively available
evidence.48
As an aside, we should note that an organism's possession of a self
model does not necessarily imply that it should develop symbolic
language in an appropriate setting. Many other factors may be involved,
including the complexity of the self representation itself, the availability of
other "information management" faculties for the cross association of
linguistic symbols each with other linguistic symbols as well as with other
48 As usual, citing evidence which "tends to confirm" a theoretical account smacks of the
logical fallacy of affirming the consequent!
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sets of polymodal associations (which needn't necessarily be linguistic), the
structure of procedural or episodic memory and its relationship to these
features for cross association, the development of appropriate motor
control structures for systematic auditory or manual expression,
environmental resource distribution suited to sufficiently high probability
of contact with other organisms, and so on. Accordingly, if possession of a
self model does not imply the emergence of symbolic language, then
neither does absence of symbolic language imply the absence of a self
model or the absence of conscious sensation. Evolutionary pressures may
continue over time to guide phylogenetic adaptation in the direction of
cytoarchitectonic features conducive to the development of symbolic
communication, but not all of the preconditions of such development
need by any means appear simultaneously. That said, we may move on to
other selective advantages not directly linked either to language or to
modelling of the organism in novel situations.
8.3 Time is Survival
One of these advantages is the improvement in response time for
an organism directed by a self model's "compressed" versions of its
various systems. An important feature of such data structures is the
"compression" of each of several interacting systems into smaller
representations, as in the reverse Mercator projection example. Unlike
the mapping example, however, these compressed representations
maintain their functional relationships to other compressed
representations. Thus, the consequences of the activity of a particular low
level system on one or several other low level systems may be rapidly
"calculated" in lossy fashion at the higher level of the self model before
direct signals from the first low level system could have propagated to and
been processed by all the others for which it provides afferent signals. This
is particularly useful where, for instance, there exists a large propagation
delay between the availability of output from one system and the
emergence of output in response from some other system connected to it.
This is closely related to the idea of a high level architectural "short
cut" which may bypass slower but more complete lower level processing.
For example, afferent signals provided by sensory receptors might activate
(after some low level processing) some portion of the self model data
100
structure, which might then activate another portion of the self model
with efferent connections to low level parts of the motor control system,
thereby closing the circuit on a sensori-motor response loop more quickly
than the initial signals could propagate directly at the lower level from the
sensory processing system to the motor activation system. This is akin to
the emergence of polymodal associations, where because of physical
limitations on connectivity, the pathway through a group of neurons at a
high level in an hierarchical processing structure may be the only
pathway. At this point, however, the account may ring slightly
counterintuitive: isn't it the direct connections, not consciously mediated,
which seem to offer the fastest response time? If so, how can a higher
level self model connection between two compressed systems be both
faster than the lower level connections and behaviourally efficacious?
We can clearly answer the first question in the affirmative, with
human reflex reactions occurring across direct connections at the spinal
cord or brain stem as the paradigm example of rapid low level responses.
We shall return to this presently. The best answer to the second question
(an answer which forms the basis of the final two selective advantages we
will consider) is that, as we noted above, the actual physical limits on
axonal and dendritic arborisation49 mean that some of the connections
which might exist between compressed representations at the self model
level may not be present at all at the lower level of the systems being
represented. Alternatively, they may be present, but they may be so sparse
that the time required for the buildup of a front of spike activity sufficient
to prompt a response in another system connected to it at a low level
might exceed the time necessary to invoke a similar response through a
higher level self model "short cut". This fact that the self model may help
overcome the physical connectional limits at the lower levels is an
important point which gets further attention in the next section.
8.4 Connections are Hard to Come By
With some 100 thousand millions (1011) of neurons and about 1
quadrillion (1015) synapses (Thomson 1985), the human brain has been
49 The latter is analogous to what is referred to in the VLSI context as "fan-in".
Interestingly, the physical fan-in limitations for both current silicon chip fabrication
techniques and human neural wetware are apparently of about the same magnitude.
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called "an asynchronous, nonlinear, massively parallel, feedback
dynamical system of cosmological proportions" (Kosko 1992, p. 13). It is
the most complex object in the humanly known cosmos. Yet, a simple
calculation reveals that the average connectivity of a single neuron in the
human nervous system is no more than 10,000 inputs. It is unlikely that
neurons with more than an order of magnitude more connections are
very common. With an actual physical limit on the number of synapses
which can fit on a soma and its dendrites, there is a limit to the number of
direct connections between neuronal groups which can be made at a single
level. Making more connections requires moving up an organisational
level so that another neuronal group representing the activity of a lower
level group (or perhaps several such groups) may provide signals when
the efferent connectional capacity of the lower level group (or groups) is
exhausted. It is here that the architectural features of the self model come
into play.
Because the representations of various models in the whole
organism are lossy, the self model may maintain coherent organisational
relationships between systems which would be difficult if not impossible
to preserve solely at lower levels, given the physical limits to connectivity.
The heterarchical nature of the self model invites the emergence of
complexity which could not develop coherently in its absence. That the
capacity for coherent organisation of progressively more complex
relationships would endow an organism with a selective advantage is
clear. But in addition to the obvious improvement in behavioural
sophistication, this kind of architecture suggests another related
advantage.
8.4.1 The Ups and Downs of Learning Levels
This related advantage is simply that high level complex and
coherent organisation might enable a particular skill to be learnt as
correlations between compressed representations at the self model level
and eventually incorporated into direct, ultimately faster, connections at
lower levels. For instance, a relationship between two motor actions may
be grasped at a high level by the self model. The actual motor
coordination of the organism might not be such that the two motor
actions could be physically performed immediately with the requisite
relationship (perhaps because encoding the relationship at the low level
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demands the modification of a large number of connections), but the
relationship could still be "imagined" at the self model level.
Over time, with activation from the self model level down to the
lower levels, the proper motor actions could eventually be learnt by the
real systems responsible for the actions. This is analogous to
understanding how to do something physically and being able to imagine
it instantly but still not being able to do it without practice. We can see
something like this process at work in a human example of learning to
perform a complex action quickly and precisely as in the study of martial
arts.
8.4.2 The Ups and Downs of Martial Arts Levels
The beginning student of a martial art encounters a set of
movements largely unlike any he or she has performed before. On the
first few (hundred or thousand) attempts, most students cannot perform
these movements with anything but a passing resemblance to what they
have seen, but gradually they are able to analyse at a high level the
sequence of physical changes which occur in the instructor's body as he or
she demonstrates a technique. This high level understanding of what the
student is supposed to be doing is the first step in performing the
technique correctly. By "high level" in this context, we mean the student
comes to understand composite sets of physical changes "from the
outside": the left hip rotates forward, the left food slides and pivots to the
outside, the right foot skims in an arc across the floor as the right hand
rises up slightly from the right hip, the right foot is planted and the right
hip begins to rotate forward, etc. The student needn't understand what
muscle actions must be performed, say, to rotate the hips, since this can be
understood as a higher level compressed representation of motor skills
which the student already has developed. The student also doesn't
immediately understand what entire sequences of movements would feel
like "from the inside", either because not all components of the sequence
have been learnt before or because they have not been experienced in the
particular sequence being learnt.50 However, grasping the sequence of
50 This does not count against the idea that the self model may "imagine" being in states it
has never before experienced, however, since there is substantial difference in complexity
between imagining a hip twist, say, and imagining a hip twist rapidly followed by a foot
slide and pivot rapidly followed by another foot slide accompanied by a small hand
movement rapidly followed by a foot plant, etc.
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composite movements at this high level is the first step in establishing the
lower level coordinations which enable the student to mimic the
technique correctly.
With this high level grasp of a particular technique, the student
may begin to experiment physically with performing movements which
approximate the look and feel of the sequence in place at the higher level.
The student learns what approximations of the physical movements feel
like "from the inside" and learns to match them with the desired
appearance "from the outside". Gradually, the difference between the
desired and the actual performance of the technique is decreased until,
with continued high level "supervision" by the self model (more on this
kind of "supervised learning" in Chapter 10), the technique may be
performed in a way roughly resembling the demonstrated one.51 But even
at this stage, the training process is far from complete.
The task now is to obviate the need for this conscious high level
"supervision" to ensure the match between performance and high level
understanding. While the student has moved from being confused about
what physical changes are taking place in the instructor's body and thus
not knowing how even to begin to emulate them to understanding what
the changes are and being able to imitate them with conscious direction,
usually the student's performance cannot be fast enough or smooth
enough while still under this supervisory control of the self model.
(Taking a cue from our previous discussion, this may be due to unfeasibly
large cross-level propagation delays in the heterarchical neural
architecture.) The next step, then, as we have indicated, is to remove the
need for this supervisory control.
This amounts simply to building directly, at the low level of the
sensori-motor control loops, the appropriate connections for "automatic"
performance of the muscle actions required to perform the given
techniques. Because the brain does not undertake architectural changes in
an "instructionist" fashion—that is, it does not determine what changes
must be made and then go and change them—this process of establishing
51 In practice, of course, the training process is much more complex than this, with
discontinuities not only in the correspondence between the student's modelling of techniques
and actual performance of them but also in the correspondence between the student's model
and the actual techniques being learnt. That is, the student becomes progressively more
aware of the subtleties of the instructor's technique so that, in a way, the student's actual
performance of a technique is chasing a "moving target".
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the direct low level connections is primarily nonconscious and results
only from repeated performance of the technique to enable cellular level
mechanisms to do their work in strengthening the capacity for mutual
excitation between neuronal groups whose activations have become
correlated through the course of that repetition. This point in training,
then, can be seen in part as the development of lower level neuronal
group repertoires in the sensori-motor systems appropriate for executing
techniques which hitherto required the intermediation of connections at
the self model level.
This may be thought of as "pushing down" into the lower levels the
understanding initially made only at the self model level. The low level
architecture was not suited for learning such complex movements, but the
self model, capable with its lossy representations of grasping the "bigger
picture" was able not only to model the technique at a high level, but it
was instrumental in eventually inducing the appropriate complex
connections at the lower level.
Rather than "pushing down" the modelling of the technique from
the higher level, this process might alternatively amount to "raising up"
the level of the self model. The high level pathways may with practice
become dedicated to providing the signals which cannot be sent directly at
the lower levels, and their connections with the rest of the self model may
largely atrophy, requiring that whatever previous functional role they
served at that level be taken over by other neuronal groups. Here,
degeneracy and variance in the group "recruited" to serve as the high
level shortcut may enable selective mechanisms (pace Edelman, see
chapter following) to "choose" a new group, largely already appropriately
configured, for the high level role. While part of the self's instantiating
wetware, then, may be lost to the low level task during this kind of
training, other groups are ready to take its place, and little of the self
model's information processing capacity need be sacrificed for any
significant length of time.
The student has now given the self model new representations and
the system new coordinations with which to work. Just as coordinations
acquired at a low level induce representations at the self model level, new
understandings at the self model level may induce the development of
coordinations at the lower level. This process in the martial arts example
endows the experienced student with the ability to analyse higher level
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combinations of techniques and to understand the tactical implications of
this or that combination as compared to another. This is akin to the
development of a new vocabulary, and, ironically, the process of analysing
and mimicking and transcending conscious supervision in the advanced
student exactly mirrors the process in the complete neophyte, except that
the complexity of the objects of analysis differs in the two cases.
8.4.3 Learning Quickness and Quickness in Learning
Thus, the improvement to learning enabled by the self model bears
directly on the question we raised a short time ago (namely, aren't the low
level connections the fastest ones?). When there is sufficient low level
connectivity to begin with, the low level direct connections are fastest
because they may result in faster behavioural response than responses
mediated by the self model. When this low level connectivity is lacking,
where the low level connectivity is such that responses invoked solely
through low level activity would be either very slow or nonexistent, the
self model can improve response time by offering high level "short cuts"
to appropriate responses. And finally, as exemplified by the martial arts
example, the self model can help the lower level to learn the desired
connections and ultimately improve the response time further by handing
the processing back over to that lower level. This last process can be
interpreted either as lowering the level of the processing or as raising the
level of the self model; in the martial arts example, this allows the martial
artist to process more complex behaviours because the learnt techniques
are available as elements in an expanding "vocabulary" of representations
in the self model.
Of course, while learning martial arts may improve a human's
chances of surviving and reproducing, such complex endeavours are
hardly relevant to the course of phylogenetic development through the
history of biological life on Earth! But while the example focuses on the
role of the self model in acquiring some very complex skills, it differs from
more selectively relevant examples only by degree. By the same process
we've explored in the martial arts example, the self model may aide the
learning of any complex skill which the lower level neural architecture is
not immediately suited to grasping. As we know from both classical and
operant conditioning, complex skills are best taught as composites of
simpler skills learnt first; simple low level sensori-motor systems are not
106
suited to recognising and emulating novel and highly complex patterns, at
least in part because of the limits to neural connectivity we have noted
previously. Self models, however, are better at this task and may enable
the emulation of a pattern, perhaps (when relevant representations are at
a suitably high level of an hierarchy) after even only one presentation of
an example. In the end, they may enable the integration into the
behavioural repertoire of lower level coordinations which could be got
only very slowly—if at all—by direct learning at the lower level. Thus, the
self model is a valuable tool for an organism which may need to copy the
behaviour of another organism (such as a parent) or which may benefit
from developing complex responses of its own after observation of some
environmental scenario. Most higher organisms arguably fall into these
categories and could thus benefit from exploiting the capabilities of a self
model.
Having explored these various selective advantages of self models
and thus, in the absence of any immediately obvious arguments against
them in a biological context, their prima facie plausibility in terms of
evolutionary biology, we will soon turn to analysing the particular
architectural methods by which self models may be implemented. By way
of transition, we will first make some notes about the cognitive
neuroscientific account of perceptual categorisation of Gerald Edelman; in
many ways, his theory is at the halfway point between low level neurology
and higher level cognitive science, and our self model theory may be seen
as both a higher level extension of Edelman's work and a philosophically
satisfying bridge of this gap. We then discuss developments in artificial
neural networks and how they may help us understand cognition in real
neural systems, together with some comment on the debate between
proponents of classical symbolic paradigms and proponents of strictly
distributed systems. Finally we move on to explore some simple examples
of the actual architectural layout of various components of the self model.
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9
Perception and Neural Darwinism
Before getting on to the architecture of self model implementations,
it is useful to look at a similar kind of theory intended as an account of
perceptual categorisation. Our own view of self models can be seen in a
way as a higher level extension of the perceptual categorisation theory
both in the sense that self models rely upon architectures being in place to
subserve their perceptual categorisation and in the sense that self models
are intended to bring together the low level perceptual categorisation and
the higher level conscious experience of doing perceptual categorisation.
Also, many of the same neurological inspirations motivate both theories.
Finally, just as the physicist studying the weak nuclear force may benefit
from gaining an understanding of electromagnetism and the kinds of
questions answered by the theory of electromagnetism—perhaps with the
goal of eventually incorporating them each into one larger theory—so too
may we benefit from understanding perceptual categorisation and the
questions which the theory helps to answer. Getting some kind of grasp
on the established theory will help us better to understand some of the
ways our own self model theory should be formulated and the kinds of
architectural questions and features it must accommodate. Our purpose,
however, isn't to explore the theory in all its complexity, but merely to
note some of the cytoarchitectonic features on which it relies and to see
both its compatibilities with existing empirical data and its relationships to
our own broader project.
9.1 Neural Darwinism
Arguably the richest cognitive neuroscientific account of perceptual
categorisation in the human brain is the theory of neuronal group
selection—so-called "neural Darwinism"—advanced by Nobel laureate
Gerald M. Edelman and colleagues. (Edelman 1978, 1981, 1989a, 1989b;
Edelman and Reeke 1982; Edelman and Finkel 1984) One of the most
important tasks of the nervous system is to learn to categorise the rich
landscape of perceptions in a world devoid of pre-existing "labels". Many
of an organism's most basic actions require the ability to differentiate
object from background, friend from foe, beneficial from harmful. An
organism must be competent to recognise two different presentations of
the same stimulus and ultimately to recognise similarities between related
stimuli and to direct its behaviour toward them appropriately. Edelman
offers an account, in terms of organisational features of large populations
of neurons, of the various mechanisms which contribute to these
extraordinary abilities. The theory of neuronal group selection is
especially concerned to explain the kind of polymorphous (Ryle 1949)
categorisation considered by Wittgenstein (1953; see also Pitcher 1968) with
respect to games, where membership in a category is allowed when any m
out of n >m possible disjunctive properties are displayed.52
Edelman's theory doesn't answer the questions about sensation
which the self model view is meant to illuminate, but it is useful to notice
features of Edelman's account which bear on the self model's architectural
features that we will shortly explore. In particular, it is useful to keep
general properties of the neuronal group selection theory in mind when
we finally pin down the self model architecture in order to monitor the
compatibility between the two approaches.
9.2 Socialist Neuroscience?
The theory of neuronal group selection is an application to
neuroscience of the kinds of population ideas (see Mayr 1982 for
overview) which we discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the
evolutionary plausibility of self models. The most significant selectionist
feature of the theory is that selection operates primarily on groups of
hundreds to thousands of closely interconnected and functionally related
neurons. In contrast to the work of Changeaux and colleagues (Changeux
and Danchin 1976; Changeux, et al. 1984), whose selectionist model of
development and epigenesis works on the basis of eliminative selection of
52 Apparently humans generally employ much more complex strategies in categorisation
than the rigid lists of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of standard
set theory. (Rosch and Lloyd 1978, Smith and Medin 1981)
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individual neurons, the theory describes mechanisms for implementing
both positive and negative selection of entire neuronal populations.
Edelman's theory is unique in this emphasis on entire neuronal
populations and the features which he builds into them and into the
interactions between them. Perhaps the two most important features are
degeneracy and the kind of phasic reentrant signalling which we discussed
above for cross modal associations in our own self models.
Degeneracy is the availability in each repertoire of functionally
related neuronal groups of an abundance of isofunctional but not
isomorphic structural variants. That is, in each large "grouping of
groupings" of neurons, there are many groups which respond very
similarly but which exhibit different architectures. This structural
diversity originates epigenetically in prenatal development and appears in
part due to various selective pressures regulated by cell and substrate
adhesion molecules and their effects on cell division and death,
movement, and differentiation. Edelman is careful to distinguish this
notion of degeneracy from the related concept of redundancy, which
describes groups of structures which are both isofunctional and
isomorphic. Both degeneracy and redundancy offer reliability and
consistency in systems made up of stochastically variable or unreliable
componentry, (von Neumann 1956; Winograd and Cowan 1963) Perhaps
more importantly in our context, degeneracy evinces the kind of variation
present in any natural population owing its constitution to selective
pressures, and it offers a wider range of possible responses to completely
novel stimuli while preventing the kind of "overfitting" which may occur
when an architecture adapts inflexibly to a given set of requirements.
The most significant feature of interaction between these neuronal
groups emerges postnatally with epigenetic modifications to the synaptic
connectivity between (as well as within) neuronal groups. Various
mechanisms—more on synaptic changes presently—contribute to the
formation of reciprocal reentrant connections between receptor sheets for
different modalities (and capable of what Edelman dubs independent
"disjunctive sampling"), motor ensembles, and so forth which are
correlated in their output activity. Edelman believes reentrant
connections emerge in response to selective pressures at the group and
cellular levels and facilitate the kinds of phasic signalling which he
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indicates subserve the maintenance of coherent spatiotemporal
relationships between environmental input and the organism's responses.
Edelman argues convincingly that such a model of neuronal group
selection is a biologically plausible route to the emergence and
maintenance of sophisticated networks capable of polymodal perceptual
categorisation in an unlabelled world. His account of selective pressures
operating on degenerate groups and the development of reentrant
signalling between groups responding to afferent signals from different
modalities is vastly preferable to instructionist or computationalist
alternatives which show little promise of being accommodated by the
neuroscientific data. In this sense, Edelman's approach stands out as the
most fruitful in a limited field of theories which attempt to tackle these
kinds of problems.
In addition to the emphasis on features of group selection,
Edelman's theory is also unique in its treatment of individual changes at
the neuronal level, and it is both compatible with and partly inspired by a
large body of cellular studies (for overviews, see Edelman, et al. 1985;
Purves and Lichtman 1985). In contrast to the somewhat primitive cell
assembly theory due to Hebb (1949, 1980, 1982; see also Hayek 1952)—
which, incidentally, is the basis for almost all development of artificial
neural networks which exhibit plasticity and which moreover cannot be
entirely correct (see Wigstrom, et al 1982 for hippocampus data)—the
theory incorporates differential pre- and post-synaptic rules for updates to
synaptic efficacy. (Finkel and Edelman 1985) It can accommodate both
homosynaptic change (i.e., change in plasticity as a result of activity at the
synapse concerned) and heterosynaptic change (i.e., change in plasticity as
a result of activity at nearby synapses on the same neuron). There is good
experimental evidence for both types of modifications at the
ultrastructural and biochemical levels (Fifkova and van Harreveld 1977;
Desmond and Levy 1981; Vrensen and Nunes-Cardozo 1981). Finally,
Edelman's mechanisms are incompatible with the simple chemoaffinity
patterning models credited to Sperry (1963, 1965).
9.3 Beyond the Group—Post-Socialism?
In the end, the theory of neuronal group selection is successful in
many ways as a first step towards answering some of the most puzzling
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questions about perceptual categorisation. In just one example, Edelman
has described a simple mapping network operating only with a
postsynaptic rule, the behaviour of which mimics very well several
experiments reported in the literature. (Merzenich, et al 1984) The self
organising network apparently emulates roughly the emergent
organisational characteristics of area 3b of the somatosensory cortex of the
squirrel monkey, an area dedicated to mapping of the glabrous and dorsal
surfaces of the hand. (Merzenich, et al 1983a, 1983b) Edelman is also keen
to point out (1989a, p. 289) that the "classification couple" (a simple pair of
feature maps with reentrant signalling) in the rudimentary Darwin II
network overcomes the artificial neural network limitations famously
described by Minsky and Papert (1969), although in all fairness there now
exists a broad selection of other artificial neural networks available in the
literature which also overcome the early perceptron limitations53—a
broad selection which, much to the consternation of his critics, Edelman
typically fails to mention in his own writing.
While neural Darwinism is a good first step towards understanding
one aspect of the brain as a distributed system (Mountcastle 1978),
however, many questions remain unanswered. For instance, although
Edelman's theory incorporates the role of cortical columnar bundles in
primary sensory receiving areas for mapping multidimensional properties
of unimodal information to a two dimensional sheet (Hubel and Wiesel
1977), such mapping alone is apparently not sufficient to account for the
relevant properties of perception (Uttal 1978, 1981). Edelman (1989a, p.
109) agrees with Zeki (1981) that further reentrant mapping with
multidimensional characteristics "seems to be required". The extent of the
additional requirement, however, is not quantified. The impression we
get from Edelman's presentation is that most of the ideas included in the
theory are on the right track and that most of the organisational and
cytoarchitectonic features it predicts will probably turn out to be confirmed
by further experiment, yet there are still significant elements of the "bigger
picture" missing. I believe Edelman is correct in singling out reentrant
signalling between classification couples and the various selective
mechanisms which help to create them as some of the most important
underpinnings of any complete account of perceptual categorisation, but it
53 These limitations served nearly to kill the field of artificial neural networks
altogether. Fortunately over the last decade or so the field has grown robustly.
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is disheartening to see, despite the technical impressiveness of Edelman's
achievement, just how much work remains to be done.
More importantly for our project, Edelman's theory does not begin
to explain how it is that it feels the way it does to be a subject of sensation
engaged in the kind of perceptual categorisation which the theory seeks to
explain. After all, basic categorisation can be performed by the simple
kinds of artificial self organising feature maps (SOFMs) to which we turn
in the next chapter, yet there is no reason to believe that such data
structures experience sensations of any kind—and plenty of reasons to
believe they do not. Edelman's theory fills the important role of helping
us to understand the perceptual abilities of humans, but it doesn't explain
the relationship between perceptual categorisation and the sensation of
being an individual in a state of doing perceptual categorisation. This is
where our own self model approach can serve as an extension of the
neuronal group selection framework, a means for understanding what
else there must be, in addition to mechanisms for enabling perceptual
categorisation, in order that such categorisation be accompanied by
sensation. The self model theory we have been exploring complements
Edelman's theory nicely, and hopefully it may contribute to the
development of more sophisticated psychological models along the lines
of those based on the Edelman-style evolutionary selective view of the
brain. (Rosenfield 1988, Goertzel 1993)
Next we will flesh out our high level description of the self model
approach with explorations of their lower level architectural features. We
begin with comments on the artificial neural network framework in the





We shall try to avoid allowing the present chapter to degenerate
into a tutorial on connectionism and artificial neural network
development, but it will be useful to pursue a few points, both technical
and philosophical, which will be directly relevant to our impending foray
into self model implementation. Seeing self models through the eyes of
artificial neural networks will help us to pin down the essential functional
relationships of the neural architectures without being too distracted by
real biological factors which are poorly understood and which may not be
entirely necessary for implementing the kinds of data structures which we
are exploring. Having said that, understanding the artificial neural
network framework will also reveal something of the extent to which we
may be missing out on important factors of biological reality in couching
our discussions too much in connectionist terms.
For the interested reader, there is already a growing body of
literature about artificial neural networks and philosophical questions of
mind (Clark 1989; Horgan and Tienson 1991; Ramsey, et al 1991; Clark and
Lutz 1992) and about enlightening philosophy with a cognitive
neuroscientific approach (Churchland 1986), as well as about broader
questions of philosophy and artificial intelligence approaches (Boden 1990)
and technical matters which are combinations of cognitive neuroscience
and philosophy of mind (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992) or cognitive
science and neurobiology. (Gardner 1993)
10.1 Artificial Neural Networks—The Tutorial
The basic approach in the development of artificial neural networks
is to reduce the behaviour of a neuron to that of a more or less
functionally simple input/output node, with outputs usually in the range
[0...1] or [-1...1], and then to connect these nodes together in networks,
usually simulated in software on a digital computer, across which nodes
can exchange signals. Sometimes these networks are hardwired in VLSI
chips, and some effort is even being made to develop more biologically
plausible models of single neurons for implementation in silicon.
(Mahowald and Douglas 1991) The point of artificial neural network
development is that when these nodes are connected together in
appropriate ways, particular nodes may be excited with some kind of
input, and the network may process the input in such a way as to give a
useful output on some other set of nodes.
10.1.1 Connections are the Spice of Life
These idealised nodes communicate with each other by means of
weighted connections representing synapses. Weights indicate the
synaptic efficacy of a connection between two nodes and are multiplied by
the numerical output of the first node to determine that node's
contribution to the activity of the second node.54 To calculate the output
of any individual node, all its weighted inputs are first summed. An
output function is then applied to this total weighted input to determine
the activation level of that node and the value which it will provide
through weighted connections to subsequent nodes. The activation level
may be described by a simple threshold function, where the node gives
maximum output when its weighted inputs exceed a certain threshold
value and minimum output when they fall below this level. Instead, it
might be a simple straight line output, where output rises linearly with
input, a nonlinear sigmoid function, or some other variety. Individual
nodes may also have a certain bias—corresponding to a real neuron's base
firing frequency—an initial proclivity to fire or to remain at rest, which
may be implemented either as a single value associated with each node
and which is added to the weighted sum of inputs each time output is
calculated or, equivalently, as a weighted afferent connection to a special
node which provides a continuous maximum output.
54 Weights may be either positive, representing excitatory connections, or negative,
representing inhibitory connections. Likewise, weighted inputs may be either positive,
indicating an excitatory postsynaptic potential (EPSP), or negative, indicating an
inhibitory postsynaptic potential (1PSP).
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10.1.2 Learning is the Spice of Connections
If this were the whole artificial neural network story, networks
would really only be able to push values around, and designing useful
ones would be a very complex process demanding careful analysis to
determine what arrangements of connections and weights would give the
desired output. What makes these neural networks interesting is that by
incorporating some rule for updating the weights of connections between
nodes as the network is presented with different kinds of inputs, a
network may learn and adapt to give more useful output on future
presentations of similar input. Learning rules may be either supervised,
in which case the network is "told" what outputs are appropriate for
particular inputs and the network is responsible for altering its weights to
match the inputs to the outputs, or they may be unsupervised, in which
case the network has no information about what outputs should correlate
with what inputs and simply organises itself in a way which is more or
less coherent according to the character of the learning rule. These simple
learning rules are analogous to the mechanisms which effect arborisation
in a network of real neurons.
On first blush, it should be only networks with unsupervised
learning rules which will be of interest to us, concerned as we are not so
much with what kinds of interesting computational feats may be
accomplished with artificial networks but instead with what kinds of data
structures may be implemented by real biological systems in which there is
presumably no "supervisor". (As we noted in the prior discussion about
neural Darwinism, categorisation must take place in an unlabelled world;
providing supervision for a network in the form of desired outputs is
tantamount to offering it such labels.) Later we will see that there is a way
in which this is not entirely true, but for the moment we will examine an
example network which may serve to illustrate the general idea of self
organising networks.
10.2 Learning With No Exams
The following network is an example both of unsupervised
adaptation and of the trend in artificial neural network development to
create networks endowed with more biological plausibility. The network
is similar to others developed with the Kohonen (1984) algorithm which
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self organise to produce coherent feature maps of the input data. I have
reprinted the following from Mulhauser (1993b),55 with some corrections
and minor modifications to enhance continuity with the discussion we
have made so far.
10.2.1 Self Organisation and Biological Plausibility
As we have previously noted, artificial neural networks are
inspired by the networks of nerve cells in brains but are designed for use
on electronic computers. Unfortunately, in the quest to simplify artificial
neural models and reduce the computational overhead required for their
execution, a number of poorly understood characteristics of biological
neural networks have been abstracted away or ignored altogether. The
model I propose showcases novel approaches for implementing certain of
these neuronal characteristics which may return performance
improvements when integrated into existing artificial neural networks.
The model makes minimal computational demands and is unique in
combining lateral connections within a layer to represent gap junctions
and ephaptic interactions, a fatigue factor for each node, and a Hebbian
(1949, 1980, 1982) learning rule.
While I am not yet able to report results of empirical testing of the
network architecture and learning algorithm I describe56, structural
similarities to other networks suggest that we might expect the net to
produce population coding which resembles something like a cross
between Kohonen's modified competitive learning strategy (1984) and
principal-components algorithms. By 'population coding', we mean that
activity in response to a particular input is concentrated in a particular
local group of neurons. Such coding may offer computationally cheap
feature extraction because the location of the active population of neurons
can be specified simply.
10.2.2 Architectural Preliminaries
The network consists of an input layer completely connected to a
second layer that includes lateral connections. That is, every node in the
55 Please see the Appendix for reprint information.
56 Initial programming and testing of the network was undertaken near the end of the 1992-
93 academic year by the Computing Studies Department of Napier University (Edinburgh,
Scotland), but the programme was not continued in the new year, and I cannot report any
substantial experimental data.
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input layer is connected to every node in the second layer, and nodes in
the second layer are partly connected to each other. It is within this layer
that we should expect population coding to emerge. Connection weights
are in the range [-1...1] and node outputs are in the range [0...1]. Node
outputs, except for the fatigue modification which I describe below, may be
calculated from the linear sum of weighted inputs according to a sigmoid
curve or other standard function. Note that no derivatives are taken of
the output function (as some learning rules demand). Thus it may be
desirable to choose an output function which allows more information
effectively to be represented in a node's output value, much as
information may be represented in the output frequency of a real
neuron.57 This might even provide a few of the benefits of pulse coded
networks. (Gluck, et al 1989; Duchateau and Lansner 1991; Gustafsson, et
al 1992; Kosko 1992) Biases are not addressed but may be implemented in
standard ways if desired.
10.2.3 Footballs and Pyramids
In biological neural networks, local neuronal activity is partially
homogenised by means of gap junctions and ephaptic interactions. The
former are actual physical connections between adjacent cells made by
large macromolecules which extend through both cell membranes and
contain water-filled pores. (Kuffler, et al 1984; McCormick 1990) Ephaptic
interactions do not require a physical connection between nerve cells, but
they have a similar effect: the electrical currents set up by the flow of ions
across the membrane of one neuron may induce electrical currents in
nearby cells. (Hille 1984; Kuffler, et al 1984)
While the strategy used by Kohonen to enable physically adjacent
nodes in a competitive learning network to code similar input patterns is
one possible abstraction of this feature, I propose a simpler abstraction in
which the input layer is completely connected to a single layer, within
which each node is directly connected to its three nearest neighbours. The
architecture may be viewed geometrically as a regular pattern of hexagons,
57 Because of the way lateral connections are treated in this network, smoother output
functions are favoured over step functions or very steeply nonlinear ones.
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as in Figure l.58 For simplicity in implementing the connections as a data
structure, the pattern can simply be stretched as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 1. Horizontal connections in the second layer
For some applications, it may be desirable to maintain the pattern of
three lateral connections per node by warping the structure into a third
dimension and connecting nodes shown here with only two connections
to the corresponding nodes on the opposite side. The uniformity of
connections might also be achieved by arranging nodes in patterns of both
hexagons and pentagons and transforming the whole structure into a
three dimensional football shape.
58 Interestingly, the decision to limit connections to the three nearest neighbours was based
on biological considerations and intuitions about limiting the influence of the lateral
connections. One year later, Der and Herrmann (1994) confirmed in their Voronoi
tesellation study that stability concerns related to the influence of lateral connections make
hexagonal arrangements preferable to quadrangular arrangements for many applications.
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Fig. 2. Simplified horizontal connections
In implementing this connection pattern, we may treat lateral
synapses as "virtual connections" and view all connections as being
between layers. This is accomplished by introducing a third layer with a
number of nodes equal to that in the layer in which we are implementing
"virtual connections". We may then dispense with horizontal
connections between nodes and calculate their effects in the subsequent
layer. Each node is connected to "itself" in the next layer by a connection
whose strength is permanently set to one. (Obviously, if biases are
implemented, they must be dropped for the "copy" in this third layer;
otherwise the biases provided to the two nodes representing the same
laterally influenced node would be additive, and this convenient
computational trick would not work.) This node also receives inputs
from each of its neighbours in the preceding layer, as in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Implementing virtual horizontal connections with an extra layer
We may thus calculate first the response of each node to the firing
patterns of the input layer and then calculate separately the influence on it
of the activity of the nodes in its horizontally local neighbourhood. There
may be different advantages to setting each of the virtual lateral con¬
nections to a uniform initial strength such as 1/3 or simply to
randomising them across the net.
10.2.4 Unsupervised Learning
Because of its role in the function for updating connection
strengths, I describe first the fatigue factor associated with each neuron.
Fatigue in real neurons, known as spike frequency adaptation, is the
tendency of some kinds of neurons to decrease their firing frequency in
response to sustained depolarisations. This behaviour may prevent the
same neurons from becoming active in representations of too many
distinct input patterns. For the present model, I suggest a fatigue value dx
in the range [0...1] (where larger numbers indicate more fatigue) which is
applied to calculate a "real output" Ox for a node x by a straightforward
modification of an output outx calculated with a sigmoid or other function
from the weighted sum of inputs to the node:
(1)
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When calculating a new fatigue value p'* for a node x, we should like to
take into account its recent firing history as represented by the previous
fatigue value as well as the magnitude of its present output. If its present
output is low relative to its fatigue value, the fatigue should fade quickly.
Likewise, if its present output is high, fatigue should achieve significance
rapidly. This can be modelled as in equations (2) and (3),
where e is a parameter set in advance to adjust how significant an
influence fatigue is allowed to become. Fatigue values should be set to 0
before the network is trained.
The learning rule I describe is inspired by Hebb's theory that
synaptic coupling increases when the activity of converging network
elements is coincident.59 We would like to increase the weight of a
connection between two nodes when the nodes produce similar output. A
high correlation paired with a low present connection strength should
correspond to a large increase in weight, while a low correlation paired
with a high connection strength should correspond to a large decrease in
connection strength. We seek a relationship something like Figure 4,
where the x-axis represents the present connection weight, the y-axis the
correlation between the nodes' outputs, and the z-axis the amount by
which the connection should be updated.
59 Recall that the Hebb rule cannot be entirely correct. Curiously, however, something
closely related to Hebb's theory is the basis of nearly all artificial learning networks
today which claim biological plausibility.
when Ox > b*




Fig. 4. Weight updating
The relationship might be nonlinearised as in Figure 5 to increase
the responsiveness of the network, although such a nonlinearisation
would need to be applied carefully to avoid undue influences on the
behaviour of lateral connections and to avoid increasing the sensitivity of
the network to a level where it becomes unable to converge on a stable
pattern of connection strengths.60
60 I believe it was Joos Vandewalle of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven who first noted
at the original presentation of this network that it is not guaranteed to converge. As I
indicated at the time, however, I am concerned more with biological plausibility than
computational utility, and there is no guarantee that biological networks converge.
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Fig. 5. Noniinearised weight updating
I suggest that equation (4) establishes the relationship indicated in
Figure 4 between a wx,y scaled to [0...1] (x-axis), representing the present
connection weight between nodes x and y, 1 - I Ox - Oy I (y-axis),
representing the correlation between the outputs O of nodes x and y, and
8(wx,y) (z-axis), the amount by which to update the connection strength.
Here w^y, which ranges over [-1...1], is scaled to the range [0...1] by the last
term inside the brackets.
The a term relates to the implementation of the fatigue factor. We
are seeking a strategy which will avoid large modifications to a connection
weight when both nodes in question are highly fatigued. This might
occur, for instance, in situations where a similar input pattern has been
presented over and over again and the nodes coding it have begun to
decrease their outputs in response to fatigue. Equation (5) indicates one
method of implementing the strategy:
(4)
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a = [ 1 - minf^, 4>y)] [max(Ox, Oy)] (5)
The second bracketed term in (5) also ties the degree to which a
weight is altered to the strength of the nodes' outputs. Thus, high
correlation must be coupled with high output magnitude to invoke a
maximal change in connection strength.
Finally, returning to equation (4), for applications where we are
concerned with an eventual settling down of the network's connection
weight activity—with or without convergence—we may add the quantity
in (6) to the front of the bracketed term in order to decrease gradually over
time the degree to which weight changes are made. (This results in
something akin to psychologists' primacy effect but not the corresponding
recency effect.) Here, r\ is the total number of inputs to be presented and t
is the the index of the current input.
T] -i + 1 (6)
n
10.2.5 What's Wrong With This Picture?
While the techniques described here are inspired by theories of how
real living neurons function, they are not without their limitations, in
part because these theories may not accurately reflect real neural
behaviour. The onset and decay of fatigue in real neurons is poorly
understood, and the effects of ephaptic interactions and gap junctions are
difficult to quantify. The characteristics of dendritic growth are actively
researched, but it is impossible to say yet just how badly flawed Hebb's
theory of synaptic change may be.
The network implementation makes minimal demands on
computational resources and may lend itself to the construction of larger
but faster nets, yet the specific strategies at work in the net might prove
problematic. For instance, the network may prove too sensitive to the
choice of an £ value in equation (2). Equations (2) and (3) may allow
fatigue to become significant too rapidly or to decay too slowly.
Incorporating data from single neuron spike frequency recording could
help fine tune these parameters. Also, depending on the types of data
presented to the input layer, it may be necessary to place a bound on the
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value of the virtual horizontal connection weights to prevent interactions
within this layer from becoming too significant. Finally, the virtual
horizontal connections may produce nonstandard relationships between
the number of nodes in the input layer and the desirable total number of
connections in the network.
This architecture and learning algorithm invite further research
into the performance of the network I have defined as well as the
performance of other networks modified with some of the techniques I
have described. Virtual horizontal connections as a simple means of
encouraging population coding should be tested and compared with other
established methods, and the usefulness of fatigue factors to promote
uniform distributions of activity may be examined in any net where
population coding is the main aim. The learning algorithm itself may be
tested and improved as a substitute for less biologically plausible
algorithms currently enjoying widespread use.
Other promising avenues for research with this type of network
include the implementation of mechanisms for growing new horizontal
connections (perhaps with a speed inversely related to the distance
between the two neurons in question) to allow synchronisation and lateral
reinforcement between spatially separated but functionally related
network nodes, interlevel feedback, and the implementation of recurrent
feedback of the output activity back to the input layer.
10.3 The Tutorial—Part Two
We can see from this brief detour into artificial self organising
neural networks that the mathematical abstractions can be rather far from
biological reality. Nonetheless, as we noted previously, they can help us
get at the essential functional processes which are going on in complex
neural systems while sheltering us from a portion of the low level
cytoarchitectonic hustle and bustle. (Of course, we must always remember
that a good deal of this hustle and bustle is undoubtedly functionally
relevant, and we must keep returning to biological reality as we seek to
develop networks which reflect to increasingly greater degrees the
capacities of real nervous systems.) Recently, another sort of neural
network development has emerged as a serious contender in terms of
both biological plausibility and computational ability.
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Rather than using a learning rule to alter connection strengths in a
network of fixed architecture, these networks are developed by applying an
artificial version of the evolutionary framework we have discussed
previously to generate populations of fixed plasticity networks suited for a
particular task. Typically a bit string "genome" represents the architectural
layout and connection strengths of a network, and a fitness function
determines how effectively a generated network performs the desired task.
Initially, the genomes for a population of networks are generated
randomly, and the fitness function is applied to select some percentage of
them which are most up to the task. Usually, of course, the randomly
generated initial networks are not very good at doing anything at all! But
these selected genomes then serve as the "stock" for generating a new
population of genotypes: through a genetic recombination algorithm,
sections of successful genomes are combined in a way akin to real
biological crossover, with a generally very small amount of mutation
(usually random flipping of bits in the genome string). The fitness
function is applied again to select the new networks best suited to the task,
and once more the genetic material of these networks serves as the basis
for generating a new population. After some generations—often
surprisingly few—highly capable networks may emerge. While this is
hardly a plausible rendition of real evolution, the technique has proven
itself extremely powerful in automatically generating populations of
networks for handling particular problems.
In what follows, we see an attempt at making such neural network
development slightly more plausible, and the basis becomes clear for the
side comment above that "supervised" networks are not altogether useless
for understanding real biological systems. The emergence of hybrid
architectures as described below is also helpful for understanding the
biological plausibility of the self model architectures we will soon explore.
This kind of pseudo-supervision by a classical subnetwork is also an
excellent example of the instantiation of the feedback which we noted
earlier could be so useful to the self model. Following the style of the
previous network illustration, I have reprinted the following from
Mulhauser (1994b),61 again with some corrections and minor
modifications to enhance continuity with the discussion we have made so
far.
61 Please see the Appendix for reprint information.
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10.4 The Evolutionary Goal
Present development of artificial neural networks, whether by
genetic algorithms or by traditional learning methods, is grossly
inadequate as a picture of biological reality. Network design with genetic
algorithms ignores the role of ontogenetic behaviour adaptation in
response to the characteristics of the particular environment in which an
individual phenotype finds itself. Genetic algorithms typically are applied
to generate zero plasticity networks incapable of ontogenetic development.
(This is the case even for the so-called "growing networks" of Nolfi and
Parisi 1992 in which the ontogeny of a network is directly, albeit
nonlinearly—see also Langton 1992—encoded in the genotype and is
independent of environmental factors unique to particular individuals.)
Conversely, network development with traditional learning methods
generally ignores the fact that real biological organisms learn within
boundary conditions set by the organism's genotype and phylogenetically
adapted by recombination, mutation, sexual selection, and environmental
pressures. The boundary conditions of traditional learning networks are
set not by the power of evolution but by human designers taking
"educated guesses" at appropriate architectures, learning algorithms, and
connection patterns.
But it scarcely needs pointing out that real adult phenotypes are the
product of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. The living
organisms we encounter every day are genetically endowed at birth with a
wealth of characteristics which evolution has determined are beneficial for
their survival and reproduction, but within the bounds laid down by their
genotypes they are also capable of adapting to changes in their
environment. They are capable of learning. Thus, insofar as the
theoretical frameworks offered by either the genetic algorithms paradigm
or the traditional learning paradigm claim to be biologically plausible, they
are incomplete, and insofar as they claim to be complete, they are not
biologically plausible.
10.4.1 Paying the Evolutionary Piper
I suggest a broader theoretical framework within which artificial
neural network design mimics the natural features of both genetic coding
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and environmentally induced adaptation by individuals. On this view,
genetic algorithms should be applied to genotypes which code not only for
the standard parameters describing nodes, thresholds, and connections (or
simple dendritic growth for growing networks), but also for characteristics
of dendritic plasticity. These characteristics might include the learning
rate of a globally defined Hebbian rule as well as a measure of the capacity
for growing new connections. The fitness function may then be applied to
a phenotype grown nontrivialiy during a "learning phase" in a dynamic
environment. It might give preference to phenotypes which adapt
smoothly to environmental changes, such as a motor control network
which could not only manoeuvre a robot arm toward a given point but
could also adapt to avoid obstacles introduced into its path.
From artificial neural nets developed within this theoretical
framework, I believe we may gain some insight into the emergence of
classical symbolic processing in real intelligent organisms. I propose that
evolution creates hybrid architectures of high and low plasticity
connections in which arrays of neurons with low plasticity connections
might embed very simple classical processors such as basic logical
connectives. This view takes theoretical support from the idea that low
plasticity subnetworks implementing classical functions may be the most
efficient "building blocks" on which higher plasticity distributed hybrid
networks could rely. Given that genotypes specify at least some, if not all,
characteristics of dendritic growth (by virtue of specifying the structures of
cells themselves), I believe it is highly implausible that Nature could have
failed to exploit this elegant way of mixing the best attributes of
connectionist and (neurally implemented) classical systems.
This is not to say that genetic algorithms may only generate
networks exploiting classical processes, for this is clearly not the case. If
adult organisms never had to learn by experience, never had to remember
information or respond to situations radically different from those which
influenced the phylogenetic development of their predecessors, genetic
algorithms might have provided for the entire repertoire of behaviour of
adult organisms with nonlearning networks operating with any balance of
obviously symbolic or distributed principles. But in the real world higher
organisms are not entirely hardwired by their genotypes. I suggest simply
that real biological development yields networks of mixed plasticity and
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that in those portions of phenotypes which are hardwired, we may find
embedded symbolic functions.
By way of example of what might be accomplished by deliberately
mixing high and low plasticity connections, below I describe a motor
control problem together with a manually designed speculative prototype
network meant to illustrate some architectural principles which might be
exploited by the automated development theory I have outlined above. It
is certainly inferior to what could be generated by such a strategy, so I
include it not as a solution to any particular motor control problems but
merely as an example of a first step.
10.4.2 A Sample Problem
For the moment we are concerned with the problem of visually
guiding some mechanical device to an arbitrary point in space. This
amounts to combining information about the present visual image with
information about the desired image in order to activate a motor system.
Here we assume that the relationship between a given activation of the
motor system and its influence on the visual image is initially unknown
but could be described by a (hopefully simple) computable function. For
this example, we also assume that visual information has been pre-
processed in such a way that the control system is presented with an
indication of, for instance, the present real coordinates of the device
together with its desired coordinates.62 The dimensionality of the problem
might be increased by also including the present and desired coordinates of
more than one coupled part of the mechanical device, such as both the
target end and the elbow joint. The details of the specific device under
motor control do not concern us. Instead, I would like to paint in broad
strokes a picture of one possible neural architecture for performing this
type of control task.
10.4.3 Another Architecture
The network I propose works on the hypothesis that an
unsupervised Hebbian network provided with feedback about its level of
success at performing a particular task might approximate the capabilities
of a supervised network learning to perform a similar task. This principle
62 This pre-processing does not amount to "cheating": it is simply a straightforward job for
another network not considered here.
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is inspired by Rumelhart's biologically plausible implementations of
something similar to backpropagation (see Zipser and Rumelhart 1990 for
early work) and his recent use of this type of network in motor control and
so-called "mental mapping". (Rumelhart 1993b) Rumelhart's networks
are primarily Hebbian but rely upon feedback from nodes producing a
theoretical neuromodulator which regulates plasticity without affecting
activation. (Rumelhart 1993a) The neuromodulator is plausible, but it
has yet to be identified in biological systems; the present network is meant
to perform a similar task without recourse to this modulator.
Rather than providing a plasticity-modifying chemical at a
particular neural junction, the present strategy is simply to provide
additional excitatory input to the two Hebbian nodes in question. In most
networks using correlation rules to update weights, such as the example
self organising network described above, high correlation between node
outputs must be combined with high present output frequency to achieve
a maximal update to the connection strength. Thus the strategy of
providing additional excitatory input to the two nodes increases the
magnitude of the connection update. Of course this will also influence the
other nodes to which either of the two in question might be connected, so
the strategy is far from identical to the neuromodulator scheme.
The network receives its feedback about performance from a zero
plasticity subnetwork which provides a classical measure of the
improvement in position caused by the most recent motor activation. A
rudimentary version of such a measure is the XNOR function,
implemented as shown in Figure 6 by perceptron-style units with all or
nothing thresholds set to .5.
However, since we require more information than a simple
verification of whether two units are either both on or both off, a more
flexible measure is the function 1 - I X - Y I, implemented as shown in
Figure 7, together with its output graph. Here the nodes have zero
thresholds and a continuous output response which can be read off from
the cross section where the graph meets either of the two vertical planes
made by the axes. I will refer to this simple network as a "convergence
detector"; it may be nonlinearised by altering the output function of the





Fig. 6. XNOR function
In the complete system, depicted in Figure 8, convergence between
the present image and the desired image is measured by the detector A and
convergence between a previous image (thus the propagation delay) and
the desired image by the detector B. While each of these detectors has a
number of output signals identical to the number of dimensions of the
image information, for simplicity only one output each is shown here.
The outputs of the two detectors are compared by single nodes, with
smooth output functions and complete efferent connections to the control
network, which effectively subtract the old convergence from the new in
the case of the subtractor marked C or the new convergence from the old
in the case of D.
t = o
output = smooth
Fig. 7. Convergence detector and output graph
The output functions of these nodes must be scaled to amplify
positive results: since we would expect sudden very high improvements
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in convergence only rarely, it is important to magnify the presence of even
minor improvements to a significant level. The D node is unique in that
it represents a neuron which produces only inhibitory chemicals, but its
efferent connections are still updated according to the Hebbian rule in
place. (Note that some sort of arrangement with fixed afferent
connections and plastic efferent connections is necessary for
communication between nodes with fixed connections and nodes which
are part of a learning network.)
Fig. 8. Complete system
The upshot of this system is that when the controlling network
yields a motor output which improves the convergence between the
desired and the actual visual input, all the nodes in the control network
will receive additional excitatory input from C, but only the connections
with those which were firing at a high rate will be strengthened. When
. the motor output worsens the convergence, all the nodes receive
inhibitory input from D, but again only the connections with those which
were firing will be strengthened.
Additional excitatory input to a pair of firing nodes which are
connected to each other in the main network will contribute to an increase
in the strength of the connection between them, whereas inhibitory input
will contribute to a decrease in the connection efficacy (or at least a
relatively smaller increase). The interaction between the inhibitory and
excitatory inputs from the subtractors themselves and the influence of this
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input on the connections between the nodes within the main network is
meant to be a primary mechanism affecting the system's development.
10.4.4 Every Architecture Has Its Problems
Perhaps the most telling criticism against the system as it stands is
that there is no guarantee the main network will converge when it is
trained upon a set of desired images with a consistent environment and
consistent motor actuator characteristics. As I have stated, however, the
architecture is intended primarily as an example of the kinds of features
which might emerge from the design theory I described above, and it
illustrates the application of a hybrid architecture to the feedback
hypothesis. A more subtle criticism is that complete efferent connections
from the subtractors suggest that in terms of reinforcement no
discrimination will be made between nodes whose firing was highly
desirable for achieving a convergence improvement and those whose
firing was only marginally desirable; all nodes whose firing contributed to
a positive change in convergence are reinforced, while all those whose
firing contributed to a negative change are inhibited. Likewise, there is at
present no mechanism for capping the influence of feedback if the
network does tend toward improved performance at the motor control
task; there is some danger of saturation. Improvement of the network to
remedy these deficiencies and others awaits full implementation, testing,
and detailed analysis.
10.4.5 Evolution and Other Goals
I have outlined what I believe is the most powerful theoretical
framework for biologically plausible artificial neural network design
considered to date. I have given reasons for broadening the class of neural
network characteristics under the control of a genetic algorithm as well as
reasons for incorporating a "learning phase" of ontogenetic development
and for applying the fitness function to the phenotypes thus produced. I
have indicated how this theoretical framework may allow us to view
some phenotypes as hybrid networks in which evolution has "discovered"
useful classical functions and embedded them in low plasticity
subnetworks. I have given an example of a problem which could benefit
from this type of approach and described a manually designed sample
network which might be useful for solving the problem.
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For complex tasks, the capabilities of networks produced under this
theoretical framework may surpass those of most artificial networks either
genetically created or manually designed for ordinary learning. Since
artificial networks are not constrained by the boundary conditions of
biological neurons operating in real space, such artificial networks may
ultimately surpass even the capabilities of their biological counterparts
with similar numbers of connections. Given computationally simple
correlational learning algorithms and ontogenetic phases of a few
thousand cycles or less, this type of neural network design is well within
the bounds of existing technology.
Already the networks which emerge from simpler genetic
algorithms are extremely difficult to analyse in terms of the functions of
individual neurons. The architectural subtleties made possible by the
framework I have described may prove still more resistant to functional
analysis. This makes yet more pressing the need for ongoing
consideration of the problems created by automated generation of more
and more capable neural networks which we understand less and less.
10.5 Real, Artificial, and Back to Philosophical
Once again, we can see from the example network that what
artificial neural network researchers allow themselves to dub "biologically
plausible" is actually a far cry from biological reality (and I am scarcely less
susceptible to this optimistic tendency than other writers!). But having
explored the abstractions offered by these two network examples, we can
now better understand some of the computational aspects of what
otherwise looks like a mass of grey squishy cells connected together in
strange ways with long branching fibres. In the last phase of our prelude
to actual neural architectures for self models, we address briefly some
philosophical considerations centring first on what we mean by
'information' when discussing information processing and data structures
and second on the closely related issue of the relationship between
information processing by connectionist structures such as these and by





In the preceding chapters, we have slowly been making our way
through material leading up to examples of architectures for
implementing some characteristics of self model data structures. Like our
side trip into quantum mechanics in Chapter 4, the present chapter is a
side trip to be clear on notions of information processing and to be sure
that our emphasis on specifically connectionist models of the material
substrate is safe from some potential criticisms from those of a classical
artificial intelligence persuasion. We begin with a note on the
representation of information in distributed systems before moving on to
the debate between connectionists and the classical AI camp. In the final
section, we conclude that whether or not connectionists generally have a
case to answer, we are here safe from the criticisms of AI.
11.1 Implicit and Explicit Information
In keeping with the treatment of information suggested in the
context of quantum mechanics, we shall here view information as
correlations between the states of material structures. That is, if the state
of one material structure is correlated with the state of another, then we
say that they each bear information symmetrically about the other. When
we say that information is processed by a neural network, we mean
generally that correlations between states of activation of particular
neurons or neuronal groups are created, destroyed, or otherwise
transformed. Only in special cases do we mean something as narrow as
the kind of information processing performed by the simple fixed
plasticity classical subnetworks described above.
One consequence of this view of information is that a distributed
system such as a neural network may contain information about, say, a
curve described by a particular function without containing any explicit
representation either of the function or of the curve. We might be able to
treat the network as a "black box" to which we feed questions such as
where on the curve particular points on a line might be mapped and from
which we receive answers in the form of points on the curve. Yet, if we
opened up the black box and looked for some straightforward "encoding"
of the function or the curve, we couldn't find it.63 In some cases, functions
may be implemented simply in neural networks with something like
binary logic (as in the classical XNOR network), but in other cases there
may just not be any straightforward computational implementation. In
other words, a function may be stored implicitly in terms of the functional
relationships between nodes and without explicit representation of any
kind.
This suggests that the notion of representation to which we
appealed in our initial discussions of self model properties need not be
that of explicit representations, and indeed pattern matching between such
representations, for instance, may take place without any sort of internal
reconstruction of whatever was being represented. (See Fatmi, et al 1990
for a note on this basic point; see Clement, et al 1991 for ideas on analogue
implementation.) This reveals what was misleading about the reverse
Mercator projection example, for instance: in the self model, there needn't
be any physical rendition whatsoever of either the external environment
or the system itself, and the representations of the self model needn't be
like the reverse Mercator projection at all! All we require is that
relationships between the system and the environment and within the
system itself be mirrored functionally in the implementing architecture.
The self model view is not in any way wedded to a naive
representationalism, and our use of the term 'data structure' does not
commit us to any kind of classical symbolic view of data. (For thoughts
related to the superfluity of symbolic representation in pattern matching,
see Gabor, et al 1960 and Fatmi and Resconi 1988. For representations and
quantum ghosts, see also Marcer 1992.)
Another consequence of this view of information is that we may
say a network performs computation without committing ourselves to
63 In general we can find some encoding of almost anything in almost anything, but here we
mean something systematic and straightforward which might, for instance, suffice for more
than one network encoding different things. (See also Chapter 19.)
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what Edelman spurns as the "instructionist paradigm", which is the view
that neural structures actually compute values such as, for instance, the
present angle of a joint, in order to determine an appropriate motor action
or whatever. For our purposes we shall take computation as being
equivalent to information processing as we have already defined it. (I am
aware there is an enormous literature related to computation and
computationalism and a number of incompatible definitions available,
but it will suffice for our purposes to adopt this simple approach.) Thus,
given the broad connotation of information which we have adopted,
whenever some transformation is performed on information, we will say
that a computation has occurred—even if that transformation was not
"computable" on the narrow recursion theoretic definition of the term. It
is absolutely essential to be clear on this use of terminology in order to see
through whatever chimeric confrontations with Edelman or anyone else
may seem to arise. By interpreting information as physical correlation
(along the lines of Landauer 1991), we remove ourselves almost entirely
from the fracas over computation, and we avoid the kinds of abuse hurled
between, for instance, the Crick and Edelman camps.64
11.2 Classicists vs. Connectionists
Closely related to these ideas of information and representation is
the ongoing debate in philosophy of cognitive science over the
relationship between symbolic computation of the sort performed by
digital computers and the information processing performed by
connectionist networks. It will be useful for us to establish just where in
this debate the correct self model view places us; in the end, we shall see
that the debate is rather overblown, and our view shouldn't be too
susceptible to criticisms from either camp. Battle lines for the debate were
drawn most famously by Fodor and Pylyshyn's scathing 1988 attack on the
64 Edelman and Crick research at the Neuroscience Institute and the Salk Institute,
respectively, scarcely one mile removed from each other in southern California. But their
physical proximity isn't matched by the similarity of their approaches to consciousness,
with Crick advocating an ordered computational neuroscientific understanding of cognition
and Edelman a disordered somatic evolution understanding. On our interpretation, a brain
operating under Edelman's rules is "computing" just as much as one operating under Crick's.
Indeed, even on other interpretations, there is nothing to stop an Edelman-type process
occasionally giving rise to a thoroughly Crick-type structure. In general, we are concerned
with what may actually be going on in various areas of a cognitive system rather than with
how we should label this or that process.
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connectionist project, and argument, parry, and riposte between various
protagonists have continued ever since.
Broadly speaking, standard bearers of the classic symbolic camp—
the likes of Fodor and Pylyshyn as well as McLaughlin (Fodor and
McLaughlin 1990)—take positions similar to that of so-called "strong AI",
whose proponents believe that all cognition is a matter of manipulation of
symbol strings of one form or another. Classicists claim, among other
things, that distributed systems like connectionist networks cannot
achieve systematicity without actually implementing a classical (i.e.,
symbolic) system. Systematicity can be understood for our purposes as the
capacity to generalise logical inferences. That is, once the system has learnt
a pattern of inference, it ought to be able to apply that pattern to any other
set of syntactically similar inputs. The challenge is often put to
connectionists in terms of recognising constituent structure in distributed
representations, or of recognising the logical form of what is being
represented and applying transformations to it without actually extracting
it from distributed form into something explicitly symbolic.
In fact, it is becoming more and more clear every month that the
connectionists are winning the skirmishes in what has been called a
"battle to win souls" (McLaughlin 1991) in cognitive science and artificial
intelligence. Although perhaps not all the early answers to Fodor and
Pylyshyn's criticisms (such as Smolensky's much discussed 1990 tensor
product variable binding) were entirely successful, more recent
developments, including the outstanding work of Browne and Pilkington
(1994) is slowly eroding the remaining arguing points on which the
classicist camp may choose to pick. (See also Chalmers 1990, Chrisman
1991, Niklasson and Sharkey 1992, Sharkey 1992.) For our purposes,
however, we may dispense with a lengthy journey over the shifting
ground underlying the issue and concentrate instead on what, if any,
significance the debate may have for the instantiation of self models.
11.2.1 Classical and Connectionist Levels
Much of the fuel for this debate, as for so many others, comes from
confusion over the different levels at which problems may be described.
In truth, if we examine any classical system—in the physics sense—at a
low enough level, we might interpret it as a classical system—in the
artificial intelligence sense—which could in principle be simulated on a
139
digital computer. This is because at the very lowest level, all we are
concerned with are particles interacting in accordance with the classical
laws of motion. Thus, if all the classicists—in the artificial intelligence
sense—were maintaining were that cognitive systems can at some level be
understood through computable manipulations of symbol strings (with
symbols representing the states of elementary particles), they would be
entirely correct.65 On the face of it, this is inconsistent with Edelman's
protests that,
"the pattern of neural circuitry...is neither established nor
rearranged instructively in response to external influences...
This is consistent with the selectionist notion that, in contrast
to computers or Turing machines, there is no general-
purpose animal—only the adaptive evolution of particular
sensory sheets and adaptive motor ensembles and of the
somatic selection principle itself evinced by particular
mechanisms within the phenotype." (1989a, p. 19) [emphasis
original]
But Edelman here may be understood in other than the way we've just
suggested (that is, the way which holds only that classical physics can
account for changes in the patterns of neural circuitry): Edelman means
simply that at the level of the patterns of neural circuitry, the organism
does not make some determination about appropriate connectivity and
then undertake to instantiate that connectivity. Thus, Edelman is correct
at the level of these patterns but not at the level of classical physics which
supplies the actual molecular mechanisms for changing patterns.
(Edelman himself is, incidentally, guilty of confusing these levels of
description when he criticises Hebb for being instructionist at the cellular
level.) This difference in levels reveals what is at the heart of the debate
between the classicists and the connectionists, and it reveals why the
debate is largely irrelevant to our project.
We can see the debate is really over the level—or perhaps, although
it is rarely acknowledged, the levels—at which we can locate the dynamics
which are necessary and sufficient for cognition. (Broadbent 1985,
McClelland and Rumelhart 1985, Corbi 1993) Thus, the classicists argue, in
65 This is wrong. For the moment, we'll conveniently ignore the existence of entirely
deterministic but noncomputable (in the recursion theoretic sense) classical processes. (See
Pour-El and Richards 1979, 1981, 1982, for instance, and also Aberth 1971.) Our analysis of
levels in the debate is mostly independent of this convenient misrepresentation.
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short, that the essential features of cognition are found in computable
manipulation of symbol strings, even if such manipulation might actually
in practice be instantiated by networks of neurons. (We must remember
the powerful argument for incorporating some nod to the connectionists:
when we look inside a skull, we really do find, among other things,
bunches of interconnected neurons!) The connectionists, on the other
hand, argue that at least some essential features of cognition can only be
instantiated at the sub-symbolic level, at the level of neural network
interactions which cannot be directly interpreted as representing
manipulations of symbols which the organism uses. But for the purposes
of locating sensation in a data structure, does this difference really matter?
11.3 Information, Levels, and Resolving the "Conflict"
In keeping with the observations we have just made about levels of
description, we can see that the self model data structure is at a higher
level of description than that where we are concerned with the type of
processing going on. As long as there is a self model data structure,
changes to it might be made by symbolic manipulation, by connectionist
sub-symbolic information processing, or by little green men activating
switches under the influence of some other kind of processing altogether.
Thus, on the view we have been exploring, sensation itself needn't rely
exclusively on either connectionism or classicism, because the relevant
data structures might be implemented any number of ways.
Having said that, it might still be true that human style sensation
and behaviour does depend on some particular mixture of types (symbolic
or sub-symbolic) of neural processing because of the kinds of data
transformations which they enable. Thus if, for instance, it is a property of
human consciousness that sometimes transitions between conscious states
are noncomputable or nondeterministic, then human systems must
exploit some kind of processes which are sub-symbolic (at some level of
description, of course, since they could still in general be called symbolic at
the lowest level of classical physics) in order to accomplish the relevant
data structure transformations. If, on the other hand, all such transitions
are entirely computable, then perhaps the instantiating wetware could
likewise be entirely symbolic, and human style sensation could emerge
from data structures sitting atop the classical string manipulations of
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strong AI. But with respect to the self model data structure, questions
about essential types of processing are an empirical matter and will not be
settled by rational argument from the "first principles" of what it is to be
such a data structure. We will later see arguments for the possibility of
nondeterministic transitions at the level of introspective awareness, but it
is good to keep in mind that nothing of the self model view we have been
developing rests either on that possibility or on any particular outcome to
the classicist/connectionist debate.
With the last of these philosophical considerations settled, it is time
to proceed with outlining some actual architectural examples of self model
implementation. In the next section, we adopt a connectionist-inspired
style to explore wiring diagrams of the building blocks of consciousness.
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Circuits of the Self
Having explored a number of topics related to the view of the self as
an abstract data structure, it is time now that we offered some ideas as to
how these data structures may be instantiated by neural wetware. In what
follows, we shall be concerned for the most part with exploring the kinds
of architectures which may have emerged in more or less adult organisms;
with few exceptions we're not offering an Edelman-style account of the
cytoarchitectonic features and learning rules which enable this emergence
itself. We began by postulating the self model at a sort of middle level to
explain how higher level awareness might come from a lower level
neural substrate, and we will now try to infer downwards in the
hierarchical organisation to see how the neurons themselves could be
arranged to give some of the self model properties we need. But
developing a biologically plausible neuroscientific account of the inherited
and epigenetic mechanisms from which these arrangements emerge is
another step, and for the moment it is beyond our scope. (Having said
that, we will at least endeavour to prevent our designs relying upon any
features known to be inconsistent with existing empirical evidence about
intercellular mechanisms.) We start with a look at very basic instantiation
of the kind of compressed representation which began our exploration of
self model characteristics.
12.1 Compressing and Representing
The well documented capacity of simple pattern recognition
networks and self organising feature maps (SOFMs), similar to the first
example of Chapter 10, to provide output keyed to specific qualities of their
input data offers the most basic form of the kind of lossy compressed
representation we first discussed early in our exploration of self model
characteristics. The idea is that a single node or group may respond
uniquely to a particular pattern of outputs from the cells in, for instance, a
sensory receptor sheet. The strengths and patterns of connection between
the receptor sheet and the groups taking efferent signals from it may be
such that one and only one dominant repertoire of cells responds to each
relevant output pattern from the receptor sheet. This is illustrated in
Figure 9, which for simplicity shows a single layer receptor sheet and two
single nodes which take their inputs from the cells in the sheet. (The full
extent of connections is not indicated.) As in all the examples we illustrate
here, it is important to remember that the diagrams are only suggestive of
the complexity of any real neural arrangement and that we are trying just





Fig. 9. Basic feature extraction and compression
In this diagram, where solid colouring indicates nodes firing
substantially above base level, one upper node responds to an input
pattern corresponding to an "X", while the other responds to an "L"
pattern. Thus, the pattern offered on the twenty-five nodes of the receptor
sheet is effectively compressed into a single node representation.
In real neural systems, there is every indication that very complex
representations do not emerge in a single step, as shown here, and that
instead information is combined from many different compressed
representations which for our purposes can be thought of as equivalent to
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very simple feature extractors. For instance, Figure 10 shows two different
sheets of neurons, each of which receives the same afferent signals but
which detect the presence of different features in the input data.
afferent signals
t
Fig. 10. More accurate compression with feature extraction
Flere single nodes respond to particular patterns on each sheet and
then offer their output to another node which responds uniquely to the
presence of a high firing rate from both. This node operates much like the
AND gate of digital logic. In this example, each receptor sheet might
respond only to straight lines within some range of a particular
orientation, so that perhaps the "L" pattern from the previous example
might also be extracted and compressed by other nodes responding
selectively to a vertical line from the left sheet and a horizontal line on
the right together with another node which responds to a combination of
these two features. (Again, note that we are here indicating with single
nodes what would more likely be an entire repertoire of neuronal groups.)
Pattern recognition of more complex objects with many distinct
features undoubtedly requires applying many different feature extracting
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units and combining their outputs into what amount to highly
compressed representations removed by several levels of organisation
from the original sensory neurons in, for instance, the retina of the eye. In
the course of propagation up through these levels of compression and
feature extraction, signals may of course contribute to the formation of
ancillary connections between groups whose outputs are frequently
correlated. It is to this development of cross association that we now turn.
12.2 Mixing Company
Cross association between groups representing correlated features
from one or more input modalities may be subserved through anatomical
reentrance. Figure 11 shows a simple bimodal association enabled both at
the level of the basic receptor sheets (where reentrant connections are
shown greatly simplified) and at the level of an early feature extraction.
1 t
Fig. 11. Simple two level bimodal association through anatomical reentrance
Here the output signals of each receptor sheet return as afferent
signals for the other, with the effect that cells whose firing is correlated in
the separate sheets develop reinforcing connections with each other; thus,
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presentation of a particular pattern to only one modality may raise the
firing rate of some neurons on the other receptor sheet which are
normally correlated with those of the first. At this level, the architecture
is very similar to Edelman's own Darwin II "classification couple".
mode n
Fig. 12. Enabling low level polymodal associations without direct reentrance
This mutual reinforcement is mirrored at the higher level by the
reentrant connections between the single nodes shown responding to
efferent signals from the receptor sheets. The growth of these reinforcing
connections may be promoted by mere physical proximity and a variant of
Hebb's rule (or other correlation rule) or in some cases even by the
development of gap junctions or ephaptic interactions.
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A simple variation on this theme emerges when we dispense with
the intermediate feature extracting nodes and provide a single node at a
higher level which responds to features from any of several modalities
and then propagates feedback to the much earlier sensory sheets, as in
Figure 12. Here the synaptic weights of the inputs to the high level node
are matched with its own threshold to ensure that the presence of any
single one of the relevant input patterns is sufficient to activate the high
level representation and the feedback signal.
feature n
Fig. 13. Polymorphous categorisation for m out of n >m properties
This arrangement has the advantage that even without the kind of
physical proximity between the receptor sheets which would allow them
to develop their own reentrant connections, a higher level feature
extractor and compressor could still promote cross association at the lower
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levels with simple feedback. This is one application of the role of self
model components in overcoming the physical limitations on direct
neural connectivity.
A similar network, without the presence of feedback and with a
slightly different relationship between weights and threshold on the
highest level node, can, incidentally, instantiate a simple kind of
polymorphous categorisation like we discussed in the context of neural
Darwinism and perceptual categorisation. Figure 13 shows an
arrangement for detecting the presence of any m out of n > m possible
characteristics from receptor sheets each responsive to different types of
these characteristics. (For simplicity, the likely intermediate nodes taking
input from each receptor sheet and providing their outputs to the highest
level node are not shown.) The relationship between the weights and the
threshold shown guarantees that when m or more relevant features are
detected, the highest level node will fire.
Combining the sort of arrangement of the last few examples with
the feature extraction of Figure 10 and the higher level structural
reentrance of Figure 11, we see in Figure 14 an example of higher level
compressed representation from a set of three mutually reinforcing
feature extractors which can together be thought of as a sort of "correlation
extractor", strikingly similar to Hebb's unimodal cell assemblies. For the
simplest cases, it is something like this type of architecture which we
should expect to underlie the polymodal representation which we
encountered earlier with respect to the development of symbolic language.
Here, three nodes, each responding to receptor sheets taking afferent
signals from different modalities, have developed mutually reinforcing
connections as a result of correlations in their firing frequencies when the
same kind of source stimulates all three modalities simultaneously. As
we saw in Figure 11, these connections can encourage firing in neurons
primarily responsive to output from single modality receptor sheets even
in the absence of appropriate signals from those sheets. In the network
depicted in the present diagram, when one or more of the three initial
single modality feature extractor nodes is excited to a sufficient level that
the other two nodes with which it is correlated are also enticed to fire—
and notice that once this begins to happen, the signals from the newly
excited nodes feed back into the system of three so that the firing tends to
maintain itself—the synaptic weights and the threshold of the final node
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are matched such that it, too, will fire. But in the absence of sufficient
signals from all three, the firing frequency of the highest level node
remains at its base rate.
Fig. 14. Cross association for polymodal representation
A real implementation of such a network would of course involve
multiple feature extractors, each sensitive to particular kinds of output
from each of these receptor sheets. As a result, the reentrant connections
between the populations of neurons here represented as the single set of
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actively researched by cognitive neuroscientists, and we will here discuss a
couple of the possible remedies.
12.2.1 Freeing Our Inhibitions
One common suggestion is to incorporate "interneurons", or nodes
producing inhibitory chemicals which sit between an excitatory neuron
and some of the cells to which it would send inhibitory signals. Thus,
subsequent nodes could receive EPSPs, or excitatory post-synaptic
potentials, from the main neuron and IPSPs, or inhibitory post-synaptic
potentials, from the interneuron. Two such neurons, one providing
inhibition and the other excitation, might even sit just next to each other,
such that gap junctions or ephaptic interactions synchronised their output
frequencies. Alternatively, receptor sheets and other structures in the
architectures we've seen may just be peppered with a mix of inhibitory
and excitatory cells, and connections might simply develop in a way
roughly functionally equivalent to the architectures we've shown.
My own suspicion is that an excited cell releases chemicals which
tend to inhibit other physically proximal cells that are not directly
connected to it. Individual cells might even be "tuned" for differential
responses to particular neuromodulators so that, for instance, nodes in a
particular population were excited by the firing of one neuron, while
nodes in another were inhibited by the same neuron's firing. However,
such a neuromodulator remains at this point purely theoretical, and the
search for mechanisms to subserve the functional equivalent of mixed
IPSPs and EPSPs from the same neuron continues actively.
Returning to the kinds of architectures which prompted our side
comment on inhibition, it is of course true that compression and
representation needn't always be of sensory receptor sheet output, as we
have shown here. There is nothing to prevent similar architectures from
developing around compression and representation of relationships
between, say, sensory receptors and motor actuators, or between any two or
more separate neural assemblies. Whatever is being represented, the
kinds of higher level cross correlation we've described enable groups in
the higher levels of the organisation to mirror the functional
relationships between groups at the lower level, just as we originally
indicated the self model requires. But to act as other than a passive
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mirror, the capabilities of these higher level representations must be
exploited in such a way that the information they contain can be usefully
processed and fed back to lower level assemblies. It is to this that we turn
our attention in the next section.
12.3 Control Systems—Self Models on Top Again
We begin with a simple "digital" example of a shared bus
architecture for three separate classical processors. The idea of a shared bus
common to several processors is common in parallel computing.
However, the shared bus is normally used only for such a purpose as
feeding each processor the same stream of instructions; typically a separate
bus gives each processor access to its own portion of memory. A different
rendition of a shared bus is pictured in Figure 17.
Fig. 17. "Digital" shared bus ring architecture
Here, each processor ("black box" because we needn't know what
goes on in any of them) is offered only three inputs, and each processor's
three outputs is fed right back to the same three lines which provided the
inputs. At least two different ways of handling the input lines could be at
work in each of the three black boxes. On the one hand, they might just
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look to some subset of the lines as an "activator", such that a processor was
activated only if it saw, for instance, a 1 and a 0 on two lines. The other
line might be used for the processor to provide its output. Since another
processor on the shared ring bus might actually look at different lines to
determine its own activation, the output of one processor could possibly
be on to an "activator" line of one of the others. Alternatively, all the
lines might be be used by all the processors both for sending their outputs
and for determining their own activation.
A few minutes spent contriving different sets of logic gates to
replace each of the three processors (in addition to simple refinements like
clamping lines low in the absence of a high signal) reveals how easy it is to
create rings whose processors are activated in any desired sequence, and
with the addition of input-dependent variable propagation delays before
output signals become available, it is possible to create very complex
(probably even chaotic) inter-processor dynamics.
There is some reason to believe that such an architecture for
exploiting a non-multiplexed bus shared between independent processors
could be highly useful for some parallel computing applications, and as far
as I am aware no such architecture has yet been reported in the relevant
literature. In general, however, the typically synchronous nature of
today's parallel computers is not well-suited to such a shared bus—
although the addition of proper wait states and dedicated control lines
indicating when a processor was "ready" to provide output and so forth
might remedy some of the most obvious problems.
What might be better suited to this type of shared bus, however, is
the kind of massively parallel, reentrant, asynchronous architecture
common to neural systems. In neural systems, there are no address or
data buses, and there are no timing signals or wait states ensuring that
outputs will only be provided when neighbouring neurons are ready for
them. In general, the requirements of neural processing are wholly unlike
the requirements of digital processing, and where digital computers are
not immediately suited to such a ring architecture, we have actually
already seen something like this architecture at work in our earlier
diagrams, although we did not note it at the time. Figure 18 depicts a
neural ring architecture, and while the connection strengths might be
different, a quick mental warping and tearing reveals the structure is
connected like the correlation extractor we saw previously in Figure 14.
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afferent
Fig. 18. Neural version of the ring architecture
Here, single nodes are replaced by a double ringed "node" which
indicates simply that we are almost certainly concerned now with large
neuronal repertoires rather than single nodes or even smaller groups.
Although we made this caveat earlier that wherever we illustrated single
nodes we should think of groups, here it is even more likely that such
control structures would be handled by large reentrant populations.
It is this type of simple control structure which may be one of the
central and most important architectures underlying the complex
information transformations in the self model data structure. It is from
these types of structures that we might expect output reflecting a
"simulation" of a set of conditions, and it is from these types of structures
that we might expect the kind of downward influence which we suggested
should be possible from the self model back to lower level assemblies.
The motivation for the first claim is the observation that with
appropriate relationships between synaptic efficacies, the behaviour of the
kind of "correlation extractor" we explored before becomes useful as a
simulator. That is, if there is information in the system (in the form of
output frequency relationships between nodes in the correlation extractor
or in the ring) about, for instance, what sensory input would be correlated
with a particular motor output, then a neural group representing the
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activation of that motor output could simply be stimulated by another
signal and the influence on the sensory input read off from the effect of
that representation's activation on the group representing the activation
of the particular correlated sensory input.
The motivation for the second claim derives directly from this: if
simulations such as this can be carried out at a high level, and there are
good indications that they could be, then there is every reason to believe
that the "results" of such observations could be usefully offered back to the
lower level assemblies. One way in which such output might be used is in
the kind of "supervised" reinforcement learning we saw in the chapter on
artificial neural networks, and another might be in "opening a channel"
for two physically separated groups of neurons to communicate. We
might picture the latter as something like a neural interchange hub—
related to the abstraction window of earlier chapters—as shown in Figure
19, where the disinhibitor nodes take afferent signals from some other
group, perhaps from some one of the groups in a neural ring architecture.
In this diagram, the efferent signals from input processors are
prevented from reaching the interchange area by inhibition from a node
which is kept firing at a sustained rate by input from a "bias" node, or a
node which is itself firing at a high frequency. (Yet again, both of these
roles would likely be filled by larger repertoires of neurons.) Likewise,
output from a set of nodes taking afferent signals from the interchange
area is kept from reaching the output activators by other inhibitor
neurons. Exchange of information between the two sides is enabled by
disinhibitors, which are nodes that provide strong inhibitory signals to the
nodes which are themselves normally inhibiting the exchange. When the
firing rates of these latter are lowered, both the input "providers" and the
output "customers" are effectively connected. Any such interchange in a
real system would be an area of very high axonal and dendritic
arborisation; there is some reason to believe the hippocampus might be
one candidate for this type of "neural switching station".
One way of combining this sort of neural interchange hub with the
simulation capacity of the ring architecture is indicated in Figure 20, where
efferent signals from a sensory processor are routed from one ring
assembly to another, where a "simulation" takes place before a number of
signals are combined to allow a given output to take place or to open a
given channel in an interchange hub.
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from input processors from input processors
Fig. 19. Neural interchange hub—one gateway to the abstraction window
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Fig. 20. Simple simulation and decision circuit
In this diagram, activation begins in the lower right corner, where
input signals excite some compressed representation which is perhaps a
member of a simple mutually reinforcing group or correlation extractor of
the type we saw back in Figure 11 or Figure 14 (here indicated simply with
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dashed lines). Efferent signals from the representation propagate into one
ring structure, where they excite a particular group that provides signals to
another member of a basic mutually reinforcing group, whose efferent
signals in turn go to another ring in an arrangement mirroring the start of
the process. (Although it is not depicted here, we can imagine the
propagation of signals from the first ring to the second member of the
mutually reinforcing group being mediated by a neural interchange hub
and enabled by some still higher level processing or perhaps some parallel
result of the activation of the initial compressed representation.) One of
the groups in the second ring is activated by this input, effectively offering
a "simulated" response to a "hypothetical" input as if the output from the
second mutually reinforcing group had come from the environment
directly. This output is finally combined with that of the first ring
structure and that of the original input processor by a group acting as an
AND gate, such that if there really is appropriate input and a particular
signal from the first ring structure and a particular signal from the
simulation, then the relevant output will be activated or the relevant
channel opened in an interchange hub.
12,4 Self Circuits—All Together Now?
Of course, this particular pattern of interconnection and sequence of
activation is entirely contrived and suited primarily for illustrative
purposes, but the general idea of these kinds of information processing by
simple interconnected neural groups is straightforward and highly
capable. We have seen in this last network the possibility for sophisticated
interaction between subsystems serving different input or output
modalities and for the rudimentary testing of responses to stimuli,
mediated by the competing outputs of structurally reentrant neural
networks. Previous example networks illustrated other applications of
reentry, recursivity, and heterarchical organisation in building functional
representations of inputs and the correlations between them and between
them and outputs.
These networks illustrate in simple ways some of the methods
which Nature might have used to instantiate in neural wetware the kinds
of capacities we have been attributing to self models. I am not aware of
any glaring biological implausibilities among the features on which the
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networks rely, and on the contrary they have much to recommend them
as examples of limited plausibility. They are compatible with existing
neuroscientific data and with Edelman's theoretical frameworks, and they
help to bridge the gap between his low level accounts and our own
exploration of higher level features of subjective awareness. On the
downside, these example networks are almost certainly too uniform and
simple to be found in real neural systems, and undoubtedly Nature will
have found cleverer ways of accomplishing many of the things which
these examples might appear to be the simplest way of doing.
Overall, however, our task in this chapter has been merely to offer
some ways in which the characteristic capabilities of self models which we
have explored so far might be instantiated by the brain's wetware, and in
that we have been successful. With more detailed work on these types of
networks, I believe it will be possible also to make more headway against
the so-called grain problem and frame problem.
Our earlier limited response to the first problem was to note that
the data structure is "blind" to its instantiating material substrate, and
these example networks show more clearly how it is that higher level
representations lose information about that which they are representing.
More careful analysis of these networks will, I believe, show that no self
model instantiated by discrete components can be "aware" of the
granularity of any more than some small portion of the overall system
and that this awareness cannot itself be grainy. That is, while it might be
possible to contrive a circuit to allow the system to become aware of a
perceptual limitation caused by the grain of its discrete instantiation—
although there is little evolutionary reason to believe such circuitry would
have emerged in real organisms—I believe that the awareness itself of this
fact will necessarily be impervious to grain.
On the second problem, there is good reason to believe that with the
development of more sophisticated combinations of the kinds of networks
described here, the frame problem will actually, rather fortuitously,
disappear. I believe the frame problem is a mere relic of the symbolic
processing roots of artificial intelligence and that it results from trying to
impose an existing logical structure—typically that of the propositional
calculus—on a body of data and then trying to process it in a way
resembling the processing of real organisms (the top-down approach),
rather than allowing the data itself to be fitted into a system of
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representation and interaction essentially of its own neural creation as is
actually done in real biological organisms (the bottom-up approach).
When more complex networks are developed, perhaps with the
combination phylogenetic-ontogenetic scheme described earlier, I believe
the frame problem will not appear for the new systems created. (After all,
no network so far developed has ever faced the frame problem itself; we
have only created the frame problem for our own understanding of
contrived systems when we have tried to develop them into tools for
doing what we want.)
So, even the questions we have not directly addressed at length
perhaps have at least a bit more direction now. Having explored in this
chapter and previous ones the self model approach at both higher and
lower levels and discussed some of the philosophical issues on which they
bear, it is time now to move on to a range of questions relevant to the
dynamics of the self model's instantiating hardware or wetware. While
we have so far concentrated on the relationship between the first person
and third person perspective and how the apparent gap between them
may be embraced and better understood, in the second half of this
dissertation we will concentrate more on observations about neural
systems from the third person perspective, inferring upwards to what
effects characteristics of these neural systems might have on experience.
Chaos will play a central role as we explore dynamical properties of neural
networks and see how they might bear on the time evolution of the
mental properties they are instantiating. We will have something to say
on complexity and the relationship between chaos and noise, and in the
end we will return to the issue of representation and how chaotic




In the early chapters of this dissertation, we explored the idea that
the seat of conscious sensation—the seat of the self—was an instantiated
data structure called a self model, implemented by some kind of hardware
or wetware system, the representing and controlling of which was a
central task of the self model itself. We noted some of the selective
advantages with which an organism equipped with a self model might be
endowed, and through some simple artificial neural network architectures
we saw ways in which real self models might be expressed in distributed
systems. We now turn our attention to the relationships between the
dynamic properties of the self model data structures and their
instantiating material systems to see what influences characteristics of the
low level dynamics may have on higher level selves. In a digital
computer, for instance, the very lowest level dynamics—at the level of
quantum descriptions of semiconductors—are probabilistic, while
whatever data structures may be implemented at higher levels are entirely
deterministic and describable by computable functions.67 Self model data
structures, however, are at least less straightforwardly deterministic
products of their underlying wetware than their digital counterparts.
This may be especially true when it comes to neural substrates
whose dynamics are specifically chaotic. In much of what follows, we
shall be concerned with the importance of specifically chaotic dynamics for
intelligent systems implemented by neural networks. While its specific
role is controversial, the capacity of some biological and artificial neural
66 Chapters 13 to 19, inclusive, have been available in different draft forms on the
International Philosophical Preprint Exchange and mirror sites for several months. I am
rateful to readers across the world for insightful comments on those early drafts.
7 Some data structures might not actually change deterministically with respect to
information available at the same level of description as the data structures themselves,
but they would nonetheless be entirely deterministic and computable with respect to
information available at the level of individual logic gates.
networks to exhibit chaotic behaviour is well established.68 Perhaps
crucially, the sensitive dependence on initial conditions of chaotic systems
suggests that minute perturbations in the low level dynamics of neural
networks could possibly evolve over time into influences on those
systems at grosser levels of description. In particular, it might be that
microfeatures of low level processes which are not available to the coarse
grained introspective awareness of the self model could over time evolve
into significant influences on higher level features of brain dynamics
which may be available to introspection.
We will explore a new representational schema which provides an
economical means of formulating the interactions between dynamics at
low, intermediate, and high levels of description. This scheme is similar
to the influential framework of Marr (1982), but as Horgan and Tienson
(1993) suggest, Marr's treatment is not immediately hospitable to the kind
of connectionist context with which we are here mainly concerned. Like
their framework (Horgan and Tienson 1993, Horgan and Tienson in
press), our representational schema is better suited than Marr's to
exploring the kinds of questions we will here set ourselves. After a very
brief introduction to the terminology of dynamical systems and a short but
somewhat technical look at chaos theory, we outline the representational
framework and consider some of the insights we might gain from it.69
13.1 Dynamical Systems
The phrase dynamical system has earned a place for itself in the
literature of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Any classical
mechanical system can be represented in the state space framework of
dynamical systems theory. The state of a system can be described as an
ordered n-tuplet, which fixes the value of each of the system's degrees of
68 Research in this area is too extensive to list within the paragraph; to name a few of the
highlights: Choi and Huberman 1983; Sompolinsky and Crisanti 1988; Li and Hopfield
1990; Kolen and Pollack 1990; Ambros-Ingerson, et al 1990; King 1991; Wilson and Bower
1992; Pollack 1992; Chapeaublondeau 1993; Fan and Holden 1993; plus the olfaction work of
Walter Freeman and colleagues (cited in Chapter 7 in toto ).
69 Some material in this section is based very loosely on an earlier paper (Mulhauser
1993c) in which the representational schema 1 will describe was set within a context of
fuzzy mathematics. In the present approach, I have adopted a cleaner mathematical
framework in which fuzzy logic is rendered superfluous by observations about the
topological relationships between the representational spaces.
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freedom.70 The evolution of a system can be represented graphically as a
phase trajectory through n-dimensional phase space, a curve showing
how each of the n variables changes with time. Aside from being a
convenient way of representing classical physical systems, phase
trajectories allow us to make geometrical observations which might be
missed were the system's evolution represented simply as, say, columns of
numbers. For instance, it is much more difficult to get an intuitive feel
about the dynamics of the pendulum represented in Figure 21 from the
table of numbers than from the phase trajectory depicted in Figure 22. In
the second figure, we can see that the pendulum is fairly uniform on each
swing except that it is gradually winding down under the influence of
some damping force.
Fig. 21 Time evolution of a pendulum
The phase space framework needn't be restricted to representations
of real physical systems. We might also represent the evolution of
something like public confidence in a government relative to a national
inflation rate. Here we might find either a continuous dynamic
evolution—when inflation goes down, confidence goes up by some
related amount and vice versa—or we might find discontinuous
dynamics such as a sudden jump in public confidence as soon as the
inflation rate reaches a particularly low threshold value. In some cases
there is a clear sense in which the dynamics of a system represented at one
70 The relationship between the number of degrees of freedom and the number of variables
n required to fix the state of the system in each of those degrees of freedom varies with the
dimensionality of the example and according to whether the system is conservative or
dissipative.
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level are indeterministic despite the fact that those dynamics are based
upon deterministic dynamics at a lower level.
For instance, consider a three dimensional phase trajectory71
indicating the relationship between the number of marine research
vessels a country has at sea, the number of total marine scientists at sea,
and the total funds being devoted to the scientists-at-sea programme. We
might notice that in general, when the funding goes down, so does the
number of vessels and so does the number of scientists, and vice versa for
an increase in funding.
Fig. 22 Evolution of a pendulum in phase space
But the number of marine research vessels is a coarse-grained look
at a country's marine research program; a country might have five vessels,
each of which carries 100 scientist, or it might have fifty vessels, each of
which carries only three scientists. These vessels might also demand
different degrees of funding to stay operational. Thus, a country might
have a mix of vessels such that sometimes the phase trajectory shows a
transition from 94 vessels and 451 scientists to 89 vessels and 430 scientists
(with a particular decrease in funding); but on another occasion there
might be a transition from 94 vessels and 451 scientists to 89 vessels and
475 scientists (with an identical decrease in funding). If we had lower level
information about the vessels themselves and the number of scientists
they carried and the cost of keeping each at sea for particular lengths of
71 Since the variables here are discrete, this isn't the best example for plotting an actual
phase trajectory, but the point we are making isn't compromised by this fact.
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time, then under the reasonable assumption that there were some
mathematical relationship between funding level and the number of
scientists a country wanted to have at sea (and assuming there were no
other confounding variables), we could predict the impact of any
particular change in funding level on which boats would be kept at sea.
But because we lack this lower level information, the dynamics at
the higher level are not predictable, even for given changes in funding.
There is nothing mysterious about this conclusion: the dynamics at the
level of boat numbers and scientist numbers and funding might not be
deterministic on the basis of information available at that level, yet the
dynamics at the level of specific boats with specific costs and specific
scientist-carrying capacities could be entirely deterministic and predictable.
Ignoring for the moment the significance of the A, labels, we can see in
Figure 23 that even if the two trajectories depicted are entirely
deterministic at a low level, their evolution is nondeterministic at the
level of description of grid squares: the two trajectories begin in the same
grid square but evolve (deterministically, at an appropriate level) into two
different squares. It will become progressively clearer in our discussion
that this emergence of indeterminism with respect to a particular level of
description is typically symptomatic of that level's ignoring relevant
properties at a lower level where dynamics are deterministic.
Fig. 23 Determinism depends on levels of description
Shortly we shall explore the application of the dynamical systems
framework to states of mind for intelligent systems, but first we take a brief
sojourn into chaotic dynamics, a particular kind of behaviour which some
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dynamical systems display that can make prediction at all but the very
finest grained levels highly problematic.72
13.2 Chaos, Graining, and Prediction
The formal definition of a chaotic system is still open to debate, but
for the present purposes I appeal to one widely used definition which
requires that three properties hold: the set of periodic points in phase
space is dense, the system is topologically transitive, and time evolution is
sensitively dependent on initial conditions. (I adopt the terms of Devaney
1988; Berge, et al 1984 and Barnsley 1988 are similar.) The first property is
the most straightforward: the set of periodic points in the phase space of a
chaotic system at any given time slice (or alternatively, in any Poincare
section) is at least countably infinite, and between any two points in the set
we can always find another. Periodic points are just points which lie on a
closed trajectory; that is, if we ignore the time dimension, the system will
keep visiting the same physical locations in phase space. Some systems
include dense coverings of specifically repellent periodic points. A
repellent point is simply one from which all points in a local
neighbourhood diverge over time. Alternatively, if the system is
invertible, trajectories in a local neighbourhood approach a repellent point
asymptotically under reverse time evolution. Many strange attractors are
densely covered with such repellent periodic points, and in some systems,
such as the hyperbolic toral automorphisms, the entire space is so covered.
Later we shall be concerned particularly with that subset of chaotic systems
which include—at least in some neighbourhoods—a dense covering of
repellent fixed points of all possible periods.73
The second characteristic which we shall take to be a necessary
condition of chaos—topological transitivity—indicates that any particular
neighbourhood in phase space will eventually be visited by the phase
trajectory of some point lying within any other arbitrarily small
neighbourhood. Topological transitivity is the property that for any /: J —»
72 The material about chaos is reprinted or adapted from a small section of Mulhauser
(1993d—please see the Appendix for reprint information); this paper receives more
attention in Chapter 15.
73 A fixed point of a given period t is the same as a periodic point whose period is t. The
term is used because if the system is sampled every t units of time, then a periodic point
with period t is fixed, or invariant.
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J, where J is a metric space, and for any two open bounded sets U, V e J,
there exists an integer n > 0 such that
/n(U) nW 0
In other words, the phase trajectory under / of at least one point in U will
intersect V in a finite amount of time, regardless of how small or how far
apart U and V are to start with. To put it still another way, given any two
open bounded sets in the space of a chaotic system, there will always exist
some finite phase trajectory connecting some point in one to some point
in the other.
The final property of chaotic systems, sensitive dependence on
initial conditions, or SIC, can actually be derived from the first two (Banks,
et al 1992)74, but it is sufficiently curious to merit its own explanation. SIC
appears when for any state in the phase space of a chaotic system, there is
another state within an arbitrarily small neighbourhood which lies on a
phase trajectory diverging from that of the first. I give here the definition
for the discrete case. A function /: J —> J, where J is a metric space, is SIC
when there exists a A > 0 such that V x e J and for any closed
neighbourhood N of x, there exists ays N and an integer n > 0 such that
If"(x)-/"(y(>4
where n represents the number of times the function is iterated. (The case
for continuous systems is directly analogous, with a term similar to n
representing the time parameter.) Note that this property occurs for every
xs J. Moreover, every neighbourhood N of x includes at least countably
infinitely many diverging y. For one constructive proof, consider any
such neighbourhood for an arbitrary x. The definition guarantees us a y e
N whose phase trajectory diverges from that of x, so note this y and con¬
sider a new N' which is the previous N minus the y (or, alternatively, a
new N' which is the previous N minus a neighbourhood around y in the
limit as the radius of that neighbourhood r —> 0). We are now guaranteed
a diverging y' in this new N', which in turn generates a new N" and a
new y", ad infinitum.
In typical chaotic systems—if there is such a thing as a typical
chaotic system—these characteristics mean that very small errors in
approximating the system's initial state are eventually magnified into
74 Thanks to Brian Meloon of the University of Wisconsin for bringing this simplification
to my attention.
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gross errors about the system's evolution.75 It is easy to see that if we had
only coarse-grained information about a chaotic system's state, and if we
were interested in making predictions about the detail of the system's
future behaviour, we could not make those predictions over anything but
the shortest time scales because of the (normally exponential) expansion of
error caused by SIC. This remains true even if we have detailed
knowledge of the equations describing the behaviour of the system at a
very low level. Thus, such systems are indeterministic with respect to
information at the coarse level (but this does not imply they are
indeterministic at the lowest level; i.e., that they are "really"
indeterministic—see Chapter 17). But there is another kind of prediction
which is unproblematic for these kinds of systems, a type which we should
keep in mind as we move on to exploring the framework in which we can
represent intelligent systems dynamically.
The kind of prediction which is relatively unproblematic for chaotic
systems is possible when we ask a different kind of question about a
system's evolution than what the specific detailed phase space location
might be. Instead of asking for details of phase space location, we might be
interested only in the attractor towards which a system is tending. Like all
dissipative systems—i.e., systems in which any given volume of phase
space shrinks through time76—the kinds of chaotic systems we are
concerned with have attractors, structures in phase space towards which
phase trajectories within a particular neighbourhood of the attractor
(called the attractor's basin) tend asymptotically. (That is, trajectories
which don't begin on the attractor never actually evolve onto it, but they
may get arbitrarily near it.) Attractors are invariant under the operation(s)
defining the dynamics of the system. They are the large structure
analogue of fixed points: an invariant subspace rather than a single point.
The interesting thing about attractors in the phase space of chaotic
systems is that often they are strange; for our purposes, we can simplify the
idea of strange attractors by appealing to the property of being infinitely
75 Contra commentators such as Hunt (1987), Stone (1989), early (since corrected!) Smith
(1991), Hobbs (1991, 1994), Kellert (1993), and even early Mulhauser (1991), however, this
magnification of error needn't completely swamp all attempts at prediction. See also
Chapter 17.
76 It is not impossible for there to be local dilation of phase space volumes, even in a
highly dissipative system (such as the Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction). But the overall
trend must still be for volumes to contract; thus, local dilation in one neighbourhood
demands speedier contraction in another.
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detailed in a nontrivial way, or fractal.77 Typically, the dynamics of a
system on a strange attractor are chaotic, so we still have, for instance,
sensitive dependence on initial conditions for trajectories on the attractor
itself. This also holds true in the basins of attraction of these strange
attractors. Thus, it is altogether possible for a system to be very difficult to
predict in the sense we described above, yet for its activity still to be
constrained within a particular basin of attraction. Thus, if we are
interested only in knowing which attractor a system is near, it can be a
very simple matter to know its future state from a measurement of its
present state. Even though we may not be able to comment as to the
precise phase space location of a phase trajectory's evolution, we can still
be sure that the trajectory has not left the basin of attraction in which it
started and that in fact it will always get closer and closer to the attractor
itself. Under this kind of complex coarse-graining of phase space, as
distinct from the simple coarse-graining we discussed above as in Figure
23, prediction of the time evolution of a chaotic dynamical system is
unproblematic, and chaotic systems are entirely deterministic with respect
to this coarse-grained level of description.
With an understanding of dynamical systems and the basics of
chaos theory to hand, we now move to an exploration of a dynamical
systems framework in which we may outline relationships between high,
low, and intermediate level descriptions of intelligent systems. I suggest
three different metric spaces representing the level of intentional states of




The first space, which we shall call X, is the most straightforward: it
is simply the ordinary physical state space representation for every entity78
which is functionally relevant to the system we are wanting to represent.
The metric for this space is the ordinary euclidean distance measure—the
77 Technically speaking, a fractal is not necessarily strange, and activity on a strange
attractor is not necessarily chaotic; but these details do not concern us here.
7ft
Here we assume for simplicity a quasi-classical treatment in which Hilbert space
wavefunction descriptions of the relevant particles or whatever are entirely decohered.
(Chapter 4 and Mulhauser 1995 in press)
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square root of the sum of the squares of the differences between two points
along each dimension. In practice, we would never represent an
intelligent system such as a brain in X space because of the extraordinary
dimensionality involved. We will, however, use it as the basic physical
foundation upon which the other two more complex spaces rest.
13.3.2 to Space
In the second space, which we shall call co space, we are concerned
with "computational relevance": instead of representing individual
particles or some such, we represent functionally relevant components of
the intelligent system. Thus, to represent a neural network, we might
include dimensions for each neuron's output frequency, its level of fatigue
and the efficacy of its synaptic connections, plus dimensions describing
neuromodulator distributions and other extra-neural factors. The metric
for this space can also be something like an ordinary euclidean distance,
although we must be aware that the mapping from real state space to co
space will not always be straightforward and that nonuniformities in the
mapping may mean that transition times between two co points may vary
because of differences in the distances between the various sets of distinct
X points which may be mapped to the same two co points. Indeed, the
topological transforms mapping manifolds in X space to those in co space
may be fuzzy, on account of the vague character of components like
neurons. (I.e., the precise boundaries indicating which particles should be
included in a particular neuron may not be well defined.) We will have
more to say about this kind of problem as it relates to the next
representational space.
Note that something like co space, unlike X space, may serve a
practically useful rather than just a theoretical purpose. While it would
certainly be difficult to represent the entire human brain in such a space,
there is no problem with representing smaller subnetworks directly. For
more complex networks, ordinary co space is still useful as the basis for a
coarser-grained representation with dimensions for representing the
overall activity of populations of neurons (such as columnar arrays in the
neocortex) rather than of individual neurons.79
79 Having been accused by at least one reviewer of confusing the issue by introducing this
space, note that many researchers already either appeal directly to such a dynamical
systems representations of neural networks or make a case for the usefulness of such
representations. These include Choi and Huberman 1983, Kolen and Pollack 1990, King
170
13.3.3 V)/ Space
The final space accommodates a very high level description of what
we might call \\f states, or something like "subjective states of mind", or
"intentional states". The parameters defining this space would be largely
independent of those describing neural phenomena in 0) space. They
would include every psychological parameter available to the
introspection of a subject, such as descriptions of anxiety, happiness,
desire, arousal, fatigue, anger, and so forth. It is at this level where we
might describe Horgan and Tienson's (1993) "cognitive state transitions",
or changes from one mental state to another.
The dimensions of \\f space may alternatively describe the
"contents" of the self model data structures which we explored in the
earlier part of this dissertation. In the end, I believe both ways of
interpreting \\r space will be of considerable value in understanding
relationships between low level dynamics and higher level experience.
Because any particular state in vy space describing data structures will, for a
given individual, be correlated with exactly one state in \|/ space on the
alternative interpretation—and recall from our earlier discussions that
this is an empirical correlation, not a logical implication—for the kinds of
analyses which follow, either interpretation will do, and for the most part
we shall take no great care to distinguish them.
Notice that the usefulness of the space interpreted in these ways
stands or falls with the usefulness of the kinds of descriptions common to
artificial intelligence. The field of artificial intelligence operates in part on
the hope that the relevant aspects of cognitive states may ultimately be
described at the level of propositional (symbolic) information.
Researchers work on the idea that cognitive processes amount to
manipulations of these descriptions which may be quantified in a
systematic way and mimicked by computers or other constructed devices.
The usefulness of space does not depend on this stronger notion, but it
does depend on the legitimacy of something like the former. If the
artificial intelligence project is on target in terms of how it describes
cognitive states, then the propositions being manipulated serve as the
1991, Wilson and Bower 1992, Pollack 1992, Chapeaublondeau 1993, and Horgan and
1 ienson 1993; not to mention others we will discuss in more detail elsewhere.
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basis for phase space representation.80 If the artificial intelligence project is
not on target in this limited respect, it is hard to see what other basis we
might appeal to for the quantification of psychological states.
The metric for such a space (on either interpretation) might again be
based on the ordinary euclidean distance measure—but we must keep in
mind that questions about distance will be phrased in terms of total
mental states or states of a data structure. Thus, we wouldn't be asking
whether something like a mental state including the proposition "I like
bran flakes" is closer to one with "My toe hurts" or to one with "Bachelors
ate unmarried and male". By way of analogy, we might think of one of
those personality tests with five hundred questions to be answered
something like "agree strongly" or "disagree mildly", except with a
continuum for each answer; here we will be asking questions about the
distance between two sets of scores represented as points in five hundred
dimensional space. The distance may not correspond to anything about
which we are accustomed to thinking, but of course that doesn't mean it
isn't a legitimate and useful distance for theoretical accounts.
More importantly, perhaps, we must keep in mind that the
parameters defining the dimensions of the space when it is understood to
represent mental states rather than states of a data structure typically will
themselves be vague terms and that it may not make sense to attribute a
well defined distance between two distinct points. (It might be very
difficult to attribute a precise real number description to a measure of
something like happiness, for instance.) And as in the case of transforms
mapping X space to co space, the topological transforms relating manifolds
in X space to those in v|/ space are liable themselves to be fuzzy. Moreover,
because subjective states of mind are multiply realisable in neural terms
(that is, two distinct co states may correspond to the very same
psychological state), transitions between two neighbourhoods in \j/ space
may not always take the same amount of time. Whatever the mapping
may be from X state or co state to psychological state, there will always be
the possibility of this difference in transition times. For instance, given
80 Of course, we might work with a superset of the kinds of propositions common to
artificial intelligence; few AI researchers, for instance, try to model the time evolution of
jealousy or lust. Moreover, adopting the propositional style of description does not commit
us to adopting anything resembling the kinds of operators AI researchers apply to their
propositions, and it does not require a commitment to computable or computationally
tractable transitions between psychological states so described be.
172
any two distinct physical states which map to the same psychological state,
one of them may be closer in X space than the other to another set of
physical states which map to a different psychological state. Thus the
distance required to traverse the space may also be shorter for the one
which is nearer. Multiple realisability, then, suggests that while we might
apply a standard euclidean distance to \j/ space, we must keep in mind that
our answers must be applied to what is at this level a fuzzy and temporally
variable reality.
More significantly, multiple realisability also suggests that vj/ space
may be treated as warped: it is a general Riemannian space in which
elliptic, hyperbolic, or neutral geometries might apply according to which
neighbourhood we are considering. We can understand this just by
considering what kinds of topological transforms might be applied to
translate a manifold in ordinary physical X space into a manifold in \j/
space. (The explanation could just as easily be phrased in terms of
transforms from co space to y space.) A manifold or a set of disconnected
volumes in ordinary physical space might map, for instance, to one single
point or perhaps a curve in \\r space. This is just what multiple realisability
means. Moreover, the topological transform, or the mapping from X space
to \\f space, is liable to vary in detail according to the neighbourhood in
question. That is, in some areas of real state space, large volumes might be
mapped to single points, whereas in others small volumes might map to
large manifolds. The result of such a mapping, apart from the loss of
information which goes with any coarse-graining, no matter how
complex, is that there is no guarantee of a consistent geometry across \\f
space. We might expect the geometry of \|/ space to look something like
that of four dimensional spacetime with massive bodies scattered about.
But because the warpage of the space is not caused by anything akin to
simple masses, which induce a mathematically uniform deformation of
spacetime, the geometry of space is liable to be far more complex.
There are a number of observations we can make about the
relationship between these three different metric spaces. In the following
we will outline a few of these before eventually proceeding in the next
chapter to a discussion of one particular argument which has emerged
from something like this way of viewing different levels of description of
the same intelligent system.
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13.4 Space Relations
First, it seems clear that at any given time slice, the "number" of
distinct \\f states will be less than the number of both co states and X states.
Yet, while the "number" of co states will generally be less than the number
of X states, in particular neighbourhoods of the phase space of chaotic
neural networks, the number of co states may actually be greater than the
number of X states. The first observation comes from the multiple
realisability of intentional states and of computationally relevant
components such as neurons, while the second is an immediate
consequence of SIC. This is a refinement of Pylyshyn's (1984) conjecture
that the number of computationally relevant brain states is always less
than the number of physically discernible states.
There is also an important observation to be made here about what
we mean by "number" of states in a particular space. As Deutsch (1985a)
notes, referring to theoretical work by Bekenstein (1981) on the
thermodynamics of black holes, any physical system enclosed by a surface
with an appropriately defined area A can have at most an extremely large
but finite number N(A) of distinguishable access states:
N(A) = exp(^)
where c is the speed of light, and the denominator is four times the product of
Planck's reduced constant and the gravitational constant. This reveals
something important both about the way we must use the dynamic spaces
discussed here and about the way almost all mathematical models should
be applied to reality.
In particular, if the number of distinguishable access states of a
bounded physical system is limited by the equation above to some very
large but finite number, then strictly speaking there is only a finite class of
points in the state space of any bounded physical system which can have
measurable significance to us. But a finite set of points marked off next to
each other has zero length. That is, only continuous segments made of an
infinite number of points have length. Thus modelling any real physical
system must require either a discontinuous space made of discrete points
and "empty space" between them (as well as discontinuous dynamics in
the space) or, alternatively, a continuous space with fuzzy points
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constituting a continuum. In the latter case, the continuous fuzzy regions
surrounding each accessible state provide the infinite class of points to
allow for overall continuity. This is a general point which is also
significant for the discussion later about modelling Nature with an
infinitely detailed number system. Fortunately in this particular case we
already have a handy way of circumventing the problem; namely, we
have already noted that the mappings from X space to the other two spaces
are themselves fuzzy.81 Thus we can expand \\f space from a space with
essentially no volume to a continuous space with positive volumes; the
same applies to to space. We must simply keep in mind when using the
dynamical spaces that two points very near each other may simply be
indistinguishable: we are operating with models applied to vaguely
mapped spaces, and our "answers" must be fuzzified appropriately. This is
exactly analogous to our later conclusions about using real number
models which include an infinite amount of detail.
Two other observations about this dynamical systems framework
follow on from these kinds of points. The first is that whenever we are
modelling a system at a high enough level of description that there is
some loss of detail from a lower level where dynamics are deterministic,
there is at least the possibility that dynamics at the higher level will be
nondeterministic. If there are "fewer" states at a given level—say, the \|/
level—than at a lower deterministic level—say, the X level—then it
follows from what mathematicians call the "pigeon hole principle" that
there will be at least one \\r description into which more than one X
description must go. (Note that this is essentially a restatement of the
main point of multiple realisability.) Thus, recalling Figure 23, there may
be points which are distinct at the lower X level and which have unique
time evolutions at that level but which are the same point at the higher
level before ultimately tracing different time evolutions at that higher
level. (This is independent of whether we are tracking mental states or
data structure states in \j/ space.)
The second related point is that because of this loss of information
as we move to higher levels, the topological transforms relating manifolds
at lower levels to higher levels (which, as noted above, might not
81 Strictly speaking, we could also say that the mapping from reality to X space is fuzzy,
because a system represented in X space has only a finite number of access states
distinguishable in X space .
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themselves even be continuous) may not be invertible. That is, once we
have transformed a manifold in, say, X space, to one in \|/ space, it may not
be possible to get the original surface back by inverting the transform. The
easy counterexample to invertibility occurs around a singularity where a
volume of points in X space maps to a single point in space.
Finally, we move on to some brief comments about applying this
dynamical framework to existing theories and explore how new theories
might be formulated within the schema.
13.5 Technoflash or Good for Something?
13.5.1 Existing Theory
Within this framework, we may formulate succinctly theories about
phenomena in intelligent systems which rely on the relationships
between different levels of description. For example, one main point of
Horgan and Tienson's recent work into the computability and
computational tractability of cognitive state transitions can be put very
economically in the terms of the new schema. Specifically, they suggest
that transitions between v|/ states are not always computable solely on the
basis of \j/ level information, because the same \\f state might supervene on
two or more distinct co states which could ultimately evolve along
trajectories distinguishable not only in to space but also in \j/ space.
Particularly in chaotic systems, this means the same \|/ state might branch
into two different \j/ states on the basis of lower level sensitive dependence
on initial conditions. At the least, information loss may result in \\f state
transitions which are computationally intractable even in the case of
tractable 00 computability. In effect, theirs is a comparison of \j/ state
overdeterminism with respect to the 00 and X levels and
underdeterminism with respect to the level itself. We might extend
their ideas by asking about the characteristics of co level indeterminism on
the basis of underlying X dynamics and chaos in real space.
My own thoughts on applying recursion theory to chaotic analogue
systems appear in Chapter 15; while confined primarily to
noncomputability at the X level, they might when paired with this
representational schema create a foundation for exploring problems of
computability at higher levels of description. The schema might also be a
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useful point of departure for examining further ramifications of our
refinement of Pylyshyn's conjecture suggested above.
13.5.2 New Frontiers
As for new ways of using the schema for exploring interactions
between low level chaotic dynamics and characteristics of behaviour at the
introspectively accessible level, we might gain new insights into
psychological questions about creativity and problem solving,
philosophical questions about free will and the relationship between
reasons and causes, and computational questions about implementing
artificial intelligences.
For the psychologist, it could be useful to try to describe the
relationship between creativity and SIC or other dynamic properties at the
to or X levels. Because a minor perturbation at a low level might result in
a system's taking a new path at a higher level, this property of chaotic
systems might provide some clues about sudden flashes of inspiration or
"lateral thinking" which, while entirely deterministic at lower levels, may
appear at the introspective level as discontinuities in our train of thought.
(We return to this idea in the next chapter.)
The speed with which a chaotic system may visit different
neighbourhoods of its phase space, coupled with the distributed
representational abilities of neural networks, might also offer a partial
account of what appears to be content addressable memory. That is, a
network visiting large areas of its phase space "looking" for a pattern to
match might be one mechanism subserving content addressable
memory.82 Understanding the role of content addressable memory may
well be critical for making sense of creativity, problem solving, and the so-
called frame problem. There is also some evidence (Tsuda 1994b) that low
level chaos enhances learning and the actual organisation of memory.
For the philosopher, explorations of interactions between levels
might also provide insights into the appearance of free will. Because so
much of co and X level dynamics is not available to introspective
awareness at the \j/ level, it is clear that apparent contracausal behaviour at
the \|/ level might be possible on the basis of entirely deterministic X level
82 A forthcoming paper based on the interlocking ring architecture of Chapter 10 discusses
content addressable memory in more detail. Another forthcoming paper engages the frame
problem more directly from a neural network perspective.
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causation. Yet this apparent contracausal behaviour needn't be without
precursor reasons at the \\i level.
Consider the evolution of a single intelligent system traced at both
the \j/ level and, say, the X level. The sorts of things we track at the higher
level are measures of psychological parameters or, alternatively,
descriptions of self model data structures, and states in this space, while
they may be related to each other by stochastic generalisations describing
which are likely to follow which, they needn't have strict causal
connections between them as such. (To pick an example out of the air,
fear of heights might lead to an amorous admiration of a Russian trapeze
artist, but then again it might not, and it certainly needn't cause it in the
strictest sense of the word.) Connections between X states, however,
generally are causal. Yet the phase trajectory in X space, described causally,
and the phase trajectory in vj/ space, described in terms of psychological
generalisations or reasons, describe the evolution of the very same
intelligent system. Just as it is a category error to conflate reasons and
causes, on this view it is also a mistaken use of levels of description. But
we can see here that the two may be brought together, without reducing
one to the other or committing a category error. Any sequence of actions
would have traceable reasons in \j/ space but causes only in to or X space.83
A full treatment of questions about reason and causation must
await another occasion. But there appears to be considerable philosophical
mileage in the idea that as far as we can be introspectively aware, our
behaviour is governed by generalisations linking types of vj/ states,
generalisations for which exceptions often occur, but that our behaviour is
still entirely determined at lower levels in a sort of "introspectively
invisible" fashion. As far as the \j/ level is concerned, this account is not
too different from the way it looks when we introspectively consider our
own behaviour. That is, it seems to us introspectively (or to me, anyway!)
that we do have particular general patterns of behaviour but that we can
always violate those patterns when it suits us (not when we're struck by a
sudden fit of indeterministic irrationality). Deterministic but chaotic low
level dynamics might provide both a possible account of the elusive
"when it suits us" as well as a way of reconciling causal determinism with
the appearance of reasoned (not necessarily contracausal) free will. I
83 See Mulhauser (1993e) for an exploration of this idea in the form of a psychological
Principle of Sufficient Reason.
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believe this rough sketch of an approach to the problem of free will
complements rather nicely Dennett's (1984) compatibilist position.
Finally, the quest for artificially intelligent systems could be aided by
an exploration of the question of what cognitive state transitions at the \j/
level are served by sensitively dependent processes at lower levels, or at
least an exploration of what level transitions are nondeterministic at
that level but are deterministic at a lower level. Gaining partial answers to
this question would tell us what processes can be modelled at higher
levels with lower degrees of detail and which must be implemented at
lower levels with more careful attention to detail.
For instance, few would dispute that an artificially intelligent
system needn't model every single behavioural property of every single
neuron in a given human's brain in order to display some of the cognitive
faculties of the human. Yet it seems nearly as obvious that for many
cognitive faculties we might wish to model, attempting to mimic only the
highest level behaviour of the human would be unworkable (either
indeterministically unpredictable or computationally intractable) because
of underdeterminism at that level. On the face of it, there should be some
boundary area between the two extremes which would allow an artificial
system to mimic an acceptable degree of the human's subtlety without
unduly burdening computational resources by modelling unnecessary
details. Until a better understanding of inter-level dynamical relation¬
ships is achieved, any choice for this boundary must be at least partly
arbitrary.
In short, I believe questions about the relationship between the
introspectively available level of description or the level of description of
the self model and the finer, lower levels of description are important
ones. The framework I have suggested is substantially
"underdetermined" itself, in that it may not yet be fleshed out with
enough detail to allow the formulation of any but the most rudimentary
theories or observations. But it is a possible starting point for one
approach to understanding the mind-brain as a rich dynamical system.
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Determinism and the Topology
of Mind
In the manuscript of his recent Cambridge lecture series on chaos
(Smith 1993) and in a commentary at the July 1993 Conference of the
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Peter Smith has strongly
criticised one of the arguments which has emerged from the preceding
way of viewing the relationship between psychological states and the
underlying neural activity.84 In particular, Smith has criticised the notion
that any conclusions concerning so-called anomalous monism can be
drawn from the sensitive dependence on initial conditions of chaotic
neural subsystems of the brain. The problem is related to the various
conclusions which might be drawn about deterministic or indeterministic
evolution at the level of subjective experience depending on how we
conceive the mapping of sets of points in X space to \j/ states; it is important
to our overall project to understand how this relationship between
material substrate and subjective experience may work.
14.1 Mind, Temperature, and a Game of Cards
We begin with the argument Smith attributes to me and claims to
be invalid:85
1. A given initial type of psychological state can be realised in a
variety of physical ways.
84 The material in this section is drawn with minor revisions from my response to Smith's
critique in Mulhauser (1993f).
85 Curiously, the paper which was the subject of Smith's commentary (Mulhauser 1993c)
does not include any explicit argument of this kind, although I assume something similar to
it in my mention of Horgan and Tienson's (1993) work. The purpose of my own paper was
simply to provide a framework for analysing the interactions between various levels of
description of the same intelligent system.
2. But the time-evolution of the physical states in question is
sensitively dependent on initial conditions—i.e., we may get
markedly different physical upshots arising from very similar
initial states.
3. Hence we can get (with significant probability) markedly
different psychological upshots arising from the same initial
psychological state.
The argument, he claims, is invalid because it is exactly analogous to the
following, which is obviously invalid because it has true premises and a
false conclusion:
1.* A given initial type of thermodynamical state (e.g. a certain
temperature) can be realised in a variety of physical states
characterised by different position/momenta distributions of
the particles in a gas.
2* But the time-evolution of a state with a given
position/momenta distribution is sensitively dependent on
initial conditions—i.e., we may get markedly different
distributional upshots arising from very similar initial states.
3.* Hence we can get (with significant probability) markedly
different thermodynamical upshots arising from the same
initial thermodynamical state.
Smith claims this analogy establishes that this general form of argument is
invalid and that nothing about indeterminism at higher levels of
description can be inferred from the presence of low level chaos. But
compare the following argument, which doesn't involve chaos at all:
1.** A given type of poker hand (such as one pair or a full house
or a royal flush) can be realised by a variety of physical card
distributions.
2.** But the time-evolution of physical card distributions (given
an appropriate algorithm for discarding cards) is "sensitively
dependent" on the initial conditions of the cards in the
hand—i.e., we may get markedly different physical card
distributions arising from very similar initial distributions.
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3.** Hence we can get (with significant probability) markedly
different final types of poker hands arising from the same
initial type of poker hand.
In an earlier IPPE-distributed draft of a document including this
chapter, I asserted without argument that the poker argument—apart
from simply having true premises and a true conclusion—is in fact valid.
Peter Smith has maintained privately that it must be invalid because the
general form of argument is invalid, and other readers have expressed
confusion over the point. So I feel compelled to make a brief diversion to
establish clearly that the third argument above is valid, and this diversion
will hopefully serve as a point of departure for understanding what is so
odd about the relationship between the three different arguments. (In the
end, we will find this argument which is at the centre of confusion really
isn't useful, but it is helpful for us to sort it all out in order to understand
why.) First, just to be sure, let's notice that if the negation of the
conclusion of an argument can be shown to entail the negation of any of
the premises (i.e., if (~ C -» ~ PI) or (~ C —> ~ P2)), then the argument is
valid. That is, if the negation of the conclusion entails the negation of any
of the premises, then it entails the negation of the conjunction of the
premises, and by modus tolens the conjunction of the premises then
entails the conclusion (because (~ PI v ~ P2) = ~ (PI & P2) and if (~ C —> (~
PI v ~ P2)) then clearly (~ ~ (PI & P2) -> ~ ~ C) and (PI & P2) -> C).
But if we negate a simplified86 3."""" from above, we get:
~3.** It is false that we can get different final types of poker hands
arising from the same initial type of poker hand.
And a few moments' reflection reveals that if we keep constant the rest of
the background premises about the game's rules and the distribution of
the cards in the deck and so forth, then the only way this can be true is if
either there is only one way to get each type of poker hand or the
evolution of a hand in the course of the game is independent of what
other cards are dealt. The first of these disjuncts is nothing more than the
negation of 1.** above, and the second straightforwardly entails the
negation of 2.** above. Thus, the negation of the conclusion entails the
86 YVe can ignore the "with significant probability" as well as the "marked" for the
moment because these depend on the degree of SIC; we are concerned only with what is left
over above.
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negation of at least one of the premises, and according to the observation
above, the conjunction of the premises entails the conclusion. But since
this argument certainly looks to be invalid by Smith's same analogy to the
thermodynamical argument, what is wrong?
What makes the thermodynamical argument invalid, the poker
argument valid, and the original psychological state argument open to
debate concerns our definitions of, and background assumptions about,
temperature, poker hand, and psychological state, respectively. The
thermodynamical argument is invalid because of the hidden premise
which maps position/momenta distributions to temperature:
temperature just is the mean kinetic energy of the particles in the gas (as
read off from the position/momenta distribution). No change in the
position or momentum of any particle makes any difference to the
temperature as long as the mean is the same. This is the simplest of the
three arguments because the only hidden premises establishing
connections between temperature and mean kinetic energy are
definitional.
The poker argument is valid because of the hidden premises which
map card distributions to hands: a full house, for instance, just is one pair
and three of a kind. Changes in cards do change the hand when they bring
about a change in the types or sizes of relevant sets that can be formed
from the cards. Thus given two distinct card distributions which both
have one pair, for instance, discarding the three other cards in both hands
and adding identical cards to the hands can yield completely different
hands, such as a full house in one and two pair in another. See Figure 24
for this example—it is a straightforward case of divergence in the style of
Figure 23, where loss of information at a higher level of description (in
this case, loss of information about what specific cards are making up a
hand) enables lower level factors to drive apart states which are identical
at that higher level of description. This argument is as easily seen to be
valid as the thermodynamical argument is seen to be invalid: just as we
already know how to construe temperature, we know what makes a full
house.
The psychological argument is open to debate because there are
hidden premises concerned with how we are to understand the mapping
from physical states to psychological states, and these hidden premises are
controversial. (Smith would apparently have us ignore the importance of
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the hidden premises in dubbing the original argument invalid, yet I
would maintain that even understanding what the original argument
means requires taking on some hidden premise about mappings between



















4v 4a 4a ja J* full house
9a 9y 4a J* J* two pair
Fig. 24 Sensitive dependence in a card game
Analysing the other two arguments relies on an appeal to hidden
premises just as in the present case, but in these cases those premises—
concerning how to construe temperature and how to construe a poker
hand—are uncontroversial. (Although, it is still fair to say that all three of
these are bad arguments in the sense that too much crucial information is
left in the hidden premises rather than being made explicit in the
arguments themselves.) Now we must examine some of the ways we
might construe this mapping from X space to \\f space.
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14.2 Mind Mapping—Finding Our Way
With respect to what sort of mapping scheme we should adopt,
Smith wonders first if perhaps I have fallen prey to the naive assumption
that psychological states are simply a uniform coarse graining of physical
states and then goes on to suggest, loosely following the more recent line
of Freeman and colleagues (for entry into the complete literature
originating from the research , see Freeman 1964, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1987a,
1987b, 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b; Freeman and Skarda 1985; Skarda and
Freeman 1987; Yao and Freeman 1990; Eeckman and Freeman 1991), that
psychological states correspond to large structures in phase space which
might be strange attractors. Fortunately I haven't fallen prey to the
uniform coarse-graining assumption, as should be apparent from my
comment in the paper under debate that psychological state space should
properly be treated as a general Riemannian space. The reason \\/ space
should be treated as a general Riemannian space was simply that there
might be complex mappings from X space to vy space which varied across
the space as a whole. This notion is incompatible with a simple uniform
coarse graining, which would yield a uniform geometry across the whole
space. But let's examine the idea that psychological states correspond to
states near strange attractors. Smith provides no indication of how we are
to construe the word "near" here, and in private communication he has
objected to my simplifying it to anything other than states within some
appropriate e of an attractor. But lacking for the moment any hint of how
to determine this e or any clear reason not to simplify the idea further, for
the present purposes I believe it introduces no confusion simply to replace
"lying near a strange attractor" with "lying within the basin of attraction of
a strange attractor". In making this simplification we are thus not always
-addressing precisely what Smith has intended, but our discussion remains
useful for our own purposes.
Smith notes correctly that if a given psychological state corresponds
to a physical state lying near a strange attractor, then we may observe
divergent physical phase trajectories from arbitrarily similar initial
conditions while retaining the same psychological state (because those
phase trajectories, while divergent, remain near the same attractor). This
provides what he calls "micro-chaos but macro-psychological stability",
and, he continues, "the move from one dynamical state (defined by its
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attractor) to another as control parameters change can in fact be as
deterministic as you like" (Smith 1993, p. 76). Such a picture allows for the
wild low level behaviour characteristic of chaotic systems without making
the high level psychological behaviour similarly wild.
It is worth noticing, incidentally, that arguments over macro-level
stability in the brain—which Smith apparently assumes is an obvious
feature—are subtle and by no means conclusive. For instance, Wright and
colleagues (Wright, et al 1993) have suggested a model for chaotic EEG data
which effectively ties low level cortical chaos to stable group dynamics, but
their work is vulnerable to a number of criticisms stemming from their
failure to take account of poorly understood features of cell dynamics
(Goertzel 1994) and their reliance (Wright 1990) on noise injected via the
reticular formation. (Tsuda 1994a, drawing on Kaneko 1990) While they
have partly defended themselves (Wright, et al 1994), the matter remains
highly contentious.
But returning to Smith's idea, I believe he has correctly sussed out a
description of something like what must happen in response to changes in
parameters such as ion concentrations and neuropeptide distributions.
Such physical changes correspond to the control parameters to which
Smith refers. Some neuromodulators, for instance, influence the way
output frequencies of whole cell families vary in response to afferent
signals. Thus they change in a global way the shape of the network's
possible trajectories through phase space, and they may well lead to just
the kind of change in psychological state which we would expect under
Smith's picture. But to accept this picture as the whole story is to ignore
altogether the role of perturbations (corresponding to changes in afferent
signals) in shifting the state of a neural network from the basin of one
attractor to that of a second attractor, coexistent with the first.87
87 Smith has objected in private communication that he intended "control parameter" in a
more general sense, to include changes in afferent signals. But the standard use of "control
parameter" refers to either a constant or a coefficient of one of the terms of the equations
describing the dynamics of the system. It does not generally refer to anything like what we
mean here by a change in afferent signals, which corresponds simply to a possibly abrupt
change in the system's location in phase space but not to any overall change in dynamics. In
any case, if we allow Smith's broader notion of "control parameter" as a term which does
include simple changes in the position of the system in phase space, then the notion that
psychological state changes in response to changes in afferent signals are deterministic
with respect to psychological state level information becomes highly dubious. As we shall
see, it is trivial to show that under a simple mapping of physical states to psychological
states in terms of attractor basins, psychological state response to a change ii. afferent
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It is an elementary observation about even the simplest artificial
neural networks (and thus presumably it applies to the far more complex
biological neural nets) that the state spaces88 of such networks include
multiple attractors. In the lingo of artificial neural nets, this is just
another way of saying that the output patterns vary according to changes
in the input patterns. To use a hideously simplified discrete example,
consider any pattern recognition network which fires a single output unit
in response to each of ten possible input patterns (the technical details are
irrelevant). Then we can put the point very crudely by saying that all the
states of the network corresponding to the presence of an input pattern
which looks like a "1" will be attracted to a manifold in state space where
the "1" output unit fires and the others don't, all the states corresponding
to the presence of an input pattern which looks like an "8" will be attracted
to a manifold in state space where the "8" output unit fires the others
don't, and so on. All ten attractors are coexistent in the state space of the
network, and the state of the network evolves in response to changes in
the afferent signals, not in response to changes in global control
parameters.89 Smith's picture apparently ignores altogether the response
of a neural network to such changes in afferent signals.
14.3 Indeterminism and Topology
If we accept the hypothesis that psychological states correspond to
basins of attraction (or Smith's hypothesis that they correspond to areas
within some e of an attractor), the existence of multiple attractors in the
state space of a neural network simply means that cognitive states can
change in response to changes in neural input. Indeed, it seems almost
obvious that this is at least as large a piece of the puzzle as Smith's changes
in response to modifications of the control parameters: my psychological
state changes when presented with a red apple because of the change in
visual input, my psychological state changes when the orchestra begins to
signals can be entirely nondeterministic with respect to complete information about the
signal change and about the original psychological state.
88 Here we mean the state space describing the firing patterns of nodes in response to inputs
after training; of course it is also useful (and more frequently actually used) to describe the
evolution of a net through a state space of connection strengths during training.
89 Of course, we could make changes in such control parameters, and the shape of the
possible phase trajectories would be altered accordingly; the point is that there are other
ways the "psychological state" of the network could change.
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play because of the change in auditory input, etc. It is not that my
neuropeptides aren't playing a role, but so are changes in the output





Fig. 25 A bounded space of "identical" mental states
It is worth noting that once we accept the presence of multiple
attractors in the phase space of a neural system, we needn't even appeal to
chaos to establish something like psychological state indeterminism.90
We can illustrate with a trivially simple example. Consider a two-
dimensional state space with four attractors such that the basins of
attraction are marked off by the four quadrants of the cartesian coordinate
system. Now suppose we are given an open circle of radius one, tangent
to both the horizontal and vertical axes in quadrant I. This possibility is
illustrated in Figure 25. Since all the states within this circle are in the
same basin of attraction, they all map to the same psychological state.
Now we perturb the system (i.e., make a change in inputs)
/ V? V2\
-corresponding to a nudge parallel to the unit vector \ 2 ' 2 1. In an
artificially simple case, with a vector of magnitude V2" and ignoring the
flow within the basins of attraction, the circle is now centred on the origin.
(Depending on the character of the flow in each of the four basins of
90 Smith has observed in private communication that we shouldn't really be talking about
anomalous monism here, since the original Davidsonian meaning of that term referred to
physical monism without strict psycho-physical laws. Understanding psychological states
as supervening upon volumes of points near particular attractors or within their boundaries
of attraction is compatible with and even suggests that the correlation between \j/ states and
X states is law-like, the denial of anomalous monism.
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attraction, the circle may of course be deformed, and it may be necessary to
apply a slightly different nudge, but the details are unimportant; all that
matters is that we have now moved some portion of the circle over the
attractor basin boundaries.) This is illustrated in Figure 26. We can easily
see that a physical nudge to the same psychological state can give rise to
four different possible psychological states, according to the differences in
underlying physical states.
Well, then, have we dispensed with the need for chaos altogether?
We can see from the example that all that is required to observe high level
indeterminism on top of low level determinism is a nudge that shifts any
set of arbitrarily similar states lying near one attractor to a new
neighbourhood where a basin boundary will intersect the translated set.
These nudges, to use the phrase Smith applies to changes in control
parameters, "can be as deterministic as you like", but that doesn't mean
the subsequent evolution, described at a high level, is deterministic.91 The
point is that even with respect to complete information about the change
in afferent signals (i.e., the environmental interaction) and complete
information about the original psychological state of a cognitive system,
psychological state evolution (i.e., response to the environment) may be
entirely nondeterministic. And, most significantly, the nondeterminism
does not come from the environment—since we are offering complete
91 This is why I noted previously that on a broad construal of Smith's "control
parameters", the idea about deterministic changes in psychological state is dubious, and in
fact it is incorrect.
Fig. 26 "Identical" states after a nudge
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information about the environmental interaction as a given—but from
the response of the cognitive system as described at the psychological level.
But this isn't chaos, this is elementary dynamics.
It's true: it appears that something like psychological state
indeterminism follows immediately unless we are prepared to ignore
basic neurophysiology and arbitrarily restrict the attractor changes that
count to those which are brought about by changes in global parameters
describing ion concentrations, neuropeptide distributions, and the like.
The role here for chaotic dynamics, and for their associated fractal basin
boundaries and sensitive dependence on initial conditions, is to make this
psychological level indeterminism more interesting.
Let's return to the argument Smith attributes to me. The gist of it is
that sensitive dependence on initial conditions in the low level dynamics
of a system can magnify tiny, apparently psychologically irrelevant
changes in physical state at one time, into physical changes which are
psychologically significant later on. If the picture of strange attractor
evolution, or cognitive state transition—the picture obscured in the
argument's hidden premises—offered by Smith were complete, this
conclusion about sensitive dependence on initial conditions would be
false. But when we consider the importance of afferent signals in the way
real neural networks function, this conclusion about sensitive dependence
on initial conditions becomes true.92 The reason is that a tiny change in
physical state, insufficient to lead to a new psychological state all by itself,
can cause the system to enter a different psychological state than it
otherwise would have the next time it is "bumped" by a change in afferent
signals.
To illustrate, consider two arbitrarily similar states within the circle
in Figure 25. Perhaps after some time, maybe under the influence of SIC,
the states have evolved into the upper left and the lower right of the
circle. They are still the same psychological state, because they are both in
quadrant I, but when we make a change in afferent signals corresponding
to the nudge illustrated in Figure 26, one trajectory now lies in quadrant II
and the other in quadrant IV. The presence of sensitive dependence on
initial conditions is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
92 The truth of the conclusion rests on the hidden information about the importance of
afferent signals and not on SIC, however; the hidden information reveals why the
argument is rather uninteresting.
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cognitive transition indeterminism, but when present it makes that
indetermiriism more interesting by increasing the sensitivity of the system
to afferent signal "bumps" and by making that increase in sensitivity even
more unpredictable with respect to \|/ level information.
As a final note, it is interesting to observe that characteristics of the
dynamical flow at the X level or the 0) level may determine the kinds of
probabilistic predictions which can be made about \\r level responses to
environmental interactions. For instance, since one "bump" in the above
example is sufficient to determine in which of the four portions of the
circle in Figure 25 the system began, under a fairly uniform and "slow" co
level flow, we might be able to predict that a nudge of a given magnitude
in another direction would be highly likely to land the system in a
psychological state corresponding to where the original quarter-circle
volume of phase space would land under two consecutive nudges. But
under, say, a "vigorous" chaotic flow at the CD level, the post-nudge
trajectory may have wandered very rapidly into a much larger area,
making such subsequent predictions impossible. The situation is faintly
reminiscent of the obliteration of information about orthogonal
observables which occurs with the measurement of a maximal quantum
observable.
14.4 Back to the Mapping—Where Were We Going?
To recap, then, we've established first that the apparent analogy
between Smith's thermodynamical argument and the one he attributes to
me is insufficient to show the latter invalid. Interpreting the three
different arguments depends on a number of hidden premises. In the case
of the original psychological argument, we've seen that making sense of it
depends on how we construe the mappings from physical states to
psychological states. If we adopt the suggestion that psychological states
correspond to classes of trajectories near particular attractors, we gain a
useful picture of how psychological states may change in response to
modifications in global parameters. But when we add in the realisation
that networks may move to new attractors in response to changes in
afferent signals, we gain two further useful conclusions. First, something
like psychological indeterminism follows immediately, without recourse
to chaotic dynamics. Second, if the system is in fact chaotic at low levels,
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we gain a richer variety of cognitive transition indeterminism. Thus
Smith was entirely correct in objecting that appeals specifically to chaos do
not add argumentative force to the basic notion that dynamics described at
the psychological state level may be indeterministic although they
supervene on deterministic dynamics at a lower level. At the same time,
along the lines of the original paper, an understanding of low level chaotic
dynamics is helpful for understanding what are plausible accounts of the
mapping from physical state to psychological state and for understanding
subtle properties of high level cognitive transitions and the kinds of
predictions about them which are possible; a representational schema for
speaking about the relationship between dynamics at various levels of
description is useful.
Next we will consider low level chaos itself and conclusions about it
which are largely independent of how we may relate low level dynamics
to higher level properties of intelligent systems yet are significant for how
we might understand the possible ways of modelling an intelligent system





We have seen some very basic ways in which chaotic behaviour in
neural networks might be relevant to the self model data structures they
may instantiate. In what follows, we explore a more technical aspect of
chaos in neural networks. Specifically, our concern will be with what
relevance, if any, the analogue nature of real biological networks has for
simulating their behaviour on digital computers. This is a significant
relationship to understand, because if analogue networks can be simulated
satisfactorily by digital computers, and if we believe human self models
are instantiated by analogue networks, then human style self models can
also (barring any other problems) be satisfactorily simulated by digital
computers. Human cognition in this case reduces to little more than a
very sophisticated Universal Turing Machine program exploiting some
very sophisticated input and output channels. Indeed, this is the
fundamental assumption of the strong AI project.
On the other hand, analogue neural networks might have special
properties which make them inherently unsuited to digital simulation.
Of course it is possible that just as digital computers can themselves be
perfectly simulated at the computational level despite their probabilistic
semiconductors, so, too, might self models be perfectly amenable to
simulation at the data structure level in spite of any special characteristics
of their neural instantiation. But finding "special characteristics" at least
establishes the possibility that self model data structures instantiated by
analogue neural networks may not be simulated digitally. Our
assumption is that the existence of self model dynamics which
characteristically cannot be simulated satisfactorily implies instantiating
wetware which also cannot be simulated satisfactorily. Here, our strategy
is to affirm the consequent of that implication; thus, we won't prove that
any dynamics at the level of the self model are inherently difficult to
simulate, but we will block the corresponding inference from the denial of
the consequent to the affirmation that human style self models can be
simulated digitally without hindrance.
In what follows, we examine the assumption that the computability
of a function governing the behaviour of a nonlinear analogue dynamical
system guarantees that that dynamical system may be satisfactorily
simulated by digital means. After a brief overview of recursion theory, we
consider two observations about chaotic analogue systems which suggest
some aspects of their behaviour may not be captured by digital
simulations. We conclude by placing these observations in a broader
recursion theoretic context and by commenting on their potential
relevance to chaotic analogue subsystems of the human brain.93 Later in
this dissertation (see Chapter 17) we shall examine a recent development
which apparently offers real evidence of the kinds of difficulties explored
more abstractly in the following discussion.
15.1 Doing It and Doing It For Real
Mathematicians usually assume that the computability of a
function governing the behaviour of a dynamical system is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for its being possible—given
appropriate resources—to simulate effectively that dynamical system with
a digital computer. In other words, the assumption is that it is impossible
for the real dynamical system to behave in such a way that a digital
simulation could not behave arbitrarily similarly, to within a degree of
accuracy limited only by the computational resources available.
This is not an unreasonable assumption. The requirements for a
function's computability—sequential computability and effective uniform
continuity—appear, on the face of it, to preclude any kind of behaviour at
all in the dynamical system itself which cannot simply be read off from an
appropriate application of the function to a set of specified initial
conditions. Even in cases where necessary errors in specifying the initial
conditions of a system mean the time evolution of a real system cannot be
predicted precisely, it appears that no phase trajectory which the real
93 Much of the material in this section is reprinted or adapted, with some modifications,
from Mulhauser (1993d—please see the Appendix for reprint information) and the early
Mulhauser (1992).
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system might trace could be qualitatively different from phase trajectories
described by simulated evolution.
In what follows, we explore whether this holds true for chaotic
systems which are analogue and whose behaviour we thus might analyse
in terms of values on the continuous real line. We begin with a brief
overview of fundamental definitions of recursion theory. With these
definitions and the earlier definitions of chaos in hand, we observe two
general properties of chaos over the real line. Finally, we locate these
observations in a broader recursion theoretic context and suggest ways in
which they might be relevant to the analysis of chaotic areas of the human
brain.
15.2 Recursion Theory
At the heart of the theory of computability is the recursively
enumerable set. Put simply, any set of natural numbers which can be
generated algorithmically—alternatively, by a Turing machine—is called
recursively enumerable. The class of all such algorithms, or Turing
programs, generates the class of all recursively enumerable sets. For some
of these, called recursively enumerable nonrecursive sets, there is no
algorithmic test for set membership. It is just such a noncomputable set,
one whose complement is not recursively enumerable, which is the key to
understanding noncomputability for a function, number, or sequence of
numbers. That such sets exist was first established by Kleene (1952; see also
Rogers 1967).
A real number is computable if there is a computable sequence of
rationals which converges effectively to it. (Pour-El and Richards 1989)
More formally, a sequence of rational numbers {rk} is computable if there
exist three recursive—that is, algorithmic—functions over the naturals a,
b, s: N —> N such that Vk,
_ ( (k)g (k)
b(k)*0 and &(k)
Such a sequence converges effectively to a real number x if there exists a
recursive function over the naturals e: N —> N such that VN e N:
k>e(N) implies |rk - x| < 2~N
More intuitively, a real number is computable if it can be effectively
approximated to an arbitrary degree of accuracy by an algorithmic method.
195
For instance, n is a computable number because the successive digits of its
decimal expansion can be generated to an arbitrary degree of precision by
an algorithm specified in advance. (Note, however, that the question of
whether a particular sequence of digits occurs in the expansion of n
cannot, in general, be decided algorithmically; the best we could do would
be to keep generating the decimal expansion and testing for the
sequence—unless and until it did appear, we could not answer the
question of whether it might not still appear.) It is significant that "most"
real numbers are in fact noncomputable. (Minsky 1967) It is easy to see
why: every real number is either computable or noncomputable, but the
set of computable reals is only countably, or denumerably, infinite, while
the set of all reals is uncountably infinite. This point plays a central role in
the observations we shortly will make about chaotic analogue systems.
Computability for a function was first formulated over three
decades ago (Grzegorczyk 1955,1957; Lacombe 1955a, 1955b), and it requires
both sequential computability and effective uniform continuity. Consider
a function / defined on a closed bounded rectangle Iq in Rq, where
a;, bj (the "corners") are computable real numbers, and Kq represents q-
dimensional real space. The first criterion is met when the function maps
computable sequences to computable sequences: / maps every computable
sequence of points Xk e Iq into a computable sequence {/(xk)} of real
numbers. The second condition is fulfilled when a certain algorithmic
relationship exists between the euclidean distance separating points in the
domain of the function and the distance between corresponding points in
the range. Specifically, the condition is met when there exists a recursive
function d: N —> N such that Vx, y e Iq and VN e N:
Having outlined the technical meaning of 'computability' on which the
rest of our points rely, we turn now to an analysis of computability for
chaotic systems which are analogue.
15.3 Analogue Chaos
The present observations rely upon the assumption that the
continuous real line—as opposed to, say, the constructive rationals—
represents the best mathematical framework in which to analyse the
Iq = (a; < Xj < bj, 1 < i < q},
implies
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behaviour of analogue systems. While both sets of numbers provide
continuity, the reals are an intuitively more "complete" transfinite set and
offer a starting point which, on the face of it, is certainly no less plausible
than the alternative. Although we will return to a closely related question
later when we discuss the applicability of real number mathematical
models to a physical world with apparently limited detail, an extended
discussion of the merits of each set of numbers for analysing analogue
systems is best left to a paper dedicated to philosophy of maths or
philosophy of logic. In the present context, we concentrate entirely on the
consequences of applying the real numbers.
As we noted previously, there is a nondenumerable infinity of
noncomputable numbers on the real line and a denumerable infinity of
computable numbers. As Minsky (1967) put it, "most" real numbers are
noncomputable. It is often said of typical chaotic systems that their dense
set of periodic points includes fixed points of all possible periods. This is a
tricky proposition, because all possible periods means there is a period for
every point on whatever interval of the real line the dynamics of the
system permit to be reached. Chaotic systems can be said to have at least a
countably infinite set of periodic points, and in the context of iterative
systems, there can be only a countably infinite set of periodic points and a
corresponding set of periods. But an analogue system is not subject to this
constraint, and there is no reason prima facie why there could not be
analogue systems in nature which truly have fixed points of all possible
periods. This is no more mysterious than the observation that a discrete
model of a rolling wheel limits the wheel's possible rotation angles to a
countably infinite set, while an analogue wheel may actually roll through
a continuous range of rotation angles from 0 to 2n describing an
uncountably infinite set. But then such chaotic analogue systems may
have an uncountably infinite number of possible periods but only a
countably infinite number of computable points in phase space at a given
time or over a given Poincare section.
If this is true, that there is an uncountably infinite set of possible
periods but only a countably infinite set of computable points in phase
space (just as there is an uncountably infinite set of possible rotation
angles but only a countably infinite set of computable rotation angles),
then it is a simple observation that there must be an uncountably infinite
number of fixed points with unique periods. Equivalently, there is an
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uncountably infinite set of fixed points with noncomputable periods. To
use Minsky's term again, "most" phase trajectories, then, have
noncomputable periods.
As a followup, it is interesting to note that a point in phase space
defined by computable coordinates could have a noncomputable period;
likewise, a point defined by noncomputable coordinates could have a
computable period. But if either the coordinates of a point in phase space
are noncomputable or the period of a point is noncomputable, then the
phase trajectory on which such a point lies is noncomputable. Thus,
unless there is some strange reason according to which computable points
in phase space musn't have noncomputable periods, not even the full
countably infinite set of computable points in phase space will lie on
computable phase trajectories (although, of course, the set of computable
points in phase space which do lie on computable phase trajectories might
well still be countably infinite!).
The second observation about chaotic analogue systems is closely
related to this first. If a system is described by a computable function, and
if a phase trajectory passes through a computable point at any computable
moment in time, then it can always be located by computable coordinates
at computable time values. The reasoning is an obvious reductio ad
absurdum: if a phase trajectory at a computable temporal and physical
location were to evolve into a noncomputable point at some future (or
past) computable time, then the computability of the function governing
the system would give us a computable method of calculating a
noncomputable value.
Now, so far these observations appear irrelevant to the matter at
hand: the second applies to any and all analogue dynamical systems,
while the first applies to any system with a dense covering of periodic
points of all possible periods. So far, we have not exploited the properties
of chaos, and these observations seem to offer no problems for effective
simulation of analogue dynamical systems in general. But what makes
them interesting is their application to systems which are specifically
analogue and chaotic.
In the case of the first observation and its followup, what is most
interesting is that if we consider the class of chaotic systems in which
points in the dense covering of periodic points are unstable,94 all
94 Recall that in some systems the entire set of periodic points is unstable.
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computable phase trajectories diverge from all noncomputable phase
trajectories. In an ordinary linear analogue system, this wouldn't be
particularly significant, because even though none of the points in a
neighbourhood of a noncomputable point would lie on phase trajectories
which effectively converged to that of the noncomputable point, it
wouldn't be the case that all of them actually diverged to the extent that is
evident from SIC. Moreover, in a non-chaotic system, we might bound
the period of a noncomputable phase trajectory with the periods of
neighbouring phase trajectories, such that even without an effective
approximation, we could still state an error bound less demanding than
that of effective convergence. In a chaotic system, we are guaranteed no
such luxury.
Notice, incidentally, that without violating the Shadowing
Theorem (see [P*] of Chapter 17), there doesn't seem to be any a priori
reason why there couldn't be arbitrarily large variation in the periods of
two neighbouring fixed points an arbitrary distance apart. Consider two
arbitrarily proximal points and their subsequent time evolution through
periodic Poincare sections (i.e., a return map). The two points may remain
arbitrarily near to each other through all the Poincare sections (thus not
violating the Shadowing Theorem), yet one may "hit" its original location
after, say, five slices (thus establishing its period as five times the interval
between sections) and the other after, say, five billion slices.
Thus, the first observation shows that not only may there be an
uncountably infinite set of unique phase trajectories in the phase space of
the relevant type of chaotic analogue system which are noncomputable
and cannot be effectively approximated, but characteristics of phase
trajectories in that set might be significantly different than those of any
nearby computable phase trajectories which could be effectively simulated.
These characteristics include period, at the least, and—due to SIC—
particulars of the areas which individual trajectories may visit even
within a neighbourhood out of which the Shadowing Theorem may tell
us they may not stray over a given time interval.
This is just the implication of the second observation, the
observation that if a phase trajectory ever includes a computable point at a
computable time, then it passes through computable points at every
computable time. In a manner similar to the first observation and its
followup, the second observation strictly partitions phase trajectories into
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a computable set and a noncomputable set. And again, there are
uncountably infinitely many phase trajectories in the second set but only
countably many in the first. The interesting contribution of chaos is that
because of sensitive dependence on initial conditions and topological
transitivity, we are not guaranteed there exists a nearby non-diverging (as
distinct from effectively converging, which we obviously are not
guaranteed)95 computable phase trajectory for any of the noncomputable
phase trajectories. Thus, while there might exist particular pairs of phase
trajectories which do not diverge from each other, there could be no
general mapping of noncomputable phase trajectories to non-diverging
computable ones.
Next we explore briefly the implications of these observations in the
context of recursion theory in general as well as in the context of analysing
the behaviour of the human brain as a dynamical system.
15.4 Computability and Behaviour—So What?
As they relate to the theory of computability itself, these
observations suggest that the computability of a real-valued function is
not sufficient to guarantee that algorithmic simulation of an analogue
dynamical system governed by such a function could capture all of its
interesting potential behaviour. The discrete representation required for
algorithmic simulation essentially restricts our ability to simulate
effectively all possible unique time evolutions of a chaotic analogue
system which could take on an uncountably infinite number of states (not
all of which are necessarily distinguishable, of course). Their sensitivity
establishes for chaotic analogue systems a set of phase trajectories for
which all possible corresponding computable phase trajectories not only
iail effective convergence but are actually divergent. Perhaps a more rigid
recursion theoretic taxonomy is required to distinguish between
computability for functions and satisfactory simulation of real dynamical
systems governed by such functions.
95 This is a crucial but subtle point which perhaps should be emphasised. In any analogue
system, we are already (trivially) denied the possibility of computable trajectories which
effectively converge to noncomputable trajectories, but in chaotic analogue systems, we are
denied the possibility even of computable trajectories which fail to diverge. And, of course,
failure to diverge is a far weaker property than effective convergence!
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Our conclusions are in the spirit of the comment of Vergis, et al
(1986) who, after proving for a limited case of well behaved linear
analogue computers a restricted form of the so-called Strong Church's
Thesis—the thesis that any finite analogue computer can be simulated by a
digital computer with resources bounded by a polynomial function of
those used by the analogue computer—suggest that "any interesting
analog computer should rely on some strongly nonlinear behavior", (p.
93) In addition, I believe these conclusions are not incompatible with the
so-called Shadowing Theorem or the existence of chain recurrent sets. In
particular, the existence of chain recurrent sets in no way implies the
existence of computable tests for set membership, and it does not imply
that all members of such sets are themselves computable numbers.
Indeed, it has already been shown (Pour-El and Richards 1981, 1982) that
the "computable" three dimensional wave equation of classical physics
can transform computable inputs into noncomputable solution values
(although Vergis and colleagues do note that this behaviour may be
suppressed by imposing a continuity condition on the second derivative.)
The ramifications of such nuances and the significance of continuity for
recursion theoretic questions about chaotic systems in general looks to be
an area ripe for more exploration.
In terms of application, the present conclusions suggest potential
difficulties for attempts to analyse the capabilities of chaotic analogue
subsystems of the human brain by observing the behaviour of downsized
algorithmic simulations. The reasons why biological neural networks
should be analysed as analogue rather than digital systems are complex,
but for the present purposes it will suffice to note that while it is true that
a single neuron either fires or does not (thus making it a simple on/off
indicator), it is the spiking frequency which appears to be a primary carrier
of information.96 (A nice overview is included in Gustafsson, et al 1992.
For applications to artificial neural networks, see the same or Gluck and
Rumelhart 1990, Duchateau and Lansner 1991, Kong and Kosko 1991,
Kosko 1992.) This frequency, unsurprisingly, is a continuous value. Other
continuous parameters related to the behaviour of individual neurons are
found in the mechanisms behind spike frequency adaptation and
threshold evolution (see Shepherd 1990; also Nadel, et al 1989 for various
96 The issue of simulating biological neural networks as analogue systems and the recursion
theoretic ramifications were first discussed in technical detail in Mulhauser (1994a).
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relevant data), as well as in the low level responses of ion gates
themselves (Stuhmer 1991, Neher and Sakmann 1992), if the "stochastic"
behaviour of these latter are understood as manifestations of underlying
continuous deterministic chaotic dynamics.
Despite years of comparative neglect in neural network research,
the work of Freeman and others pursuing related research suggests that
the special properties of chaotic dynamics have an important part to play
in the way biological networks function. In particular, Freeman has
postulated an explanation of olfactory pattern recognition in terms of the
coupled nonlinear differential equations characteristic of chaos theory.
Freeman's apparent discovery of strange attractors in olfactory cortex EEGs
is often understood to indicate chaotic dynamics in low level
communications between neurons.
The interesting question is whether a digital simulation of chaotic
cortical areas could function as efficiently as its biological counterpart,
given that an uncountably infinite set of possible phase trajectories
available to the latter would be inaccessible to it. In the case of the
olfactory cortex, it is interesting to wonder whether its pattern recognition
capabilities are in any way dependent upon or aided by evolution through
a specifically continuous domain enabled by the essentially analogue
neural architecture. Similarly, we might wonder at the potential of
chaotic analogue networks for solving NP-complete problems (Garey and
Johnson 1979) in polynomial time, as Hopfield and Tank (1985) have
explored—although their results are only good sub-optimal
approximations. Promising results in this area have also emerged from
research on magnetic alloy systems called spin glasses (Barahona 1982,
Johnson 1983) and the related simulated annealing heuristic (Kirkpatrick,
et al 1983; Aarts and Korst 1989). Vergis and colleagues (1986, p. Ill) are
able to predict only that spin glasses require an exponential settling time in
the worst case over all inputs; whether or not these systems or chaotic
analogue networks will yet emerge as contenders for polynomial solution
of NP-hard problems remains to be seen. The bearing of our own
explorations on such questions seems to be an open problem.
Questioning the algorithmic nature of processing in the human
brain has become taboo in technical circles, largely in reaction to poorly
founded arguments from philosophy of mind such as those put forward
by Penrose in his controversial 1989 book. But setting aside the almost
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religious faith of some AI researchers in the computability of all cognitive
functions as well as some philosophers' similar faith in the
noncomputability of at least some aspects of intelligent systems, it appears
to be a question as yet unresolved whether genuine technical problems of
a recursion theoretic nature may arise for analyses of the powerful
processing capabilities of biological brains.
In the next three chapters we address a line of thought which is
relevant to questions about the very existence of chaos in the real world
and thus to whatever conclusions we might want to draw about conscious
experience supervening on putatively chaotic neural substrates.
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16
Chaos and Infinite Intricacy
We have discussed a number of points about the appearance of
chaos when neural networks are analysed in the dynamical systems
framework, and we have seen some of the ways in which chaotic
characteristics might bear on the instantiation of self models. But these
observations are vulnerable to attack in the spirit of a number of
philosophical points Peter Smith has made recently in his Easter Term
1993 Cambridge lecture series on chaos. Smith's overall project seems to
be to tranquillise some of the apparent philosophical hysteria associated
with chaos theory as a "revolution" in scientific methodology and
explanation. Like quantum mechanics, chaos science seems to lead
otherwise sensible people to say some altogether unfounded things which
are at best poor extrapolations from facts and at worse downright
manipulations of them. I think something like Smith's overall overall
project is desperately needed, and hopefully his points will have a
purifying effect on philosophical discourse about chaos. But a couple of
his comments, in particular those on mathematical models with infinite
intricacy, on predictability, and on complexity (together with the
relationship between complexity and representation) might appear to
reduce to insignificance a number of the points we have made up to now.
We must now follow Smith on a somewhat lengthy digression into
philosophy of science in order to evaluate his analysis and the impact of
points he raises in these areas on our own discussion of the significance of
chaos theory for philosophy of mind.97
97 Some of what follows might smack of an extended personal debate with Smith, but
given that he has established himself as one of the leading authors in a very small pool of
philosophers writing on such topics, it is only natural that the directions he has taken may
bear significantly on our own project.
16.1 Chaos—Is it Really You?
Smith simplifies his discussion of chaotic systems as models of
reality with a clever but inadequate line of argument. We might sum it
up simply with the maxim that where there is no such thing as infinite
physical detail, there is no such thing as chaos.98 More precisely, he
observes that the kinds of macroscopic physical systems to which chaotic
models are typically applied are the kinds of systems which cannot truly
exhibit infinite intricacy. Thus, he suggests, the characteristic feature of
chaotic models (i.e., their infinite intricacy) cannot truly represent features
of the real physical systems being modelled. (Smith 1993, pp. 8-9)
Smith wonders: can such a mathematical model with infinite
intricacy really be a good model of a physical world in which there
apparently is no infinite intricacy? How can an infinite amount of excess
detail which is not borne out in the real world make for a good model?
He points out (1993, pp. 10-11) that we apply models rather than equations
to the real world and that what we are really after are models which are
isomorphic to the real world. The equations, he says, are really just a way
of specifying the model. If this is true, it seems to follow that whatever
simplicity we might discover in terms of the equations of a chaotic model
is of only minor importance in the face of such a disparity betw'een the
detail in the model and the detail in the world. And if there really isn't
any chaos in the real world, then it seems that everything we have
explored so far concerning chaotic dynamics in real neural networks may
be completely irrelevant.
16.1.1 Intricacy, Real and Abstract
There is only a little to say about the presence of infinite intricacy in
chaotic models. But Smith has two different concerns in mind about the
absence of such infinite intricacy in the real world. The first, which he
mentions only briefly, relates to quantum indeterminacy. The second
derives from the fact that the macroscopic objects of most systems to
which we would like to apply chaotic models are essentially abstractions
such as centre of mass or velocity of a fluid. Presently we will take a quick
98 Smith has objected in private communication that he is not denying the existence of
chaos but merely challenging us with the question, "how can we use chaotic models when
there is no true infinite intricacy in the world?"
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look at the first of Smith's concerns and a more detailed look at the
second. But first, as a brief aside, it is useful to make some observations
about infinite intricacy in models themselves and the fractal nature of the
strange attractors common to chaos theory.
In this area, Smith places far too much emphasis on fractals. The
three properties to which we've appealed to characterise chaotic systems
(and which define their own kind of infinite intricacy) often result in sets
of points with a fractal character which are invariant for the equations of
the mathematical model. But these fractal sets, or strange attractors, are
mathematical abstractions in phase space. It verges on incoherence even
to speak of fractals (or, as Smith has suggested privately, to speak of dense
sets of periodic points, etc.) as anything but mathematical abstractions.
Irrespective of loose wording from Benoit Mandelbrot or anyone else (see
Mandelbrot quoted by Smith, p. 18), we should not expect fractals to have
any real existence whatsoever. No one has ever seen a fractal, and no one
ever will. Infinitely intricate mathematical abstractions do not exist on
colourful computer screens, along coastlines, in EEG activity, or anywhere
else. Fractals cannot even be observed (only inferred) in mathematical
models in a finite amount of time. If anyone should ever approach you in
a dark side road and offer to sell you a fractal, don't buy it. What they are
selling is, at best, an approximation to a fractal which, if you could allow it
to develop for an infinite span of time, would be a fractal. (Note that
Smith follows this same line of reasoning with respect to the physical
world, yet he makes very little of the fact that mathematicians don't see
fractals either.)
But then, no one has ever seen a perfect ellipse either; they don't
exist in planetary orbits, in geometry texts, or anywhere else. No one has
ever seen the number e or the number k. We cannot conclude from the
lack of perfect ellipses that general relativity is wrong, and from the lack of
e and n running about, we cannot conclude that eiK - 1 = 0 is wrong, nor
can we conclude that somehow the circumference of a circle (if real circles
only existed!) isn't really exactly the circle's diameter multiplied by n. And
we certainly can't conclude from the absence of fractals in either the
mathematical or physical world that coupled nonlinear differential
equations don't perfectly describe the underlying mechanisms
determining the behaviour of some types of physical systems. We will
return to this kind of point more carefully again, but for now suffice to say
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that from here on, we will concern ourselves primarily with whether the
equations of a mathematical model can display the three characteristics
which define a chaotic system and not with whether the physical world
can display the impossible.
16.1.2 Intricacy at the Quantum Level
I said before that Smith was concerned with infinite intricacy both at
the quantum level and at the level of macroscopic abstractions such as
centres of mass and so on. We turn now to the first of these concerns. It is
not unusual for philosophers to throw about the indeterminacy of state
vector reduction as the catch-all fuzzy background for the whole world."
Almost anything might be precise, but as soon as we get to the quantum
level, we are lead to believe, everything gets smeared out and imprecise
and uncertain and fuzzy. For better or worse, this is only partly true. It is
true that the results of our measurements of quantum systems are
probabilistic in nature and that there is a fixed limit, quantified by Planck's
reduced constant, to the precision with which we can know the values of
two orthogonal observables. But while these features are undeniably part
of the quantum landscape, it is often overlooked that unitary evolution of
quantum systems in accordance with the Schrodinger equation is entirely
deterministic and precise.
The Schrodinger equation is a continuous real-valued
wavefunction, and while parameters of a system such as energy or charge
may be a quantum, or discrete, value, this does not preclude there being an
infinite class of, for instance, possible positions for a particle as described by
its wavefunction. Just because the outcome of a transition from unitary
evolution through state vector reduction is described probabilistically does
not in any way mean that there is not a certain kind of infinite amount of
possible detail at the quantum level courtesy of unitary evolution. Of
course I do not mean to say we can build fractals out of particles described
by wavefunctions, but quantum theory just does not pose any problem for
the kind of infinite detail characteristic of the defining properties of
chaotic systems, such as sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
While we cannot say that such and such an arrangement of physical
particles is a fractal, quantum mechanics in no way prevents us from
" This shouldn't be taken to imply that Smith is one of these philosophers! But since he
has introduced the topic, we will grind the axe for good measure anyway.
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saying that given any possible location in spacetime for a particle there is
an infinite class of other points in the neighbourhood of that location such
that if the particle were at one of those locations instead, it would follow a
phase trajectory which diverges from the one it follows from the given
location. (Note that this amounts to a sensitive dependence on initial
conditions relative to a manifold of particular position where the values
of orthogonal observables such as momentum could vary. This is a
problem with trying to apply phase space descriptions to the quantum
world, where we should properly be speaking terms of Hilbert space. The
inaccuracy of the phase space description does not compromise the general
point we are making, however.) It would appear that this will remain
true unless quantum mechanics should embrace a quantum picture of
spacetime itself.
16.1.3 Intricacy at the Classical Level
Let's turn now to the stickier question of infinite detail in
macroscopic abstractions such as centre of mass or fluid velocity. Smith
uses an example from celestial mechanics in which we are interested in
the motion of a planetary object in terms of its centre of mass. He correctly
observes that the actual centre of mass is a vague point because at any
given moment it is indeterminate what particles should be counted as part
of the planetary body. This brand of indeterminacy might be very small,
and we might rightly count it as irrelevant to the kinds of questions we
would want to ask about the planet's motion, but as long as there is any
vagueness at all, Smith is right in concluding that it cannot exhibit
behaviour which is infinitely intricate. Essentially, if we want to paint an
infinitely detailed picture we need an infinitesimal paintbrush, and unless
we can shrink the centre of mass to a precisely defined point our
paintbrush will always be too large.
The problem does not go away if we treat this kind of vagueness as a
problem of knowing the location of a point which really is there but which
we cannot locate. It is tempting just to say, for instance, well, this planet's
centre of mass is here, plus or minus a possible error of 5cm in all
directions. In that case we would be interested in tracing the time
evolution of the centre point of our area of uncertainty. Without
assuming any kind of hidden variables interpretation of quantum
mechanics, we could draw a rough analogy with the case for quantum
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indeterminacy. To use again the example property of sensitive
dependence on initial conditions, we might say that the centre of mass of a
planetary body was somewhere within this cloud of indeterminacy, and
wherever it might turn up for this particular observation, there is some
other place arbitrarily close to it where it might have turned up instead
and which would lead the planet along a diverging phase trajectory.
But this is inadequate for the reason that there just isn't in most
cases a well-defined centre of mass. It's not a problem of ignorance, of
there actually being a centre of mass which is just difficult to find. It is a
problem with the centre of mass abstraction itself: just as Smith observes,
at any particular moment it is just indeterminate which particles we
should or shouldn't include in calculating a body's centre of mass.
But how much can we make of this kind of vagueness? Smith
suggests that since we can't even decide where a centre of mass should be,
perhaps we have no business trying to explain such a point's behaviour
through a mathematical model which pins it down not just very precisely
but can pin it down with an infinitely intricate relationship between its
initial location and its location at some future moment of time. Isn't it a
bit like trying to track the evolution of a nation's GDP without being clear
on, for instance, what kinds of output should be included or whether we
should include industries from the nation's territories and protectorates?
I think there is something about applying infinitely intricate models to
vague abstractions which so far has escaped scrutiny.
16.2 Intricate ModelsWanted—ApplyWithin
Specifically, infinitely intricate models might still apply to any
appropriate—perhaps even arbitrary—sharpening (pace Dummett and
others) of vague abstractions such as centre of mass. In other words, we
might say that if there were a well-defined centre of mass precisely at such
and such a point, then that point would evolve through time to this other
location in phase space. This is akin to saying that if a hill of sand must
contain at least 4 million of grains of sand entirely within and not
touching the border of a 15 cm radius, then after such and such a wind has
blown on this hill of sand for a particular precise length of time the hill
will have blown away. In practice, our definition of "hill of sand" is even
more vague than our definition of centre of mass, but that doesn't mean it
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would be useless to have a mathematical model which let us know how
long it took for a hill of a given size to disappear under a given wind
condition.
For macroscopic objects on the scale in which we're interested, the
vagueness of abstractions such as centre of mass or hill of sand lies entirely
in the abstraction and not in the real world. If we want to calculate
something about the behaviour of such an abstraction with dynamical
models, we must give the model something real and precise to chew on.
When the model has digested the real input and given us back a
description of behaviour, we cannot say the output is useless just because
it was gotten from a sharpened real input which doesn't match our
normal vague use of the abstraction; we must simply apply our vague
abstraction again and recognise that the centre of mass or whatever is, as
we will use it, more blurry than the answer we've got. The model is like
the monster who chews up nails and spits out tacks, even if all we're
wanting to know about is bumpy blobs of unfinished steel. Essentially we
consider a vague quantity such as the location of a centre of mass, sharpen
it up and feed it to the mathematical model, and then keep in mind that
the output itself—like the real world—remains too sharp for our normal
use of the abstraction and must be blurred to bring it in line with what we
might actually observe. (Note that this is exactly analogous to our earlier
conclusion drawn from the thermodynamics of black holes that we are
applying continuous models to physical systems with only a finite number
of distinguishable access states. The point holds generally and is not
dependent in any way upon considerations peculiar to chaos.)
16.3 Ontological Significance of Models
The reason we must resort to such an inelegant interpretation of
mathematical models of things like centres of mass is that we really
shouldn't expect there to be any natural laws governing the behaviour of
quasi-classical centres of mass. We should expect there to be laws
governing gravity and the strong and electroweak forces which influence
all the particles that go into making a body with a centre of mass. But
looking for a natural law governing an abstraction like centre of mass for a
macroscopic object is like looking for a natural law governing the
behaviour of flying mallets. We might derive approximate models of
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flying mallet behaviour by appeal to fluid dynamics (which of course is
also concerned with abstractions), but mallets are as ill-defined as centres
of mass. To apply a precise model of mallet flight to the real world, we
would have to give the model a well-defined mallet, the likes of which we
would never observe in the real world, and interpret what the model had
to say about our abstract mallet according to the kinds of vague flying
mallets we might actually observe. That this is necessary isn't a fact which
should be blamed on the precision of our model, it should be blamed on
the messiness of our flying mallet abstraction.
16.3.1 Limited Precision and Realism
Now someone might object along the lines of Smith's approach that
even if we actually could use an infinitely intricate model to describe the
time evolution of vague abstractions just by appropriately sharpening
inputs and blurring outputs, there would'remain a whole class of models
without infinite intricacy which would offer at least as good or perhaps a
better isomorphism with what we observe in the real world and abstract
from it. That is, why should we bother with an infinitely detailed model
when we're just going to throw away all that detail when we actually apply
the model? Our answer here will be something that Smith has already
dismissed as of no great importance, but I believe his dismissal was too
quick.
We have noted already Smith's observation that models are what
really get applied to the world, that equations are merely a way of
specifying the model. But I suggest that what we are really after are the
equations which somehow really do govern the motion of dynamical
systems. If there are no equations really governing flying mallets as
abstractions, we want the equations governing sharpened mallets as well-
defined constructions of particles for which there are governing equations.
Some of this begins to sound like a comment on realism. Smith mentions
as an aside in several places that his view might be taken to imply some
brand of anti-realism, but he does not take up the issue fully. In order to
get a handle on whether apparently gratuitous infinite detail in chaotic
models makes them inferior models of the behaviour of vague
abstractions lacking infinite detail, we must briefly engage questions of
realism edge on.
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I propose that there are equations which precisely describe the
motion of at least some kinds of bodies in the world. Whether or not the
equations of quantum mechanics as it presently stands are a representative
sample of such, I believe that there is some body of equations more or less
like quantum mechanics which would precisely describe the dynamics of
some kinds of bodies (but not of ill-defined flying mallets or vague centres
of mass). This is little more than saying I believe the world operates
according to particular laws of Nature. So far this is not a particularly
stunning comment on the realism vs. anti-realism issue.
The implication of such a view is that there could be equations
governing the behaviour of at least some bodies which are in fact sets of
coupled nonlinear differential equations which can exhibit chaotic
behaviour. This is independent of whether we have ever actually
observed real systems governed by the equations exhibiting something
like sensitive dependence on initial conditions. (Indeed, it would be
impossible to observe sensitive dependence on initial conditions either in
the real world or in mathematical models since we would need to try
experiments over an infinite number of phase space points.) This is not as
strong a realist position as it might at first sound; there is nothing startling
about saying that even if all humans were born without any way of
directly observing light Maxwell's equations might still be true. Maxwell's
equations might still explain many things we could observe. In the same
vein, although we cannot observe something like sensitive dependence
on initial conditions, chaotic equations of motion might explain some of
the behaviour we do observe through vague abstractions such as centre of
mass.
This still does not answer the objection, however, that some other
non-chaotic equations might just as accurately for our purposes describe
the phenomena we are able to observe. But surely we are concerned not
just with whether two candidate models, perhaps with appropriate
sharpening or blurring or both, can each describe what we see. We are also
concerned with the simplicity of the explanations the two models offer.
Suppose for instance that someone offered a theory of planetary motion in
terms of superpositions of various geometric constructions which, while
highly complex, yielded a picture of planetary motion quite close to the
kinds of motion we could actually observe. Suppose that someone else
offered a simpler theory of planetary motion which didn't require such
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complex constructions but which yielded a picture of planetary behaviour
similarly in keeping with what we could actually observe. When
physicists finally finally gave up trying to make complex epicycles work, it
was both because they couldn't make the discrepancies with observed
planetary motion disappear and because of the vastly greater simplicity, or
parsimony, of the alternative. I would argue that even if there were no
conflicts with observed planetary motion, perhaps because astronomical
instruments weren't sufficiently capable, or perhaps even because there
was some limit in principle to what they could measure, we should still
count epicycles out in favour of simpler alternatives, whether Newton's
or Einstein's. Likewise, even if there are other models which describe, for
instance, the time evolution of a vague abstraction such as centre of mass,
without involving infinite intricacy and the attendant sharpening and
blurring, if these two models are in practice indistinguishable, we should
opt for the one with simpler equations.
The comment on realism then is simply this: that one set of
equations or natural laws is correct as applied to appropriately sharpened
abstractions100 and that we are then justified in applying standards such as
parsimony in choosing one model over another experimentally
indistinguishable model. And as far as I can see, the simplicity and
elegance of the equations of chaotic models is unlikely to be surpassed by
another model which gives up the power of deterministic coupled
nonlinear differential equations for the sake of avoiding infinite detail. If
anyone should produce a model of a physical system which does do this
job, then we would be well advised to opt for it over a chaotic alternative.
Shortly we will discuss the suitability of (often computationally simpler)
stochastic models for applications where we are not interested so much in
what actual equations govern physical systems but only want a model
which displays behaviour similar to that of the real physical system. But
first we visit again the recurring theme of description levels.
16.3.2 Limited Precision and Levels of Description
All this so far is well and good, but there still is one more twist in
the story of intricacy in models of vague abstractions such as centre of
mass. Recall our earlier discussions about tracing time evolution of
100 And with a cosmologist's bent, I mean here noise free abstractions; we return to this
question near the end of this chapter and again in Chapter 18.
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neural networks at different levels of description. There we noted that
dynamical behaviour is underdetermined at the co and levels, despite
quasi-classical deterministic X dynamics. The rationale behind this point
was that several points distinct in X space might be included in the same
point in co or \\r space and that these points might lie on phase trajectories
which diverge not only in X space but also in co or space. There is a
problem analogous to applying mathematical models of limited intricacy
to abstractions like centre of mass. The problem can be understood either
as a difficulty with using deterministic mathematical constructions to
model physical phenomena described at a level that might be
underdetermined or as a difficulty with unduly reducing the
dimensionality of the model system to below that of the real system being
modelled.
Returning to the example of centre of mass as it relates to the first
way of understanding the problem, we can note that an infinite number of
possible distinct physical arrangements (not all of which will be physically
distinguishable) yield the same centre of mass for a macroscopic object of a
given approximate mass, shape, and density. Thus, if it should happen
that any characteristics of the actual position/momentum distributions of
the particles in the macroscopic body (beyond the rough information
given by the centre of mass) are ever relevant to that body's dynamics as
understood through the centre of mass abstraction, then any model which
doesn't track these characteristics will be inherently subject to error.
Indeed, if the actual equations governing the dynamics of the particles in
the macroscopic body (whether we know these equations or not) are
chaotic, these errors may ultimately become quite large. Thus even if we
cannot in practice observe fine details of the structure of a macroscopic
body, a mathematical model which lacks the (in practice, unobservable)
intricacy of the real physical system may not describe the behaviour of
what can be observed precisely enough to be useful. Without exploiting
the fine details of a system at a level of description belozu the level of what
we are actually wanting to describe, a model may not be able to account for
what would otherwise appear to be indeterminacy at the higher level of
description. This is just another version of the earlier observation that
there is unlikely to be a deterministic description of level dynamics
which works solely with \\r level information.
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Another aspect of this kind of problem arises from the (often
necessary) reduction in dimensionality as we move from the real world
system to its model. When we model a system involving an abstraction
such as wind velocity or air pressure, we are in effect reducing the
dimensionality of the model by counting the abstraction as one single
variable rather than as a composite of variables each describing aspects of
individual gas particles. Rather than causing a problem with our long
term qualitative description of the behaviour of the abstraction (the air
pressure or whatever) as in the above, this way of reducing dimensionality
does mean that we can no longer legitimately maintain the uniqueness of
phase trajectories of bodies moving in the gas. Essentially, we are
projecting higher dimensional dynamics onto a manifold of lower
dimension. This may be entirely appropriate when we really don't care
about the system's dynamics in all those higher dimensions (such as all
the motions of the individual particles of gas as opposed to the simple
abstraction of wind velocity or some such). But this also means that phase
trajectories unique in the higher dimensional space may actually cross in
the lower dimensional projection. Thus, even dynamics tracked at an
intricately detailed low level may still be nondeterministic at that level.
The system as plotted in the phase space of the dimensionality in which
we are interested might pass through the same point over and over again
while never passing through the same point in a higher dimension.
Thus, in the lower dimension, the system may eventually cease passing
through the same point and move into some other regimen, while
remaining entirely deterministic.
The usual way of coping with this observation is to say that the
system being modelled is subject to environmental noise. When the
dynamical influence of the higher dimensions is relatively unsystematic,
it is easy enough just to add it in as noise, and the behaviour of the model
will be qualitatively similar to that of the real system. But this is
essentially a clever fix for overcoming the basic problem with the model:
that it is does not pay enough attention to the intricate detail of the real
world. This is not to say it isn't a wise thing to do! Tracking the intricate
detail of a system in millions of dimensions is practically impossible and a
waste of resources if we can get the same results by injecting a little noise.
But what we are doing is just making up for the vagueness of our
abstraction (wind velocity, air pressure, or whatever) by adding back in an
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influence that we have established empirically to be rather unstructured
and statistically uniform. (We will return to this point in more detail in
the chapter on complexity.)
16.3.3 Ontological Significance in Practice and Theory
This brings us to the final point about modelling vague abstractions
or high level features with intricately detailed chaotic models. In those
cases where the influence of very low level dynamics on higher level
abstractions is unstructured and uniform, it would seem we are perfectly
justified in using what may be computationally simpler stochastic models
for certain applications. For practical purposes, stochastic models may be
computationally less intensive than highly detailed chaotic counterparts,
and they may display nearly identical qualitative behaviour at the levels of
description in which we are most interested. But in terms of
understanding how the physical systems really work, as in the above
discussion of realism versus anti-realism, the chaotic models are
preferable because they are deterministic. Indeed, there is a strong case for
the idea that all physical behaviour which can be interpreted as stochastic,
perhaps with the exception of probabilistic state vector reduction, is really,
at a lower level of description, deterministic chaos. A full exploration of
such an ontological position is unfortunately beyond our scope for now.
But before we finish with this topic, it is useful to notice that many
of the chaotic models we actually use are not really models of the kinds of
systems we actually observe in the world. As Smith notes in several
places, real observable systems are always subject to environmental noise.
But the equations for chaotic models we actually use often have no terms
for this noise. Our equations specify models of what we might observe if
there were no noise. That there are no real systems where noise is entirely
absent—save the entire cosmos—is not a criticism of these models,
because a correct model may perfectly well describe "what makes a system
go" independently of external noise. A model of what makes a car go may
describe perfectly well an engine and a transmission and a drive train and
so on, but it may ignore entirely the fact that no real cars ever go precisely
as the model predicts, because there is always air turbulence and road
irregularity and so on. But these latter aren't what makes the car go! And
it is no criticism of a model which ignores air turbulence and road
irregularities that it doesn't perfectly match the behaviour of observed
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cars, even if some other very complex and perhaps stochastic model could
account for the air turbulence and road irregularities and their influence
on observed reality. Moreover, few have ever called into question the
explanatory power of Newtonian mechanics or General Relativity or
quantum theory just because none of their equations include terms for
environmental noise!
Likewise, if we are interested in ontological questions about what
makes things go, instead of just good engineering sense when it comes to
making good predictions about the world, Smith's objections about a lack
of infinitely intricate behaviour are irrelevant. To put it succinctly, Smith
suggests that if an infinitely detailed model yields, for instance, fractal
structures in phase space, but there are no fractal structures in nature, then
the model cannot be an accurate description of reality. But a model's
inability to account for the influence of countless tiny perturbations
external to its domain of explanation just isn't a criticism of that model's
description of reality. And it is no more a criticism of chaotic sets of
equations that they have fractal invariant sets when no such fractals are
ever observed than it is a criticism of an equation yielding the RPM of an
engine at a certain throttle setting that no car running down the road ever
has it's engine running steadily at that RPM for the given throttle setting.
16.4 Models Through the Intricate Haze
We have addressed, then, Smith's concerns that chaotic models are
not suited to the kinds of systems to which they are typically applied. We
have noted the inappropriateness of paying too much attention to the
infinite intricacy of fractal attractors rather than the kind of intricate
intricacy we see in the three defining characteristics of chaotic systems, and
we have discussed the sense in which for understanding how systems
"really" work, chaotic models may well be the best candidates. Smith had
challenged that perhaps where there was no infinite intricacy, there was
no chaos. But hopefully the situation is somewhat clearer now and we
can see that chaos is alive and well and living in the real physical world.
Now we must move on to a discussion of Smith's comments on
predictability as it relates to reality and chaotic models and see if they have
any more significance for our purposes than his points on infinite
intricacy.
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It may not be necessary for a model of a chaotic system such as a
particular neural network to be completely predictable in order to exhibit
the kind of useful behaviour of interest to the cognitive scientist. Indeed,
it may be only necessary that it display qualitatively similar behaviour.
After all, there are no perfect simulations of particular human brains, but
there are plenty of human brains out there with behaviour which is
qualitatively similar to each other and which have properties of use to the
cognitive scientist. But the question remains whether chaotic systems
have any particular properties relative to predictability which may be
relevant to simulations of systems like complex neural networks. In what
follows we will discuss the ways in which chaotic systems are unique and
demand special considerations for computer modelling. In particular, the
low level chaotic behaviour of some neural networks might require very
detailed low level simulation in order to extract behaviour which is
sufficiently similar to biological reality, and it might suggest a way in
which characteristics of subjective experience in the self model may be




Broadly speaking, Smith's aim in discussing predictability is to pin
down the sense in which he can say that chaotic systems are just as
predictable as any other kind of system and not worthy of any special
attention in this area. This is contrary to what seems to be the prevailing
notion among philosophers that chaotic systems are altogether
unpredictable and are unique among quasi-classical systems in so being. If
Smith is correct, then chaotic features of the instantiating substrate of self
models are unworthy of special attention in terms of predictability.
17.1 Quantifying Predictability
17.1.1 Epistemic Determinism
Smith begins by quantifying the notion of "predictability in
principle", or "epistemic determinism" with the requirement [PI] (Smith
1993, p. 32):
[PI] (V8)(Vt)(3e)(the state after interval t can be fixed within 5 by
fixing the initial state within e)
But [PI] is trivially satisfied by all physically deterministic systems, chaotic
or otherwise: given any 8 and any t whatever, e = 0 satisfies [PI]. Since we
are talking about deterministic chaos anyway, [PI] is entirely superfluous.
Probably Smith had in mind something like [PI1]101:
[PI'] (V8 > 0)(Vf)(3e > 0)(the state after interval t can be fixed
within 8 by fixing the initial state within e)
This formulation captures Smith's notion of "epistemic determinism" in
a way that [PI] does not because determinism straightforwardly entails [PI]
whereas it is at least less obvious whether it entails [PI1]. Smith seems to
intend [PI'] as just a comment on the relative stability of infinitesimally
Indeed, Smith has noted in later private communication that he was just simplifying
the formulation by assuming 5 > 0 and e > 0.
separated trajectories as quantified by the Lyapunov exponent A. (which is
positive for typical trajectories of chaotic systems), where for typical
trajectories divergence is proportional to ^e^t. In a moment we shall see
that [PI1] is ambiguous and doesn't quite capture what we're after.
But first we can immediately observe one important point about
applying [PI'] to real physical systems as opposed to mathematical models.
The kind of "epistemic determinism" Smith has in mind with [PP] (or his
original [PI] perhaps) generally applies only to mathematical models and
not to the real world. While there are plenty of cases where [PP] holds for
a mathematical model, in (almost?) none of these cases does it hold for the
real physical system being modelled. The reason is very straightforward.
Given quantum mechanical bounds on measurement, we can never fix a
system's initial state finely enough to satisfy the (V5 > 0) quantification.
Indeed, an infinitesimal 5 here doesn't make sense beyond the scale of
Planck's constant, but even when it is safely within that scale, given the
exponential phase trajectory divergence common to chaotic systems, it
certainly does not follow that the e required to meet [PI'] will also be
quantum mechanically plausible. Thus, even if we fix up [PI'] to take care
of quantum mechanical uncertainty on the final state end, it remains false
for physical systems whenever an impossibly precise e is required. This is
all entirely compatible with saying the mathematical model of the system
meets [PP]. In order to formulate a criterion for predictability in principle
as it relates to real physical systems, we might apply another fix to the [PI]
series to make sure of quantum mechanical sense on both the initial and
final ends of the matter. But I suggest that we keep with the same style for
describing predictability and just keep in mind that real physical systems
typically won't meet our requirements. There remains a minor
refinement to be made to [PI'] which will change our characterisation of
predictability to a form very similar to the Shadowing Theorem.
The wording of [PP] or a derivative fixed to account for problems of
quantum measurement does not allow us to distinguish different
behaviour of systems in the vicinity of different points. In particular, our
notion of "epistemic determinism" or "predictability in principle" should
allow us to distinguish the sense in which predictability is limited in the
vicinity of a what is called a singularity. (Note that in an earlier IPPE-
distributed draft of a document including this chapter, I referred to
predictability in the vicinity of critical points—a class of points of which
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singularities are a special case—and after describing the example below
suggested that they were common to chaotic systems. In this my
discussion was entirely incorrect, and I am grateful to Peter Smith for
clarifying my thinking on this point. While singularities certainly may
exist in chaotic systems, they are not typical of such systems,102 and
Smith's original text was altogether correct in stating that something like
both [PI'] and the following [P*] are met by typical chaotic systems.)
Consider a simple sensitively dependent but nonchaotic system
consisting of a sphere of uniform density placed atop a cone, with a
gravitational attraction at the open end of the cone and in line with its
axis. If we follow for the moment a simple model of the system with no
rolling resistance and a perfectly smooth sphere and cone, and we say the
sphere will just come to a stop when it has rolled down the side of the
cone and hit some perfectly smooth and energy absorbent plane at the base
of the cone, it is easy enough to read off the sphere's final position just by
noting the angle 0 of the sphere's initial "north pole" in polar coordinates.
In it's final position, the sphere will rest tangent both to the cone and to
the plane, with its centre at the same 0. (With information about the
initial b as well, we could express the final position in terms of where that
initial north pole has gone, but the extra detail is irrelevant for the present
discussion.)
In this simple system, the initial condition corresponding to values
of zero for 0 and (j) is called a singularity. If we operate with [PI'] as our
description of what it means to be "predictable in principle", we can
comment only on the overall behaviour of the system, completely
missing out anything special about the singularity. It would be useful to
be able to say something about the predictability of the system with respect
to particular neighbourhoods. To do this, we must be able to speak about
fixing errors around particular initial conditions rather than just about
fixing errors in general. Smith already had this kind of description to
hand in his earlier discussion of what is commonly called the Shadowing
Theorem, but [PI'] doesn't capture all the subtlety of that discussion. [P*],
which for our purposes can be thought of as a derivative of the Shadowing
Theorem, does the trick:
102 Lipschitz condition satisfaction and continuity of the equations describing a system—
properties shared by the bulk of chaotic systems—guarantee no singularities.
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[P*] (V8 > 0)(Vf)(Vxo)(3e > 0)(Vyo)( if I xo — yo' < e, then after
interval t, I xt - yt I < 8)
Here we can see that [P*] fails specifically when xo = the singularity and 5
corresponds to a difference in position smaller than half the circumference
of the circle formed where the cone meets the plane (assuming the length
of the path from the point of the cone to this circle is less than this
amount). The reason is that, given xo = the singularity, any e whatsoever
includes yo points with 9 angles separated by exactly n radians, and these
initial conditions correspond to final states on opposite sides of the cone.
Note that on a strict interpretation (presuming universal quantification
over all possible initial states) [PP] is false for this simple system and for
any system with one or more singularities; such systems do not possess
this sort of "epistemic determinism". We could save the idea by
interpreting [PL] more loosely but at the cost of ignoring singularities. [P*]
remedies the shortcoming by incorporating the xo which reveals which
particular neighbourhoods are home to trajectories which are "predictable
in principle". Like a strictly interpreted [PP], [P*] is false for any systems
with singularities, but we at least have a way of specifying the set of xo for
which it fails.
There are a number of things we might notice about predictability
in the neighbourhood of singularities. Most importantly, we are not
claiming that behaviour in the neighbourhood of critical points is
nondeterministic (the systems can still meet Smith's original [PI]), nor are
we claiming that predictive errors in the vicinity of such points are
somehow unbounded. It's just that with respect to the space of possible
ending states of systems like the sphere on the cone, the predictive error
can be very large (in this case, the whole space). This is strictly compatible
with more relatively stable (as quantified by the Lyapunov exponent)
typical trajectories.103
17.1.2 Qualitative Predictability
Let's return for now to the question about magnitude of predictive
error. For some systems, we are interested to know a system's "final state"
103 In private discussions, Smith has suggested that when the set of critical points in a
given system has measure zero, we are justified in throwing out that set because a randomly
chosen point in the phase space of the system has probability zero of landing on a member
of the set. But since the phase space volume of relevant neighbourhoods around such points
may not have measure zero, I believe this is unjustified.
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only in terms of what basin of attraction the system has entered. Large
errors in predicting the exact future state of a system do not concern us,
because we are curious to know just whether the trajectory is one of a set
which will asymptotically approach an attractor in a particular area of
phase space and exhibit behaviour qualitatively similar to that of other
trajectories in the same area. Also, we might not be concerned with
deciding whether a system actually will be within a certain distance of a
given attractor; once it is in the basin of an attractor, then we know it will
tend towards the attractor, however quickly or slowly, and this may be
enough for our predictive needs. We might call a system for which
predictions of this kind are possible "qualitatively predictable", in the
sense of [Q], where B represents a basin of attraction:
[Q] (VB)(Vx £ boundary of B)(3e > 0)(Vy)(if ((I x - y I < e) & (x e
B)) then ye B)
Note that [Q] misleadingly appears to be a weaker description of
predictability than [P*]: in any neighbourhoods where a system satisfies
[P*], it looks like it must also satisfy [Q]. [P*] gives us, for any desired
predictive accuracy over any time interval, a required initial measurement
accuracy. [Q] seems to require, essentially, that for every point x not on a
basin boundary there is always a measurement accuracy fine enough that
we can be sure the neighbourhood within 5 (from [P*]) of x doesn't overlap
a basin boundary. Since the distance from any point not on a boundary to
the nearest boundary is trivially positive, it seems [P*] can provide any e
we require to satisfy [Q]. Momentarily we will examine a system which
illustrates how this line of reasoning is flawed.
It is clear, of course, that the converse relationship does not hold: a
system's meeting [Q] in particular neighbourhoods does not imply its
meeting [P*] in those same neighbourhoods; for a simple example where
one is met but not the other, consider any system which has a singularity
in an attractor basin (admittedly, this is odd, but it's certainly not
impossible!). In such a system [P*] might fail in the vicinity of the critical
points; yet trajectories in the same neighbourhood could never leave the
basin and end up in a different one, and [Q] would be satisfied.
Now if a given initial condition, an x from [Q], lies far from the
boundary of a basin of attraction, then the "final state" of the system can be
predicted with certainty as long as our measurement error e is smaller
than the distance from x to the basin boundary. Even if x is close to an
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ordinary (nonfractal) basin boundary (or, alternatively, if e is larger), such
that some of the points within a particular e of x are actually in a different
basin of attraction, this proportion of initial conditions with uncertain
outcomes generally scales linearly with e. In terms of extrapolating this
property from mathematical models to systems in the real world,
incidentally, it is worth noting that [Q] can no more be true of physical
systems in general than can [PI'] and [P*]. (This is because we can choose
an x close enough to a basin boundary that quantum uncertainty prevents
us shrinking e small enough that it doesn't overlap the boundary.) Where
a model's qualitative predictability in the style of [Q] becomes most
interesting is in the neighbourhood of a fractal basin boundary.
17.2 Qualitative Unpredictability with Epistemic Determinism
In this case, the proportion of uncertain initial conditions within e
of x scales nonlinearly with e, in a way that is usually related to the
Hausdorff-Besicovitch dimension of the basin boundary. In a correlate of
Smith's observation that chaotic systems demand exponentially more
accurate initial measurements as the desired time interval for prediction is
increased, initial measurement accuracy requirements for prediction of
final state in terms of attractor basins can also be highly nonlinear.
Grebogi and colleagues (1987), for instance, describe a model of a kicked
double rotor where decreasing the initial error e by a factor of 1010 yields a
decrease in the proportion of uncertain trajectories within e of x of only a
factor of 10. But even with such high costs in initial data, such a system
remains qualitatively predictable in the sense of [Q].
17.2.1 Riddled Basins
Recently, however, John C. Sommerer and Edward Ott (1993) have
described a chaotic model for which [Q] fails but for which, curiously, [P*]
does not. In the Sommerer and Ott system, we are faced not just with a
highly nonlinear relationship between e and the proportion of uncertain
points. The "final state" of their system in terms of attractor basins is
uncertain for every e > 0; moreover, this property holds not just on a
limited fractal basin boundary (of the sort described by Smith pp. 32-33;
more on this presently), but over the entire phase space volume of the
system's two basins of attraction.
224
These basins of attraction are called riddled; an attractor basin B is
riddled if it satisfies the following [R]:
[R] (Vx e B)(Ve > 0)(3y)(( I x - y I < e) & (y e B))
In other words, a basin is riddled if, for any initial state x in the attractor's
basin, the set of points within any arbitrarily small distance e > 0 of x but
not in the same basin as x has positive volume in phase space. The
Sommerer and Ott model is the first example of a physical system (as
opposed to just a mathematical mapping, as in Alexander, et al 1992)
which possesses riddled attractors. The model describes a particle moving
in the x-y plane with an acceleration given by the sum of three forces: the
gradient of a symmetric scalar potential, linear friction opposite to the
particle's direction of movement, and a periodic external force in the x-
direction. They reduced the dimensionality of the system through a
function that returns mappings of points on a Poincare section at times in
phase with the periodic external force.
The four-dimensional phase space of this simplified system
possesses an invariant plane (along y = vy - 0) with a strange attractor.
Within this invariant subspace, one Lyapunov exponent of typical
trajectories is negative while the other is positive, thus indicating chaotic
dynamics on the attractor, and normal to the invariant subspace both
Lyapunov exponents are negative for typical trajectories. This implies that
a set of points not in the invariant subspace, with nonzero phase space
volume, is attracted to the chaotic attractor, but, as the authors point out,
this does not rule out a dense set of atypical orbits on the attractor having a
positive normal Lyapunov exponent. This latter condition allows for
initial conditions arbitrarily near the invariant subspace to be repelled
from it. These points may eventually find themselves in one of two
repelling regions of the scalar potential and go to positive or negative
infinity in y and vy, the y velocity component. Thus there is a second
''attractor" at along these two dimensions. Sommerer and Ott's work is
the first known model of a physical system with the three conditions
shown by Alexander and colleagues to imply riddled basins of attraction:
an invariant manifold in phase space with a strange attractor, negative
Lyapunov exponents normal to typical orbits in the attractor, and a
positive volume of initial conditions in any region of phase space attracted
to a different attractor.
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Although this is the first model of a physical system with riddled
attractor basins to be studied, and while such systems are of course only a
subset of all chaotic physical systems, Sommerer and Ott indicate that the
conditions for such systems are "by no means so restrictive that riddled
basins can be considered unnatural". (Sommerer and Ott 1993, p. 140)
Indeed, apart from the symmetry of the scalar potential, the equations of
the system are unremarkable, and the system's riddled basins are a highly
robust feature which do not disappear under a wide range of changes in
control parameters. It seems unlikely that such systems will be rare in
nature.
17.2.2 Riddled Basins and Qualitative Predictability
For our present discussion, the first immediately salient point about
such systems is that riddled attractor basins are strictly incompatible with
[Q]. This is straightforward: when [R] is true, there will be a y in a
different basin of attraction to x for every e > 0. Yet [Q] would require some
e > 0 which guaranteed that every y within e of x was in the same basin of
attraction. It appeared originally that satisfaction of [P*] implied
satisfaction of [Q], and so we might infer that systems with riddled basins
fail [P*] as well. Yet while such systems are not "qualitatively predictable",
they do remain "epistemically deterministic" as we have defined the
terms. The line of reasoning which suggested that [P*] implied [Q] was
flawed in that it assumed there was some distance from the xo trajectory to
the nearest basin boundary; but in the case of riddled basins there are
"holes" leading to other attractors in all neighbourhoods, and [P*] cannot
provide a 5 to satisfy [Q] for a given x. There is no indication that
Sommerer and Ott's system could somehow circumvent the Shadowing
Theorem; thus we can only assume that along with a broad class of
coupled nonlinear differential equations it does satisfy [P*].
Of course riddled basin systems are also still deterministic in the
original [PI] sense: if the initial condition is known precisely, then the
system's exact final state can, in principle, be calculated without error for
any future time. But if there is any imprecision whatsoever in our
knowledge of the initial condition, we retain the ability to predict the
system's future state within § for any chosen amount of time, but we lose
the ability to know the system's ultimate behaviour in terms of attractor
basins.
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Thus, paradoxically, we can shadow the centre point of a
neighbourhood to within an arbitrarily small distance, but we cannot
comment on the destiny of other trajectories within that neighbourhood
except up to the point in time to which we have already calculated.
Essentially, we can keep trajectories within a certain area, but we cannot
say where they are going! The best we could do would be to choose each of
the points in the neighbourhood in turn and calculate their trajectories,
one by one. Even if in principle we could calculate the destiny of any
single point in phase space—a dubious proposition in itself, to which we
will turn presently—we still could not infer anything about the long term
destiny of points lying arbitrarily near it. Within the distance 8 of where
we might know a particular point x will map after a given amount of
time, there is qualitative variance in trajectories in that a positive volume
of points within e of x will diverge from it sufficiently to go to a different
attractor than x itself.
17.2.3 Riddles and Convolutions
Now, here's a curious fact about this kind of system which
differentiates it from the example of the desktop toy suspended above
three magnets which Smith discusses. (1993, pp. 32-33) In the pendulum
example, there are convoluted boundaries between the basins of attraction
such that a set of initial points near the boundary of attraction to one
magnet is dense in sets of points near the boundaries of attraction to the
other two and similarly for the sets of points attracted to each of the three
magnets. Smith notes that "since the approach to the attractor is
asymptotic, the "final" position of the pendulum must mean its position
in the limit as time goes to infinity" (p. 33). That's fair enough, but
(recalling that this is a dissipative system) if we observe any arbitrary
nonperiodic trajectory there will be for it some time after which we can be
sure the pendulum isn't going to leap over to some other magnet.104 This
is different, of course, to saying that there is some time which will do for
all possible trajectories (which is like saying there is some largest integer).
104 Thjs js uniess we had a model in which the magnets are so powerful that asymptotic
motion within all e > 0 of an attractor may still be "disturbed" and pulled toward another,
but in the typical example there is some area in which the attractor basin is no longer
convoluted (or, alternatively, "locally riddled"), and once a nonperiodic trajectory enters
that area—which it must do eventually—we can be sure of where it is going.
227
But in the case of riddled attractors, we may observe any arbitrary
trajectory for as long as we want, but unless that trajectory begins life on
the invariant plane or in the repellent area of the scalar potential, (unlike
the pendulum example) unless and until it enters the repellent area, we
can never be sure where it is actually going. In the pendulum example,
there is a region of phase space like a "safe house", such that once a
trajectory gets there, we know it will definitely go to the attractor point at
infinity. But in a riddled basin, we might never know if a trajectory is safe;
it may still get sucked right back towards the other attractor. (Sommerer
and Ott's work is the first model of a physical system which exhibits this
feature.) This curious fact is important to the following section.
17.3 Riddled Basins and Computability Revisited
Recall that qualitative variance of trajectories within a small
neighbourhood of a given point on a computable trajectory is exactly what
we indicated earlier, on a priori grounds, should be possible for a class of
analogue chaotic systems. We have observed already that due to problems
of quantum measurement, our criterion for qualitative predictability is
not met by actual physical systems which are chaotic. But we now have to
hand an example of a mathematical model which also fails to meet the
criterion. To find unpredictability in the physical world was one thing, but
to find it in the mathematical world is another.105 We have encountered
a mathematical model governed by computable functions which displays
an aspect of noncomputable behaviour.
It is specifically the continuous nature of the equations of motion
Sommerer and Ott have exploited which yields exactly the kind of
situation I earlier argued was possible, in which computable equations do
not guarantee that all aspects of a system's behaviour are computable. We
cannot actually know with certainty the destination of any point not on
the invariant plane or in the repellent area of the scalar potential, but
supposing we chose some distances which would do for "close enough" to
the attractors, with only a denumerably infinite class of computable phase
trajectories passing through points within a given e of xo at a particular
105 On a related side note, see Chaitin (1994) for an example of a beautifully
noncomputable number which emerges from basic algebra as well as for insightful comments
on the "decline and fall" of reductionism in mathematics in the face of mathematical
truths which are "true for no reason at all".
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time, we could computably set about the task of calculating each of their
ultimate destination in terms of (satisfactory proximity to an) attractor
basin. But doing so still gives us absolutely no information about the
uncountably infinite class of noncomputable phase trajectories passing
through the same space in an analogue system. For all we could know,
the "real" destination map of an analogue system with riddled attractors
might spell out "© God, All Rights Reserved!" in noncomputable points
in one attractor basin against a background of noncomputable points in
another basin!
Indeed, as I noted above, we cannot even be sure of the qualitative
accuracy of the destination maps Sommerer and Ott include in their
article. Regardless of the host of problems associated with the roundoff
error in calculating the trajectories of points Sommerer and Ott chose,
while we can be certain that those points which definitely arrive in the
repellent area of the scalar potential will be pushed to infinity, we cannot
be sure that any other points even arbitrarily close to the invariant plane
will ultimately be attracted to it.106 Sommerer and Ott note this as the
possibility of "arbitrarily long transients" but fail to note its implication for
the qualitative accuracy of their destination maps. It is tempting to think
that the Shadowing Theorem guarantees that calculating the computable
trajectories would give all the information we needed and that no
trajectories in the neighbourhood would behave significantly differently,
but we have already noted that truth of [P*] with respect to a given
neighbourhood does not imply that [Q] is also true in that neighbourhood.
Of course the complexity of the Sommerer and Ott system is bad
enough without even considering questions about analogue systems: the
dynamics of the system as run on a digital computer are highly complex as
well! The specifics of the system's behaviour can be reproduced only by
digital computers with identical architectures and numerical evaluation
algorithms. The authors note that their calculated destination maps of
points in the Poincare sections they studied differed in fine detail (but not
in general riddled character) when they used different computers with
different round-off algorithms and precision. This just reinforces the
Sommerer and Ott colour points within a very short distance of the invariant plane
(I y I < 10"8, I Vy I < 10~9, y»v < 0) as if they ultimately went to the plane (p. 140), but unlike
systems without riddled attractors, we still cannot be sure!
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point that the details of behaviour for such a digitally simulated system
would likely be vastly different than for any similar analogue system.
Although I did not have the [P*] and [Q] formulation to hand or
even any knowledge of Sommerer and Ott's research when I originally
outlined the earlier arguments about computability of chaotic analogue
systems, the new system suggests a way of quantifying one route to
noncomputable behaviour in terms of [P*] and [Q]. Simply, it would
appear that any analogue chaotic system described by computable
functions and which fails [Q] but still meets [P*] will display the kind of
noncomputable behaviour we have discussed. (In complete fairness,
however, the problems about noncomputable behaviour in the Sommerer
and Ott system come largely for free as a result of the model's deep
complexity and are not dependent on the train of logic I outlined in the
original section on computability and chaotic analogue systems.) This is
not to say there might not be other ways to get to similarly interesting
behaviour, and the earlier arguments hint at what some of these might be;
but this certainly appears to be one route to noncomputable system
behaviour in the face of computable governing functions.
17.4 Prediction, After the Facts
We have explored Smith's analysis of predictability in chaotic
systems and seen some of the ways in which they do remain different than
nonchaotic deterministic systems in general. Although the systems with
[R] style basins of attraction, for which [Q] fails while [P*] remains true for
typical trajectories, are the most striking examples of properties unique to
chaotic systems, we have also noted how [P*] may fail in the vicinity of
some points and what impact this has on the systems' predictability. The
unique properties of chaotic systems are such that they cannot be quickly
dismissed as irrelevant to cognitive modelling just because chaotic
systems are in general "predictable in principle" like other deterministic
systems. These unique properties may have functionally relevant roles in
real intelligent systems which will not be served by any but the most
detailed simulations of extremely fine physical details of neural networks
present at or below the level of individual neurons.





We turn now to Smith's last comment on chaotic models which is
significant for our own project. The issue this time is in what sense, if
any, chaotic behaviour can be categorised as random. A central question is
whether the apparently chaotic behaviour we observe in the real world is
qualitatively the same as the chaotic behaviour we observe in
mathematical models. In the mathematical models, Smith suggests,
detailed chaotic behaviour might be viewed as the result of the equations'
nonlinearity magnifying the fine details of the expansions of real numbers
used to specify a system's initial conditions. In the real world, Smith
observes, chaotic behaviour might be viewed as at least partially the result
of the continual influence of environmental noise. We noted above, in
the discussion about describing the behaviour of physical systems with
mathematical models of lower dimensions, that injecting noise is a
common and often indispensable tool for bringing the model's behaviour
in line with what is observed in the physical world. But if it is more than
a tool, if apparent chaos in the real world is qualitatively as random as
noise (whether it really originates just from noise, just from chaos, or
from some combination of the two), then almost all philosophical
questions we might ask about the importance of chaos qua chaos dwindle
to irrelevance. Now we must examine more closely the rationale behind
equating the "randomness" of low level chaos with that of noise. The first
issue is how we may quantify complexity in order to compare chaos and
noise, and it is to that which we next turn our attention.
18.1 Defining Complexity
18.1. KCS and Shifty Business
Smith begins his exploration of the issue with an appeal to the
Kolmogorov/Chaitin/Solomonov, or KCS, definition of algorithmic
complexity. Algorithmic complexity, also known as algorithmic
information content, algorithmic randomness, or algorithmic entropy, can
be usefully applied to physical entities, rather than just bit strings as we
will use it here. It is the length, in bits, of the most concise description
(usually, the shortest program for a Universal Turing Machine or
Bernoulli-Turing Machine107) of the physical entity or bit string for a
given level of accuracy. This measure of complexity can easily be applied
to bit strings by evaluating the question of whether the string can be
compressed in such a way that the compressed bit string together with its
required decompression procedure can be specified significantly more
succinctly than the original string. That is, the complexity of the
compression algorithm is irrelevant; we are concerned only with whether
it is possible to compress the string in such a way that it can still be
decompressed by a concisely specified algorithm.
Smith notes that in general the question of whether an arbitrary
string is KCS random is undecidable. If we do know a way of compressing
a string appropriately, we can say the string is not random, but if we don't
know how to compress a string we can never say the string is random
because there might still be some as yet undiscovered algorithm which
could perform the feat. The observation is closely related to Godel
undecidability and to our previous discussion of computability.
We are interested in applying algorithmic complexity to binary
codings of the behaviour of chaotic systems. Smith's example is an
enormous simplification of the Lorenz model interpreted as a shift map
over a bit string describing to which wing of the Lorenz attractor a given
point will map at stroboscopically sampled times. (Note, incidentally, that
this model ignores features of the real Lorenz system and is just the sort of
dimension-reducing projection of complex dynamics onto a manifold
which we criticised in the context of infinite intricacy.) That is, we start off
the Lorenz model at a given point on the Lorenz attractor (for our
purposes, we can read "on" as "arbitrarily near") and then measure it at
periodic times to note the wing of the attractor to which the point has
moved. This generates a binary expansion describing the gross behaviour
of the trajectory on which the point lies, and we can apply the KCS
measure of randomness to this binary expansion. Notice that the kind of
107 A Bernoulli-Turing Machine is a Universal Turing Machine augmented with a random
number generator.
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"model of the model" which Smith has offered is deliberately designed to
be a very simple model indeed. In the context where Smith uses this
picture, the dynamics of the real Lorenz model become almost entirely
irrelevant, since the binary specification of an initial condition in a single
dimension simply describes with each succeeding digit which "wing" of a
now irrelevant attractor a now irrelevant trajectory is visiting at each
periodic sample. That is, the initial condition .1101110001 just means
"wing 1, wing 1, wing 0, wing 1, wing 1, wing 1, wing 0, wing 0" and so on.
This is the point at which it becomes confusing to see what we are
supposed to learn about the real Lorenz system from Smith's argument.
He observes that most finite sequences count as random by the KCS
definition. Indeed, it is interesting for us to note that in the infinite, space
of all possible infinite strings, not only is the measure of the set of
nonrandom strings zero, but there is an uncountably infinite set of strings
which are noncomputable and which thus cannot be generated by any
algorithmic process, regardless of the length of the string we might use to
specify the process if there were one. Thus even if every single string
which could be recursively generated could also be generated by a finite
program shorter than the string itself (an impossible proposition, of
course), we could still say "most" strings were random (in the same sense
in which there are infinitely more real numbers than integers). This is
true even when we include the comparatively rare cryptoregular strings
such as the binary expansion of n or of the square root of 2. But returning
to the finite case, Smith notes that the proportion of sequences of a given
length which cannot be specified by a program at least k bits shorter (i.e.,
the proportion of random sequences) must be greater than 1 - 2~k. (Of
course this becomes more accurate the greater the string length we are
considering.) Thus, the portion of sequences which can be compressed by
more than 20 bits will be less than one in a million. He goes on to suggest,
essentially, that since almost every binary sequence of any considerable
length is KCS random, the behaviour of the Lorenz model understood as a
shift map is almost always KCS random. In his own words,
"an arbitrarily chosen 'seed' xo will, with a probability which
can exponentially approach one, yield a sequence of n visits
to the two sheets of the (simplified) Lorenz system which is
as KCS random as almost every sequence of n coin tosses."
(p. 67)
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He is careful, incidentally, to point out that we are here concerned with a
measure of the randomness of the output of the system, not of the actual
means by which the output is produced. (Computer scientists would use
the term "pseudorandom" to describe a string which appears random—
and might even be KCS random—but which was created by purely
deterministic means.) But of course, there is no real dynamical system at
work here anyway; there is just straightforward string manipulation.
Moreover, recall that Smith is here discussing a very simple model
of the Lorenz system. The model is so simple that the argument about
coin tosses is almost trivial. Let's forget for a moment everything we
know about the real Lorenz system. "Visits to the two sheets of the
(simplified) Lorenz system" are nothing but the successive bits of
arbitrarily chosen binary numbers, and we certainly don't need KCS or any
other technical description of complexity to tell us the relationship
between arbitrary bits and arbitrary coin tosses. What are we supposed to
learn about the real Lorenz system from this argument to show that
arbitrary Is and Os are just like arbitrary heads and tails?
At first we might think that we could learn very much from it if
there were only a straightforward relationship between the real Lorenz
system and the simple shift map—we might learn that in some sense the
output of the Lorenz system is indistinguishable from random output.
That is, maybe if we could find the right way to look at it, we could get
behaviour from the real Lorenz system that was just like that of the
simple shift map, and that behaviour would be indistinguishable from
random. But of course, it's no secret that if we look at almost anything in
just the right way, we'll get random-looking behaviour anyway. (See the
next chapter for an example of finding "randomness" in a deterministic
digital computer.) Moreover, to reiterate our warning when introducing
this model of a model, Smith's modelling of the model is just the sort of
endeavour which we criticised in the context of infinite intricacy, and it is
just the sort of endeavour which we earlier saw was a source of trouble in
understanding cognitive systems solely on the basis of V|/ level dynamics.
This objection aside, it seems very problematic in any case to
establish a relevant correlation between the two systems which allows us
to keep Smith's desired conclusion on board. One problem is that if we
strobe the real system at regular intervals, and if there exists any initial
condition to give us a particular finite bit string, then there exists an
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infinite class of different such initial conditions. This is a straightforward
implication of the Shadowing Theorem: for any initial condition which
does the trick, we are guaranteed a neighbourhood of other initial
conditions which shadow the first closely enough also to do the trick. (We
could prove a similar but weaker many to one correspondence by applying
the pigeon hole principle: there is an infinite class of initial conditions but
only a finite class of bit strings of a given length.) The problem is even
worse, because the real system, unlike the model, needn't zip along from
wing to wing at a constant speed. So for a given strobing rate, there could
be a host of other trajectories which gave the same chosen string but
which fitted in "extra" visits to other wings between sampling times. We
could go on with other troubles, perhaps including stepping into a higher
dimensional model of strobed output dynamics in the space of all possible
outputs in order to show that in any given neighbourhood of the original
system we can find some initial condition offering any desired strobed
output, but the problems are already enough for the point we are making.
That point is simply that once we have established this many to one
correlation by looking at the real Lorenz system, there is no guarantee that
strobed outputs will be uniformly distributed in the space of all possible
outputs. Once that guarantee is lost, there is no point to be made about
similarity of output to random coin tosses. Smith's original observation
about the shift map model was so correct as to be almost trivial, but
without a significant amount of additional argument, which doesn't look
too easy to provide, it just does not apply to the real model.
Unfortunately, Smith's final conclusions about the randomness of
chaotic output appears to try to extrapolate the conclusion about the shift
mp model to the kinds of models we use to try to explain the real world.
He says,
"The behaviour of a chaotic model is often equivalent to
some variety of shift map defined over digit strings
representing real numbers. In other words, the randomness
we find over time in a trajectory's behaviour is the
randomness that comes for free as we walk along the
expansions of typical real numbers... But if that's so, when
we turn to apply the model to the world, why shouldn't any
discerned chaos just be an artefact of the modelling medium
(simply chaos, as it were, dug out of the real number system
used for building the model, rather than the world)?" (pp.
69-70)
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If we take on board the first sentence, everything after is spot on. But the
behaviour of typical chaotic models is not often equivalent to a shift map
until we start strobing the system or otherwise reducing its dimensionality
in some other way which obscures the continuous nature of real systems.
(And again, it is no secret that if we look at most things in the right way,
they can be pretty random-looking.) Real systems in Nature give us no
indication that they interact only at stroboscopically sampled times or that
they have dimensions which are irrelevant to a deterministic description
of them. If we are interested in building a model of why the world looks
the way it does when viewed through strobed glasses, that's one thing, but
if we are philosophically interested in what actually "makes Nature .go"—
and this is the project in which I suggested in the previous chapter that we
should be interested—that's another thing altogether. For that project,
this line of thought is not relevant.
Having rid ourselves of any suspicion that this line is relevant to
our own aims, let's explore some other questions about complexity as
applied to the output of chaotic systems.
18.1.2 Chaotic Compression and KCS Variance
Smith notes (1993, p. 27) that it appears that every sequence of
integers (such as 4, 2, 6, 13, 1, 99...) has a corresponding point or set of
points on the Lorenz attractor which will take exactly the number of orbits
around each wing of the attractor which is named in the sequence. So for
our example, there is some initial condition which initiates a trajectory
which travels around the left wing four times, the right one twice, the left
one six times, the right thirteen, and so on. (Alternatively, there is a point
which will generate any binary sequence.) Proving this is no small task,
-but it is an idea which I believe most mathematicians would find highly
plausible. Indeed, it seems no more implausible than the idea that any
region in phase space will eventually be visited by some point lying in any
other region, which is just topological transitivity, one of the defining
characteristics of chaotic systems. But if it is true, then it follows that
chaotic systems such as the Lorenz model can be treated, in effect, as
information compressors, exactly in those circumstances where the initial
conditions generating a given sequence can be specified succinctly.
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It may not be a computationally tractable or even a computable
matter to determine one of the points in phase space which will lie on a
trajectory following orbits describing an arbitrary sequence, and it certainly
isn't the most efficient way of compressing a string for the general case, but
this doesn't stop its being possible for there to be an initial condition at a
computable point in phase space which will generate a description of any
computable sequence whatsoever. Now, in some cases, specifying the
initial point may take more bits than the desired string itself, and in some
cases specifying the point together with instructions for generating the
trajectory by applying the equations could also exceed the length of the
string. But in other cases, there might be huge savings in length. For
instance, every point on the Lorenz attractor specified by coordinates of a
fixed length generates an infinite class of sequences of length from one to
infinity; by applying other recursive functions of constant length to the
output of the model in terms of numbers of orbits (perhaps even by
feeding outputs back into the Lorenz system), we can generate an even
broader class of similarly ordered such sequences.
Indeed, the idea of reducing some lengthy description to a more
manageable size by coding the description in a chaotic system is the basis of
the secretive commercial work of pioneering chaos researcher Michael
Barnsley. By applying the so-called Collage Theorem (Barnsley 1988), it is
possible to achieve extremely compact and progressively more accurate
lossy representations of a pattern with a chaotic iterated function system.
Similar methods may be involved in the image processing technique
known as FITS (Functional Interpolating Transformation System),
developed by Paris-based FITS Imaging for its software Live Picture. The
software essentially translates a complex bit mapped image into a set of
equations representing the same picture. The image can then be
.manipulated extremely rapidly because the huge amounts of data in the
original image don't need to be altered, just the compact mathematical
representation.
Given the very high compression ratios possible with this kind of
method, we can easily see that some binary sequences produced by the
Lorenz model will not be very KCS random at all if we can specify their
initial conditions concisely enough. But there is no obvious relationship
between the number of digits we might use to specify an initial condition
and any qualitative "character" of the binary sequence the ensuing
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trajectory will describe. Indeed, we shouldn't expect there to be because the
behaviour of an individual trajectory depends on the dynamics of the
system, not on the particular number system we use to specify that
trajectory. Thus, the KCS definition may allow that two very similar (on
some interpretation) binary strings produced by the Lorenz system could
differ greatly in complexity according to whether the strings are
compressible as initial conditions (specified with a limited number of bits)
for the Lorenz system itself. In other words, for similar strings of a given
length there may be nearly arbitrary variance of the KCS measure of
complexity.
To use a drastic example, suppose it just happened to be possible to
compress a bitmapped image of John Major by specifying an initial
condition for the simplified Lorenz system which only requires five bits to
express precisely. That is, if we gave the Lorenz system that initial
condition, it could generate a pattern of bits which corresponded to those
in our bitmapped image. But suppose a similar image of Douglas Hurd
couldn't be generated by the Lorenz system unless we specified an initial
condition with four thousand bits. (Here I don't mean we're using any
greater precision: in this context exactly 2.11 is just as precise as exactly
2.247935769843459820498.) Ignoring for the moment the capabilities of
other compression strategies—all of which, for all we know, might be
substantially less efficient than the present method—we are left with the
conclusion that John Major has a much more compressible (even soft and
squishy!) image than Douglas Hurd. So Douglas Hurd is more complex, or
algorithmically random, depending on the preferred interpretation. But
this is a very counter-intuitive notion of complexity! Why should the
output of the Lorenz model objectively look any different in terms of
randomness or complexity when it started out at a point specified precisely
with only five bits of information than when it started out at a point
specified precisely with four thousand bits of information? (We might
make similar arguments by appealing to other compression strategies, but
it is enough to note that without reference to any compression standard at
all except the system itself, we are left with a counterintuitive notion of
randomness.)
With such observations in mind, we now move to an exploration




To start, the KCS definition of algorithmic complexity corresponds
intuitively much more to randomness than complexity. Complexity
generally evokes the notion of something that is highly ordered rather
than something uniformly disordered. We won't debate the semantic
point of whether we should consider uniformly disordered things
complex or only grant that honour to things with hidden order; instead, I
suggest simply that it is useful to consider this kind of difference between
order and disorder and that such a consideration may shed some light on
the question we have been considering about the relationship between the
randomness of deterministic chaos and the randomness of noise. We
might expect that a measure of complexity in the sense of the presence of
order should often return "opposite" values compared to KCS complexity.
We might hope that in adopting such a measure, we could also overcome
some of the deficiencies of the KCS measure as discussed above.
18.2.1 Logical Depth
One such candidate measure is the logical depth of C.H. Bennett
(1987, 1990) Logical depth is defined as the execution time of the shortest
program for a universal computer (such as a Turing machine) which can
generate a description of the object in question. More precisely, it is the
harmonic mean of all such programs, since there may be a large class of
programs of the same length which could generate any finite object.108
The idea here is that logically deep objects (or binary sequences or
whatever) should contain internal evidence of most plausibly having
been the result of long computations or dynamical processes. (Note that
wholly disordered strings can be generated quickly by long programs,
whereas highly ordered strings might be generated more slowly by shorter
programs.)
The most striking difference between logical depth and KCS as
measures of complexity is that KCS returns a high complexity for both
nondeterministically created disordered sequences and arbitrarily chosen
sequences described by the Lorenz model, whereas Bennett's measure is
108 Thjs js analogous to the idea that the graphs of an infinite number of polynomials may
pass through any finite set of points.
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meant to give low complexity to very disordered and perhaps
nondeterministically created strings and higher complexity to strings
generated (or generable) by deterministic chaotic processes. Rather than
simply the "opposite" value that we might have expected, logical depth
hopes to discriminate between sequences essentially in terms of the
complexity of how the sequences may be generated (i.e., execution time)
rather than the "complexity" of the strings themselves.
An improvement on the logical depth measure, relatively minor
but useful, has been offered by David Deutsch. (1985a) Deutsch's measure
of quantum logical depth, or Q-logical depth, is keyed to the harmonic
mean of the execution times of the shortest programs for his own
Universal Quantum Computer. The key point of difference with ordinary
logical depth stems from the suggestion that in Nature, random states are
generated not by "long programs" but by short programs exploiting
nondeterministic hardware. The quantum analogue of logical depth
solves this minor problem by generating random sequences with very
short programs. Yet, since we are primarily concerned with the execution
times on particular machines, this change is unlikely to alter the measure
of complexity by anything other than a uniform constant amount. Despite
the theoretical elegance of Deutsch's quantum computer109, it is difficult to
see how the measure of complexity returned would differ markedly from
that provided by logical depth measured with a Bernoulli-Turing
Machine.110
However, a significant advantage of Q-logical depth is the ability to
consider complexity across worlds in the Everett interpretation of
quantum mechanics. The Everett interpretation is widely considered to be
experimentally indistinguishable from other interpretations of quantum
mechanics (Deutsch's own 1985b objection notwithstanding), and
ordinarily I would not advocate reading too much into ways of thinking
the interpretation seems to encourage. Yet in this case, I believe it is a
useful tool for getting a handle on the kind of complexity we are
discussing. In particular, we can interpret Q-logical depth as containing
information about all universes (i.e., all states in the quantum linear
superposition of the Universal Quantum Computer as it generates the
109 Such computers are problematic. (Chapter 4 and Mulhauser 1995 in press)
110 Also, it is very well to note that short programs for the Universal Quantum Computer
can generate random strings rapidly, but if we are given a random string and asked to supply
the Q-program to generate it, we are back where we were with Bennett's measure.
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state in question) simultaneously (this means, incidentally, that the il¬
logical depth is not an observable).111 The Q-logical depth indicates high
complexity only for objects which are present in all universes. As Deutsch
puts it,
"Observationally complex states that are different in different
universes are not truly deep but just random. Since the il¬
logical depth is a property of the quantum state (vector), a
quantum subsystem need not necessarily have a well defined
Q-logical depth (though often it will to a good degree of
approximation). This is...to be expected since the knowledge
in a system may reside entirely in its correlations with other
systems." [emphasis original] (Deutsch 1985b, pp. 114-115)
For the moment, we are primarily concerned with the first sentence; I
repeat the rest of the quotation for the complementarity with the earlier
discussion about interactive decoherence and environmental correlations
in complex quantum systems. While this is a rather speculative point, we
might consider a sort of "staying power" of complexity and note a parallel
between high Q-logical depth and some measure of structural stability
which reaches down to the quantum level. That is, those objects with
structural stability across universes—i.e., through possible linearly
superposed states—are the most complex. This is another way of
interpreting the difference between strings created by nondeterministic
random noise and those deterministically created by chaotic dynamics:
truly nondeterministic noise fluctuates without pattern across all
universes, whereas chaotic patterns are more stable by virtue of their
concealed order (i.e., their complexity which emerges even with Bennett's
classical measure).
18.2.2 Logical Depth—Problems Solved?
We are now in a position to evaluate whether Q-logical depth
overcomes the problems which led us to seek an alternative to KCS
complexity. Recall that one concern was that KCS does not discriminate
between strings created by entirely disordered nondeterministic processes
(with tossing a fair coin as the paradigm example) and those created by
111 We are of course not talking about the philosophers' possible worlds here, but rather
about the different universes which can be interpreted as being home to the various possible
states represented in the quantum linear superposition of the state vector.
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ordered deterministic chaotic processes. Of course if it is Smith's aim to
equate the randomness of chaos for practical purposes with the
randomness of noise, then it is not surprising that he should have chosen
this definition of complexity! Our other concern was the arbitrary
variation in the KCS measure according to whether a given string could be
compressed just by giving the initial condition and governing equations of
a chaotic system which generated it. It seemed counterintuitive that two
otherwise similar strings (such as bitmaps of the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary) should have different measures of complexity solely
because one resulted from an initial condition specified in some number
system to a greater number of places than the other.
As far as the first concern goes, the problem is meant to be solved by
either logical depth or Q-logical depth. Both measures return a high
complexity for strings which can be generated by succinctly specified
ordered deterministic processes. Smith notes after his initial discussion of
KCS complexity that deterministic chaos can in principle be distinguished
from nondeterministic, disordered random noise by finding the right way
to analyse it. Logical depth and Q-logical depth try to incorporate this
feature into the measure itself and offer us a better way of distinguishing
chaos from "mere noise". Having said that, however, there remains a
problem in what we mean by "succinctly specified".
Suppose it takes c bits to specify the equations of the Lorenz system.
Then each initial condition specifiable by x bits generates an infinite class
of strings of length yk> x + c bits in length (one for each length), where y^ =
x + c + k and k e {1, 2, 3...}, which are compressible by the present method
by k bits. And of course, there is an infinite class of initial conditions
specifiable by some x bit description. (In case this sounds odd, consider
that it is no different than saying there is an infinite class of integers, all of
which are of finite length.) This is all consistent with the fact that the
probability of compressing an arbitrary string of length y (in the space of
Lorenz outputs of length y) by this method (regardless of y) is less than 2l c
This is because there are 2y strings of y length and less than or equal to
2x + l _ 2 unique strings of y length generated by x or shorter length initial
conditions. Thus the probability (tossing out that extra constant - 2 to
make a cleaner answer without compromising the general point) is less
than 2X + 1 ~ y, or 21 _ c of finding an x or shorter length initial condition to
generate a given y length string, or less than 21 ~c'k that we will be able to
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compress the y length string by k bits or more. In other words, most
strings of length y begin at initial conditions which require greater than x
bits to specify and won't be compressible by this method. (And should
Lorenz outputs be uniformly distributed in the space of all possible
outputs, the bulk of them would also be KCS random, indicating that they
could not be substantially compressed by any method.) Thus, these strings
will have a low logical and Q-logical depth because the shortest program to
generate them will just print them out. We can at least be happy, though,
that for those strings which are compressible as initial conditions for a
chaotic system, logical depth, unlike KCS, should be able to distinguish
their origin in chaos rather than in nondeterministic randomness.
Returning to the first problem, our excursion into the complexity
measure shopping market has been even less fruitful. Because it is still
the case that a sequence requiring an extremely precise description of the
initial conditions of the dynamical system which created it could turn out
as random as coin tosses on the logical depth measures, there could still be
arbitrary differences in the complexity of similar strings, where one could
be generated from a very succinct initial condition and the other only
from an initial condition specified with very many bits. (Of course, this
argument does not necessarily generalise over all possible compression
algorithms; we are concerned for the moment just with the complexity of
the string with reference to its own system's standard of compression in
terms of specifying an initial condition.)
This second concern especially, then, appears to be a shortcoming of
all the complexity measures we've tried so far. In an earlier version of this
material, I suggested that it would be helpful to have a measure which
didn't care about particulars of the starting conditions for a system, which
commented only on the overall dynamics of the system itself (as opposed
to individual strings produced by it). Although I was unable to suggest an
alternative at the time, I would like now to offer one.
18.2.3 Functional Logical Depth—Problems Solved
I suggest a new measure which, by concentrating on the complexity
of the relationship between inputs and outputs rather than on outputs or
even processes themselves, hopefully allows us to avoid some of the
pitfalls of the other measures while allowing us to describe new
observations which may have eluded us before. By quantifying the
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complexity of the relationship between a set of inputs to some "black box"
system and the corresponding outputs, the new measure allows us to
compare different systems in a way largely independent of our knowledge
of the processes at work in the "black box". The new measure we will call
functional logical depth, or F-logical depth, and it is defined as the mean
execution time of the shortest Universal Bernoulli-Turing machine
description of the input/output relationship of the system in question.
That is, it is the average over all possible inputs of the length of time taken
by the shortest program to produce an output identical to that which the
system in question would produce in response to the same inputs. I hope
mathematicians everywhere will excuse the silliness of trying to express
this in the following way, but in the simplest two dimensional case, the
functional logical depth F of a relationship described by Bernoulli-Turing
program S for a given level of precision P (i.e., how many bits we're
looking for in the outputs), where "pseudo-function" E returns the execu¬
tion time to produce an output of precision P for a single initial condition
specified in x and y, might look something like:112
Here integration is over all the relevant x and y in the domain of the
system, and the result of the integration is divided by the area of the
domain space in order to give an average execution time. We can think of
this graphically as a process of scanning across a plane of possible (x, y) and
plotting a height along an E axis corresponding to the execution time to
produce the output for each (x, y). The two integrals give the volume
under this E manifold, which we then divide by the area of the (x, y)
domain to derive the average height of the manifold above the (x, y)
domain. Notice that F-logical depth is closely related to but not identical
with the computational complexity of algorithm analysis, in which
112 This is really simplified beyond plausibility, with, for instance, an easy (x, y) domain
over which we can integrate in this simple manner. Indeed, for some systems, both the (x,
y) domain and the manifold in E might be fractal. I've deliberately written it out in this
entirely inaccurate way purely for illustrative purposes; shortly in the text we observe that
F-logical depth is not a computable value anyway.
E(S(x, y), P)dxdy
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algorithms are ordered according to the number of steps which must be
performed in their completion.
A few minor points deserve attention before we move on to more
significant observations about the measure. First, for a nondeterministic
system, we aren't concerned that S produce outputs identical with that of
the real black box system—how could it?—but only that its probability
density function matches to within P.113 Second, in comparing outputs,
we won't be concerned with the amount of time it might take otherwise
output-identical systems to give their outputs, since for the purposes of F-
logical depth, we want to measure the complexity relationship between
inputs and outputs, not whether this system or that is quicker or slower or
even incorporates some arbitrary time delay. Also, F-logical depth does
not necessarily measure the complexity of a particular process, but only the
complexity of the input/output relationship of that process. Thus, any
two processes which instantiate the same input/output relationship are
equivalent in terms of F-logical depth, regardless of their individual
computational complexities. Finally, perhaps the clumsiness of the
pseudo calculus will be excused in light of the fact that F-logical depth is
no more a computable measure than KCS, logical depth, or Q-logical
depth.114
There are several things more worthwhile noticing about F-logical
depth as a measure of complexity. First, the value is at a minimum for
nondeterministically random or trivial outputs. If there is no probability
relation whatsoever between inputs and outputs, then for each input S
can simply offer a scaled output from its random number generator and be
done with it. Likewise, the F-logical depth will be minimal if the
relationship is trivial, since S might either just look up the appropriate
output value in a table or output a constant value or even output the
input string—as in the case of Smith's shift map rendition of the Lorenz
system—according to the particulars of the trivial system in question.
(This observation also reveals that F-logical depth is more meaningful for
systems with continuous or with discrete but very large input spaces. For
113 The usefulness of F-logical depth distinctions depends on the value of P. At low
precision, all processes look F-logically shallow.
114 We might measure a quantity similar to F-logical depth by applying the algorithmic
complexity measure to a bit description of the relationship between a system's inputs and
outputs. This approach does, however, entail certain difficulties which I believe make F-
logical depth preferable.
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systems with discrete and small input spaces, it may always be quicker and
shorter to exploit a simple lookup table than to undertake calculations
more closely related to the behaviour of the real input-output system
under consideration.)
At the other end of the complexity spectrum are the kinds of deep
processes the products of which logical depth was originally intended to
pick out. By defining the F-logical depth measure over all possible inputs,
we have avoided one difficulty which arose for ordinary logical depth,
namely, the problem of giving a low complexity to those outputs which
truly were created by long and complex processes but whose initial
conditions in terms of those processes required very many bits to specify.
Again by focussing on an overall input/output relationship, this measure
avoids the kind of variation in complexity which occurs when, for
instance, offering a million generations of a million chimpanzees
typewriters really does result in the creation of a highly ordered
encyclopaedia. F-logical depth just indicates the process itself is of low
complexity and makes no claims about individual outputs. Likewise, F-
logical depth cannot comment on the relative complexity of the images of
the British Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, but it can comment on
the kinds of processes which lead to them and what relationship these
processes may have to those of a million generations of a million
chimpanzees.
To be sure, it is useful to be able to comment on individual outputs,
but this shouldn't be seen as a criticism of F-logical depth: it isn't intended
as a replacement for the other measures, but simply as a complement,
offering something the others do not. With the new measure in hand, we
may now examine the last of the conclusions Smith would like to make
which may be relevant to our own project.
18.3 Chaotic Randomness and Random Randomness
The first and simplest conclusion to note is that in terms of the new
measure, we can see clearly that the randomness of deterministic chaos
does not equal the randomness of nondeterministic noise. Let's be very
clear on this point: the three properties to which we have appealed to
characterise chaos are input/output relationships. Outputs are sensitively
dependent on inputs (SIC). The set of possible outputs which repeat is
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infinite, and in the input space, the set of inputs which give these outputs
is dense (dense covering of periodic points). Finally, some possible input
arbitrarily similar to a given one will eventually give an output which is
arbitrarily similar to some other given one (topological transitivity).
Thus, we are perfectly justified in applying this measure as the standard by
which to make comparisons of complexity between systems. And once
more, the conclusion that chaotic systems can, if we look at them in the
right way, give outputs which look random on the other measures is
singularly unremarkable. But what about the relationship between F-
complex chaos and the noise which Smith emphasises is part of the
boundary conditions of every system?
18.4 Noisy Chaos
Let's turn to the final conclusions Smith wants to draw from his
application of the KCS measure of complexity to the output of chaotic
systems. Smith notes as we have said before that it is possible in principle
to distinguish the "randomness" of deterministic chaos from that of
nondeterministic noise—and the F-logical depth measure gives us the
conceptual framework to do just that.115 But, he says, the randomness (by
the KCS definition) we observe in chaotic systems is the kind that "comes
for free" as a result of the system's nonlinearity extracting detail about the
real number specifications of the system's initial conditions. But this kind
of detail, he argued previously, is incompatible with the kinds of
abstractions to which we typically apply chaotic models. Thus perhaps
physical phenomena shouldn't really be modelled with the infinitely
detailed real number system. Instead, perhaps we need noisy models of
limited precision which reflect Smith's belief that all physical systems are
subject to low level random noise (strictly nondeterministic noise, we
might wonder?). Thus, he cheerfully finishes, what really matters is the
qualitative behaviour of the limited precision models we run on digital
115 Of course, we can also draw the distinction if we have empirically discovered some of
the underlying order of deterministic chaos, but F-logical depth offers a framework when
this empirical data is lacking. It is important in this context not to slip into the non¬
technical definition of chaos—meaning utter disorder or whatever—and then draw some
conclusions with respect to its relationship to noise, eventually foisting that conclusion back
onto the shoulders of chaos in the technical sense.
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computers, subject as they are to continual noise in the form of roundoff
errors, or limited precision computations.
Now, we have made the point in several places before that odd
things may happen when we artificially reduce the dimensionality of a
system of which we are wanting an explanation, and this observation
comes into play here again. We won't reiterate the response to Smith's
points on abstractions and what level of precision is appropriate for them,
as this is by now well trodden territory. But now we can make similar
points about noise.
18.4.1 Who is Making Noise?
The first observation we may make is that there is something
curious about the assertion that all physical systems are subject to
continual low level random noise. If Smith means noise that is random
on the KCS definition, then this could be either deterministically
produced chaotic "noise", or it could be truly nondeterministic. If it is the
former, then Smith cannot appeal to this point as an argument against
modelling in the real number system, nor can he appeal to it as an
argument for the kind of "noise" created by roundoff errors unless he is
prepared to offer an argument that roundoff errors are chaotic. In fairness,
he does not make any direct appeal to this first argument against real
numbers, although it would be easy to interpret Smith's final comments
as mutually supporting assertions painting a particular picture of reality,
rather than as a well structured linear argument. If, on the other hand,
Smith means noise that is random and nondeterministic, then he is
sidestepping a subtle question and leaving us with the impression of a
powerful ontological position for which he offers no argumentative
support, namely that there exists nondeterministic noise in the world
which does actively influence every possible real physical system.
To take this impression first, as physicists or engineers, we of course
find it useful to model systems with environmental noise rather than
trying to track the evolution of every single particle which could have an
influence on the system being modelled. But as philosophers, we remain
interested in how a system "really" works—what makes a system go—in
the spirit of our earlier comments on realism. It is fine to assert that what
really matters for grasping the qualitative behaviour of physical systems is
the kind of simulation we can run on a digital computer. But it is
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philosophically unsatisfactory just to assume that truly nondeterministic
noise exists everywhere and influences every conceivable physical system
(and that this noise is qualitatively similar to computer roundoff error).
This is particularly true considering the availability of coherent entirely
deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics. (Bohm 1952) The
perturbations of quantum vacuum theory (see Podolny 1986 for a
charming introduction and a romantic history of science in the former
Soviet Union; also Puthoff 1989, 1990) may be the best candidate for a real
nondeterministic noisy background of the sort Smith may be proposing,
but as far as I know there is no a priori reason why it, too, cannot be
subsumed under a comprehensive deterministic but nonlocal
interpretation of quantum physics. Indeed, all-pervading
nondeterministic background noise is arguably incompatible with the very
project of quantum cosmology. If truly nondeterministic noise does not
necessarily come from quantum mechanics, then where does it come
from?
18.4.2 Levels of Description Ad Nauseum
The answer, I believe, lies in the question which Smith's approach
has sidestepped. That question concerns whether noise is random relative
to the system being modelled or random relative to "everything", as it
were. In other words, is noise, instead of being some all-pervading
background hum, actually an entirely deterministic and perhaps wholly
ordered (and even F-complex) effect of some other system, which gets
"sampled" by our model just as Smith's model of the model "samples" the
Lorenz system and winds up with mostly KCS random output?
There is an interesting parallel here with the discussion of
interactive decoherence in complex quantum systems. As we saw earlier,
until they decided to analyse quantum systems at a more detailed level of
complexity, physicists were saddled with the idea that consciousness was
essential to quantum measurement. It was only when more and more of
the dimensions actually relevant to a quantum system were considered
that this problem disappeared. Likewise, it may be that when quasi-
classical systems are modelled in greater detail, "random noise" reveals
itself as an entirely deterministic but perhaps chaotic lower level
influence. Although this point is clear within the F-logical depth
framework, it makes little sense if we limit ourselves to KCS complexity.
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It is possible to have an entirely deterministic model of a physical system,
or it is possible to posit the existence of an all-pervading nondeterministic
noise. KCS complexity makes it impossible to distinguish. Once again, if
our project is to get hold of an ontological understanding of what really
"makes Nature go" instead of only achieving the (perhaps very difficult)
task of creating models that make good engineering sense, then we cannot
simply sit back on our low-dimensional, limited precision laurels and say
noise is everywhere.
18.4.3 Out of Our Depth?
One final observation about Smith's closing comments is that they
preclude the kind of theoretical distinction offered by the eminent
mathematician Steven Wolfram (1985) between homoplectic and
autoplectic processes. Homoplectic processes, Wolfram suggests, result
from those dynamical systems which generate macroscopic KCS random
behaviour by magnifying the significance of environmental noise (which,
on our interpretation, might really be the influence of chaotic systems
otherwise external to the system being modelled). The admittedly
speculative brand of autoplectic processes, on the other hand, would
generate the same macroscopically pseudorandom behaviour (i.e.
behaviour which may be KCS random but is complex on the F-logical
depth measure) independently of the presence of noise. Such a robust
autoplectic system could generate logical depth and maintain internal
evidence of a long history, whereas homoplectic processes would remain
comparatively shallow because of the randomising influence of noise. If
there is nondeterministic Smith style noise, this kind of robustness is just
the kind we expect to single out when we consider the multiple worlds
view of Q-logical depth or a quantum analogue of F-logical depth. (Yet
Smith's picture precludes it!) An autoplectic system would remain stable
over possible universes, whereas the complexity of a homoplectic system
would be wiped out by the "random" variance across universes (here it is
useful to appeal to the vacuum fluctuations mentioned above).
Taking Wolfram's distinction as a point of departure, Bennett
wonders interestingly if dissipative processes such as turbulence, which
are not explicitly computational, could still generate logical depth. He
wonders if something like a waterfall could be an autoplectic process
which contains objective evidence of a long dynamical history: is there
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any objective difference between a day old waterfall and a year old one?
He does not answer the question, although he does cite Ahlers and
Walden (1980) for evidence of "fairly long-term pseudorandom behaviour
near the onset of convective turbulence". (Bennett 1990, p. 147) The
question, however, is one which we must leave for another time.
18.5 From Complex to Simple
In any case, we have seen that KCS is not the only description of
complexity on offer, and we have seen that Smith's argument for counting
the outputs of chaotic systems as random is an unremarkable comment on
the uniform distribution of real numbers. It is applicable to the real world
only insofar as we can establish a useful relationship between continuous
(differential) models and strobed or otherwise discretized (difference)
models of lower dimension (politically correct term: 'dimensionally
challenged'?) We have seen some of the advantages of using logical or
quantum logical depth as our measure of complexity, although we have
noted that they don't succeed in picking out all the deterministically
created but KCS random strings. They also share a shortcoming of the
KCS description in that arbitrary, otherwise similar, strings may receive
different measures of complexity for no other reason than that they can be
described succinctly as initial conditions of chaotic dynamical systems.
These problems are overcome by functional logical depth, an alternative
measure of the complexity of the relationship between inputs and outputs
of a system, whatever the internal details of the system might be.
We have made a fairly critical exploration of Smith's closing
conclusions about chaos, noise, and limited precision simulations and
seen that there is much more to be said about the problem than is at first
apparent using only the KCS description. It is time now to turn to a
general class of problems which arises for our kinds of purposes when we
try to use any of the standard measures of complexity to describe
dynamical systems.' Our examination of this problem returns us to the
central theme of representation which was so crucial in our early
understanding of self models, and offers us a glimpse into what, if
anything, we should really be concluding about the possible characteristic






















These first two strings make little sense on first glance; the third
representation is for most people most recognisable. The first is the same
text written in binary (base 2) ASCII equivalent, where each 8 bit byte
corresponds to a particular character, and the second is the same in
hexadecimal (base 16) form, where each pair of characters indicates a byte.
The fourth representation is a simple kind of code where entire words are
indicated by single digits, and the final very economical representation is
the book and chapter and verse from the King James Bible. A brief
consideration of these five ways of saying the same thing reveals that
complexity is not a straightforward measurement and that we must
understand the relationship between complexity and representation in
order to make any sense of complexity as applied to philosophical
questions about minds.
Representation 3:





19.2 Complexity in Representations
If we type the characters of representation 3 into a modern personal
computer, they will be stored in the machine as simple binary switches
from which we could extract exactly the bits in representation 1. When
the computer actually fetches these bits from memory, it always does so in
groups of multiples of 8 bits, often 32 bit chunks sometimes called words
or double words. These 32 bit chunks correspond to sets of 8 characters in
representation 2. Thus the first 32 bits of representation 1,
01000010011011000110010101110011, correspond to the first 8 hexadecimal
characters 426C6573. Although everything in a digital computer is stored
in binary form, computer scientists often use the simpler hexadecimal
representation when analysing a machine or when writing low level code
because it is shorter and faster to understand. Most people find it more
natural to think in terms of hexadecimal representations than in binary
expansions of the same thing.
the children of God.
1 = Blessed; 2 = are; 3 =
the; 4 = peacemakers; 5 =
:; 6 = for; 7 = they; 8 =
shall; 9 = be; A = called; B
= the; C = children; D =
of; E = God; F = .
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But most people find it even easier to understand the text of the
third representation, and in our everyday human to human
communications this is the form we use. For our purposes, we might
very loosely call this the native representation. In order to understand
what is being said by either of the first two representations, we must
understand how the bit patterns or hexadecimal patterns correspond to the
characters of our ordinary text native representation. This correspondence
is given by the ASCII table, the American Standard Code for Information
Interchange. Without the standardised code, we would have no way of
understanding the first two representations.
We can say something similar about the last two representations.
Here, in order to understand the string 123456789ABCDEF, we must know
the special table given above. Rather than representing individual
characters with a special code, as in ASCII, here we are representing entire
words. Likewise in the last representation, we are denoting an entire
sentence by a simple verse reference. If we know what the King James
Bible is, then we can understand Matt 5:9 just as well as we can understand
123456789ABCDEF if we know the special table.
The point of all this is that whenever we analyse the complexity of a
string, we will almost always involve some representational scheme.
Even when we considered the behaviour of the simplified Lorenz model
and the bit strings it generated, we began with the representational scheme
which said "when the trajectory is on this wing of the attractor, we'll call it
a 1, and when it is on this other wing, we'll call it a 0". (The only case in
which a representational scheme won't be involved is if we are analysing
output in a system's native representation; more on this presently.)
But each representational scheme includes its own degree of order
or complexity. For example, we could generate the string in
representation 4 very simply by just writing down the highly ordered list
of the first 15 positive hexadecimal numbers. But if the table defining the
representational scheme had been different, such that the string were
maybe C326B5F847D1E9A, generating the string could be much more
difficult. By a simple change of the representational scheme, the string has
gone from highly ordered to (apparently) not very ordered at all. But yet
we are considering, in a way, the same basic thing: the string from
representation 3. Likewise, ASCII representations of plain text like the
first two above can be easily compressed by standard methods by about
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50%. Thus, they have some pattern and complexity. Yet if we run the
same strings through a few rounds of a randomising algorithm such as
DES, the U.S. government's Data Encryption Standard, typical strings may
be nearly impossible to compress.116 Where does the complexity go? In a
clear sense, it is present in the data encryption algorithm, which has
essentially replaced the standard ASCII representation system with a more
complicated one. Indeed, a change of the representational scheme can
transform a description of almost anything into a description of almost
anything else—a sort of information theoretic alchemy. We could devise
some decoding scheme, for instance, where we could extract the first few
bars of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or the first few bits of a digitised
photo of John Major from any of these five example strings. In general,
there is some decoding scheme to find anything in anything.
Thus different ways of representing particular things such as
English sentences or descriptions of Beethoven's music carry with them
different consequences for the complexity measures. Insofar as discussing
the complexity of a system almost always involves the use of some
representational system, attributing complexity almost always involves a
prejudgement inherent in the representational system we choose. Some
representational schemes produce very dense and uncompressible strings,
where superfluous information is stripped out by the complexity of the
scheme, whereas some produce strings with plenty of inessential data
which can be removed by compression. Indeed, particular
representational schemes will give preference to particular kinds of order
within that which is being represented. For instance, the kind of
representation used in the last example above plainly gives preference to
sentences which happen to be verses of the Bible. It is still an ordinary text
representation, but it relies for its brevity upon the vast information
stored in the correlations between short book names and verse indices to
give a very dense representation.117
116 Someone might object that DES has actually increased the logical depth of the string
which was randomised, since it is now a more computationally intensive task to extract the
original string and compress it, rather than just trying to compress the DESed string. But of
course doing this requires a specification of the entire DESed string as well as of the
required decryption algorithm; thus, the shortest program which can generate the DESed
string likely will be one which simply lists its elements, and the string will be both KCS
random and logically shallow.
117 It's interesting to notice that when we compress a given string we are offering a
different representation of the same data and including within the product string a
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We've established that the same thing represented two different
ways may appear more or less complex according to thp characteristics of
the representational system. One example of this is the Bible passage
represented as binary ASCII as opposed to binary ASCII which has been
randomised by DES. In a way, both patterns represent the same thing
under different interpretations, yet the first appears logically deep because
it is compressible while the other looks both KCS random and logically
shallow. Moving from the representational scheme of ordinary ASCII to
ASCII with a few rounds of DES thoroughly alters the complexity of the
"same" string under both KCS and the logical depth measures. (Notice the
high complexity of DES itself under the F-logical depth measure, by the
way.) With the observation to hand that the choice of representational
scheme largely determines the outcome of a complexity measure applied
to a system, let's consider what it would mean to measure complexity in a
system's "native representation".
19.3 Complexity Without Representation
The easy example here is analysing the internal functions of a
digital computer, since the complexity measures we've considered are all
meant for application to bit strings, and that's exactly how data are
represented internally in a digital computer. Since monitoring bit streams
at some points would yield highly ordered patterns and at others highly
disordered patterns, we'll consider two examples. First, suppose we
watched the signals across control lines from a floppy disk controller to a
disk drive. The fact that there is a limited number of possible meaningful
signals which the controller can send to the disk drive (turn on the main
motor, strobe a stepper motor switch or a data latch, reset the read/write
head, etc.) means that only particular patterns will ever occur. There will
also be a higher level of order in that particular commands frequently
follow each other (such as turn on the main motor and strobe a stepper
motor) while others never do (such as strobe a stepper motor and then
turn on the main motor). Note that these individual patterns themselves
might be uncompressible, but the order present in the way in which they
definition of the new representational scheme in terms of the original one: a key for one¬
way translating, or decompressing.
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are used will give us an easy way of compressing the overall pattern.118
Thus on an appropriate scale the stream of bits we might read across these
lines will look highly ordered and easily compressible on any of the three
measures of complexity we've considered. The immediate lesson of this
example is that patterns which look from an external point of view to be
highly disordered or random (but recurring) might be put to very ordered
functionally relevant use in a digital computer. While the individual
patterns might be highly disordered, for the computer they represent
instructions in a well ordered process.
Now, in the same digital computer system, we could also measure
the signals along functionally relevant lines where the patterns would not
be nearly so regular. For instance, in a computer with 9-bit parity checked
RAM, we might decide to sample the line carrying the parity bit.
Computers with parity checked RAM store an extra bit along with every 8
bits of data to indicate whether there is an odd or an even number of high
bits (i.e., Is) in that memory location (or, equivalently, to make the total
number of Is either even or odd). While there will be localised exceptions
for programs which frequently access highly redundant sequences of bytes
in memory, in general if we watch a computer for long enough while it
executes some code the value on the parity line of the computer's data bus
will be patternless, indicating a 1 about as frequently as a 0.119 Under the
measures of complexity we've considered, the strings we sampled along
this line would be considerably more random and uncompressible than
the strings we measured along the disk control line. The uninitiated
philosopher of digital computers might even conclude that the value on
this parity line constituted a computer equivalent of nondeterministic
noise. The immediate lesson from this example is that even in a highly
ordered system such as memory accessing in a digital computer,
appropriate measurements may yield strings with little or no apparent
pattern.
Now we have two examples of sampled signals from a
paradigmatically well ordered digital computer, and one is highly
compressible while the other appears fairly random. Yet they are both
118 The particulars of individual signal patterns depend on the instruction set of the
relevant chips, of course, but there is nothing in digital computer design which prevents us
in principle from using the most "random" strings possible to represent whatever we want.
119 This is part of the theory of parity checking: the reliability of the scheme depends on
an unbiased, fairly uniform distribution of evens and odds.
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from functionally relevant areas of a system which at the level of
description we are considering is entirely deterministic and completely
free from noise. And since it is not necessary to translate the quantities
we're measuring in any way, we needn't worry that our choice of
representational scheme has influenced the complexity result in any way.
We have noticed that highly disordered patterns might be put to highly
ordered uses and that likewise highly ordered processes might generate
highly disordered patterns.
Our entire discussion has been motivated by questions about the
complexity of chaotic signals and their relationship to nondeterministic
noise, specifically as these questions bear on the presence of chaotic
processes in the brain. After exploring the relationship between
representation and complexity as well as asking particular questions about
complexity in native representation in the digital computer example, we
are now in a position to say something about what complexity measures
might say about chaos in the brain.
19.4 Complexity in Natural Chaotic Systems
First lets consider the easier question: if we sample signals in the
brain, convert them into binary patterns, and analyse their complexity,
what conclusions might we draw? Well, if we happen to sample in an
area where signals look chaotic (as Freeman, for instance, has done), we
might find a KCS random pattern which could also be a logically deep one.
Regardless of whether the pattern actually was logically deep, it might be
akin to the individual command patterns which the disk controller sends
to the disk drive. That is, the chaotic pattern could itself play a
functionally relevant role in a process ordered at another level. To use an
example inspired by Freeman, the chaotic pattern might simply be the
firing pattern of neurons in an area of the olfactory cortex which is
presently sensing the odour of bunny food. Just as the individual disk
drive controller signals may be patternless yet represent for the computer
functionally relevant commands in a well ordered process, the chaotic
firing patterns in the rabbit's cortex may represent for the rabbit a piece of
data functionally relevant to the process of getting a bite to eat.
Moreover, despite the fact that detectable order might not emerge
until signals are analysed at a higher functional level, we cannot even
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conclude that the special properties of chaos such as sensitive dependence
on initial conditions are irrelevant at the lower level. (Something like
this we could do in the disk controller example, where relationships
between bits in a particular disk drive command have no functional role
at that level, although they do obviously have a crucial role at the level of
the logic gates of the chips activated by them.) It might be the case, for
instance, that something like SIC is a property required by neural systems
capable of making the kinds of fine discriminations displayed by the
olfactory cortex. While the higher level order may be non-chaotic, the
lower level order may be essentially chaotic, ordered on the functional
logical depth measure but perhaps not on KCS.
Alternatively, finding an apparently chaotic signal, or even a signal
which was random on both the KCS and logical depth measures, could be
akin to finding apparently patternless signals on a parity line. We might
be measuring an apparently random (epiphenomenal) byproduct of a
functionally relevant, logically deep process. Likewise, whatever we did
find might be merely the result of our choice of representational scheme.
These possibilities for interpreting chaotic or even random (on the logical
depth measures, as opposed to just KCS) signals in the brain suggest that
without much more information there is very little we can conclude
about the role the signal plays in the brain's functioning.
This brings us to the more difficult question about complexity
measures applied to brain functioning: how can we move from an
analysis of complexity of a representation of brain functioning (such as
binary representations of spiking frequencies) to an analysis of complexity
in the brain's "native representation"? (In particular, how can we begin to
draw conclusions about the presence of deterministic chaos in the brain
and how this could be related to nondeterministic noise?) This is akin to
moving from an analysis of disordered individual disk controller
commands to the functionally relevant and ordered use to which these
commands are put. It is akin to moving from the level of describing the
less ordered precise positions in 3-space of particles of toner on a white
sheet of paper to the more ordered level of the actual text being
represented by those particles of toner.
259
19.5 Chaos and Complexity in Neural Systems
Answering this question is by no means easy, and it is one on which
we shall here make only rudimentary headway. Some people might like
to say that there can't really be functionally relevant chaos in the brain
because otherwise people's behaviour would be chaotic. Others, like
Smith, appeal to the KCS definition of complexity to put chaos on the
same footing as nondeterministic noise; on this view, it is hard to see how
chaos in the brain could play any important role at all. But both these
naive approaches are unable to accommodate the kinds of observations we
have made. They do not begin to answer the question of how to analyse
chaos in the brain in it's native representation. So let's take note of some
very general points that can be made.
First, it is possible that all chaos in the brain, if analysed in terms of
the uses to which it is put by the brain itself, would be something like the
patternless codes which might be sent to a disk drive. In other words, we
could theoretically change the chaotic pattern to any other pattern, and as
long as we preserved the functional role of the new pattern with respect to
the old, nothing would change. Even if it weren't physically possible to
achieve such a change with a real biological neural system, perhaps
because neurons are structurally disposed to produce chaotic spiking
behaviour, it could still be true that any artificial rendition of an
intelligent system could get by with a nonchaotic pattern in place of the
chaotic behaviour of the real brain. Moreover, in this case, a chaotic
pattern could just as easily be wholly nondeterministic noise (as long as
bits of such noise were reproducible).
Alternatively, all chaos in the brain might turn out to be nothing
but a byproduct of interactions between separate nonchaotic subsystems.
In this case, it might be impossible to achieve the same kind of
information processing with neurons without creating the same chaotic
byproduct. Along similar lines, it might be impossible to build a wood fire
for cooking food without producing smoke, but the special properties of
the smoke might be entirely irrelevant to the cooking process. If the chaos
were a result of peculiarities of biological neurons but not of simulated
intelligences (in the sense that smoke is a property of burning wood but
not of an electric hob), it might be possible to implement the relevant
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information processing artificially without creating the byproduct chaos
(just as it is possible to cook food with a smokeless electric hob).
Finally, it could be that the special properties of chaotic systems are
functionally essential at the level where they are present. We discussed in
Chapter 13 some of the possible applications of chaos in cognitive systems
and some of the capabilities which its presence might help explain. We
suggested, for instance, that SIC might be important for any neural
network capable of recognising fine differences between odours. Such
sensitivity could also be important for sensing changes in the position of a
motor control system, and topological transitivity might be important for
rapidly "searching" wide neighbourhoods of an area of phase space. SIC
and dense coverings of phase space with periodic points could be
important for the creativity of a system able to make nonlogical "leaps".
Yet all these capabilities might at the same time be parts of a process which
was essentially nonchaotic at a higher level. None of these capabilities—
recognising fine differences in odour, sensing positions for motor control,
searching large spaces, or being creative—imply in any way that higher
level processes which appeal to them will themselves be chaotic. This
takes care of the concern stated above that real biological systems can't be
relevantly chaotic because then their higher level behaviour would be
chaotic: a chaotic process may simply provide input to a higher level
process which was not noticeably chaotic. (But recall the literature we
discussed in Chapter 14 which indicated ways in which chaos may persist
into high level brain dynamics.)
19.6 Complexity's Last Representation
In the end, of course, conclusions about the role of chaos in
biological intelligent systems and its relationship to nondeterministic
noise will have to wait for more empirical data. It is primarily a job not
for philosophers but for experimentalists. Philosophers have an
important part to play in analysing the possibilities and developing
testable theories which can guide experimental explorations, but they have
no place in prejudging the whole question by appealing to some abstract
measure of complexity. The importance of chaos theory cannot be
ushered away by the generally appropriate but overzealous naysaying of
Smith, but likewise it is not the magical solution to all the problems of
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consciousness that it sometimes seems trumped up to be in the popular
press (and even by some otherwise sober-minded philosophers!).
We have come a long way from the original view that chaos was
essentially little different from noise and that all that really mattered in
terms of analysing real physical systems were the kinds of limited
precision simulations we can run on digital computers. The point of the
previous few chapters has been to explore some properties of chaos and
their possible relevance to intelligent systems and then to defend our
points against the temptation to devalue chaos to irrelevance. Chaos as it
relates to questions of mind is an area ripe for more experimental
exploration and theoretical guidance, and it cannot be dismissed so easily.
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20
Tell Them What You've
Told Them
We noted in the Introduction that our strategy in this dissertation is
akin to that of the physicist who is trying better to understand the weak
nuclear force. Our physicist takes an educated guess that perhaps things
called w-particles exist, and she goes on to see what sorts of things she
could explain with re-particles. She investigates some of the consequences
of positing w-particles, she asks whether w-particles are plausible in the
context of her existing hypotheses, and she explores some of the empirical
and theoretical data with which it is most important to see if ze-particles
are consistent. As her research programme proceeds, she comes to a better
understanding of the use of the ze-particles hypothesis, and hopefully she
comes to a better understanding of the weak force.
Likewise, the bulk of this dissertation has been dedicated to
sketching the general plausibility of a number of different positions on
fundamental issues in philosophy and investigating what problems those
positions might help solve, what other positions they are compatible with,
and what empirical and theoretical data they need to be checked against. It
is now time to look back over the progress we have made and take stock of
the usefulness of our original and most basic positions.
20.1 Under the Influence
Let's start with the two underlying themes for which we never
explicitly argued but which have influenced much of our analysis of more
major positions: the concern for different levels of description and points
of view. With respect to the first, we've seen repeatedly the importance of
examining systems at more than one level; often substantive conclusions
have emerged when we've considered data drawn from different levels of
description of the same system. There's more than one way to describe a
cat (or a self model)! In our discussions in the second half of the
dissertation, we've seen how dynamics at one level may profoundly
influence the possible behaviour of a system at a higher level. Likewise,
we saw in the first half some ways in which an explanation proposed at a
given level to explain a particular phenomenon—such as our account of
the emergence of conscious sensation from a material substrate—may
demand certain characteristics of dynamics at a lower level.
Our awareness of different points of view has been similarly
helpful. In particular, the complementarity of the first person and third
person points of view underlies our cybernetic realism position. In the
case of levels of description, we began with a whole unitary system and
then deliberately introduced different aspects of it by looking to
characteristics which appear at particular scales. In the case of points of
view, we began with two distinct aspects and attempted to bring them
together into a whole. Especially with our discussions of what we've
dubbed the first person problem and the third person problem, we've
taken some steps toward achieving this goal of unification. While the two
points of view are important in their own right, just as descriptions at
different levels are important in their own right, we've seen they are also
important as different aspects of the same thing. Now let's examine
whether our more explicit positions have served us as well as the
underlying influences.
20.2 101 (Almost) Philosophical Positions
The first of these positions, of course, was the cybernetic realism of
Chapters 2 and 3. The task of those two early chapters was to situate
cybernetic realism in the context of materialist ontology and, through our
analysis of the first person and third person problems, to see some of the
rationale behind it. Without some such position—specifically, that there
are matters of fact about what it is like to be certain material structures—
the rest of this dissertation, as a project aimed at furthering the cause of a
comprehensive science of the mind based on material monism, could
never have got off the ground. (After all, to deny that there are matters of
fact about what it is like to be certain material structures sounds either like
the denial of material monism or the denial that there is anything which
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it is like something to be, full stop!) To that extent, our position on the
issue was entirely helpful.
Again in Chapter 4, we took and eventually defended against Brian
Josephson a position the likes of which was indispensable to the task
we've set ourselves of examining mental questions through explorations
of the physical. If it should turn out to be incorrect that consciousness is
irrelevant to quantum measurement, then the cognitive scientist has one
of two choices. On the one hand, the scientist might "give up the ghost",
so to speak, and allow that there is a non-material realm of mind which
somehow interacts with the physical world and brings about state vector
reduction. Under this option, many of the interesting questions about
minds are spirited off into a realm where the empirical methods of physics
are almost certain to fail us in our bid to understand the mental. The
mind in that case would then be destined probably to remain forever as
that last bastion of mental privacy we described in the Introduction. On
the other hand, the cognitive scientist might instead "bite the bullet" and
take on the burden of explaining just how it is that some material
structures collapse wavepackets by virtue of being conscious while others
do not (or, alternatively, how it is that conscious physical structures are
prevented from existing in states of linear superposition while
nonconscious ones are not). This would be a brave undertaking which I,
for one, and which apparently no other author in this field, has any clear
idea how to approach. Thus not only was our position on the matter
helpful, but let's hope for the sake of everyone pursuing questions of
material cognition that it's correct!
In the next chapter, we employed cybernetic realism, now hopefully
safe from one possible criticism from quantum physics, as the backdrop for
a new position on how consciousness actually emerges from the material
substrate. The self model approach suggests that what Dennett calls the
"center of narrative gravity", or what we term "the self", lies in the data
structure which may be instantiated by particular material structures. I
expressed the hope in that chapter that the self model view might help
clarify the arguably problematic notion of self, and I wondered about how
the sceptic might debate with someone who had thought of themselves
for all their lives as a self model.
On the first issue, I believe the self model approach has helped
clarify the notion of the self, and it has certainly offered new ways of
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addressing some familiar philosophical issues surrounding the subjects of
conscious experience. In particular, it is at the centre of a particularly
useful treatment of qualia which suggests that qualities of experience are
always relational and can be understood through the relationships
internal to the materially instantiated self model data structure. That is,
the self model view offers us somewhere to embody these qualities of
experience; later we saw how it might also offer us some handles on the
grain problem and frame problem, as well as a way of addressing Putnam's
points about meaning and even a speculative way of accommodating
neurophysiological evidence about oscillations in cortical activity.
In the course of exploring the self model idea in some detail, we
noted a number of characteristics which we would expect self models to
have, and we saw both how some of those characteristics might be
implemented neurally as well as how some of those characteristics may
help transcend some known properties of neural architectures (such as
bounds on dendritic and axonal arborisation). The emergence of
polymodal associations in self model data structures also gave some
insight into the development of language, while several self model
characteristics helped us on the way to overcoming some commonly sited
shortcomings of functionalist views of mind.
In Chapter 8, we checked on the evolutionary plausibility of the self
model view and noted some of the selective advantages which we would
expect for organisms equipped with a self model. We returned to the
language theme and speculated on how language emergent from a self
model might lend itself to improved procedural memory, and we noted
one possible explanation of the "internal dialogue". We also saw how self
models may speed the learning process, and through a martial arts
example we traced very broadly a possible sequence of changes in an
organism equipped with a self model as it learns a particularly complex set
of behaviours.
All told, the self model view has turned out to be a rich point of
departure for investigating a host of philosophical and cognitive scientific
questions, and we've demonstrated at least its prima facie biological
plausibility, taking note of several more of its advantages along the way.
We also saw, in Chapter 9, how it coheres with Edelman's low level theory
of perceptual categorisation and helps to bridge the gap between it and
higher level phenomenal experience. Since rounding out the self model
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discussion with artificial neural network examples and comments on
information processing, the self model view appears to suggest a robust set
of approaches which, while certainly not yet as well supported as the
existence of w-particles, nonetheless shows promise as a fruitful topic for
further investigation. What to say to the hypothetical individual who
thinks of himself or herself as a materially instantiated data structure, I
leave to the sceptic to sort out.
In the second half of the dissertation, we took what amounts to the
rather safe position that philosophically relevant things can be said about
the dynamics of a low level material substrate and the conscious
experience of a self model instantiated by it (and, in particular, that
specifically chaotic dynamics in that substrate might be especially
important). While not contradicting our earlier argument that the self
model is blind to a wide variety of characteristics of its instantiating
hardware or wetware, this angle suggests simply that relationships
embodied by, and the temporal evolution of, self models is largely
dependent on dynamical properties of the instantiating substrate. As an
aide to exploring this idea, we introduced a special representational
schema and immediately saw how it could be applied to existing theories
and how it might even help us to analyse questions about free will,
creativity, and memory. It gave us a way of phrasing observations about
the relationship of chaotic low level dynamics to the temporal evolution
of higher level features of cognitive systems; in the next chapter it helped
us to defend against Peter Smith an argument for indeterminism in
cognitive state transitions based on observations about underlying
dynamics and particular ways of mapping sets of low level states of a
material substrate to higher level mental states. Hopefully the usefulness
of both the original position and the representational schema emerged
clearly at this early stage.
In the Chapter 15, we entered a technical discussion about the
computability of a class of chaotic systems, and we found that the
implication from the computability of a set of governing equations to the
computability of the behaviour of a corresponding real system is far from
straightforward. Our analysis suggested that there may be aspects of
behaviour in chaotic analogue substrates which are not Turing
computable. We noted that if this is true, may carry important
implications for the way we view human cognition and its relationship to
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computation. If true, the conclusions of this chapter underscore the
importance of multi-level analysis and suggest that human minds may be
significantly different to anything which might be produced by the strong
AI project.
With such important implications at stake, we turned in the next
chapter to addressing a series of comments due to Peter Smith which
threaten to reduce to irrelevance the presence of specifically chaotic
dynamics in the material substrate of cognitive systems. In this and the
two subsequent chapters, we defended the view of chaos to which we had
so far appealed against criticisms from infinite intricacy, predictability, and
complexity. Along the way, we clarified a number of points about how
chaos should be treated, we explored a real system which appears to
vindicate the position taken in Chapter 15 on the computability of chaotic
analogue systems, and we offered a new measure of complexity designed
to overcome the problems of previous measures as well as helping in the
defence against Smith. In the end, we wound up with positions largely
compatible in most cases but in some important instances strictly
incompatible with Smith's. Over the course of these three chapters, we
legitimated our original interest in chaotic dynamics and its possible
relationship to higher level instantiated data structures.
In the last of the main chapters of this dissertation, we returned to
the issue of representation which played such a central role in our
understanding of self model data structures, applying our new grasp of
complexity to demonstrate first that complexity is inextricably bound up
with representation and second that the part played by chaotic dynamics in
intelligent systems is emphatically an open question. It so far suggests
only possibilities and cannot be prejudged either by Smith's well-targeted
but arguably overzealous naysaying or by the overly optimistic
assumptions frequently made, for instance, in the popular press, that
chaos somehow is the magical key to human escape from determinism
and all other "problems" of material monism. Although this last
sequence of chapters of philosophy of science was rather a roundabout way
of getting to our destination, we can now see that our original position
that it is important to investigate relationships between low level
dynamics and higher level data structures—with particular attention to
specifically chaotic dynamics—has been altogether vindicated.
268
20.3 Telling Them Again—The Short Form
Overall, we've covered a very wide range of topics, and each of the
positions we've taken on substantive issues have proven themselves
worthwhile—which shouldn't be too surprising, of course, since the
positions which turned out to be less fruitful were deliberately omitted
from this dissertation! We've seen the value of analysing cognitive
systems at different levels of description and from different points of view,
we've seen that quantum mechanics is largely irrelevant to the materialist
cognitive science project, and we've seen how the self model approach to
seating conscious may help answer a variety of interesting questions. I
can't vouch for anyone else, but I feel I am a materially instantiated data
structure! We've also noted how chaos theory may be important to
philosophy of mind and how it should at least be kept an open subject for
further study, and our exploration of complexity in the context of chaos
helped us also to reveal how complexity cannot be divorced from
representation. Along the way, we've made some promising speculations
on topics as diverse as "empirical logic", the illusion of qualia, the internal
dialogue, content addressable memory, the grain and frame problems, the
role of cortical oscillations, creativity, free will, and others. So what
haven't we covered, and what haven't we covered well enough?
20.4 Shortcomings of a House on Stilts
Perhaps it would take another book as long as this one to begin to
cover the shortcomings of our analyses. The overall picture on offer here
is like a house built on stilts, meant to raise us up out of the wet and muck
of various philosophical quandaries, that from our various positions we
might spy through the windows of our house some dry land on which to
build a better philosophical framework. But while we've done a fair bit of
direct checking that our stilts are in order, more of our time has been spent
looking out the windows and suggesting that if the views are so good,
then the stilts must be steady. While this is hardly very different to the
physicist and her zy-particles, it is worthwhile to take note explicitly of
some of the issues which could benefit from further analysis.
First, there is certainly much more to be said about relationships
between self model data structures and their neural wetware. We've also
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not explored sufficiently the relationships between various parts of the self
model and between the self model and other data structures instantiated
by the material substrate but not directly incorporated in the self model.
Surely other nonconscious models, in addition to the self model, are
instantiated by neural subsystems; how is their role in the system different
to that of the self model? And what particular changes occur in the self
model during disruptions to normal conscious experience such as
anaesthesia or intoxication?
Along similar lines, we might also ask what other information
theoretic characteristics are displayed by self models apart from those
we've explored? How might these characteristics be implemented with
neural networks, and how might the very primitive example networks
we've discussed be improved? What, if any, low level characteristics of
these networks are absolutely essential, and which could be replaced by
simpler ones?
Other significant questions about low level characteristics remain.
It's clear, for instance, that we've not concluded the analysis of recursion
theory and the importance of analogue chaos. That our tentative
conclusions on the subject are at odds with almost universally accepted
received wisdom in computation circles is perhaps good reason to believe
something has gone wrong in our approach, although the failure so far of
any readers or conference audiences to point out exactly where we've gone
wrong is some reason to believe the opposite.
Later in our analysis of chaotic dynamics, we spent a good deal of
time examining issues of complexity and even offering a new complexity
measure. However, none of those discussions got us any closer actually to
measuring complexity; since none of the complexity measures we
discussed were computable, they served only to help us in theorising
about complexity in the abstract. Actually measuring complexity is a
difficult and actively researched topic, and while our analysis has
contributed little to that research, it could certainly benefit from whatever
developments may yet emerge from it.
Similarly, it is a shortcoming that all our explorations of chaotic
dynamics have focussed on dynamical systems actually in a chaotic, or
supercritical, regime. In fact, it is almost certain that the real payoff from
chaotic systems in terms of information density and so forth will come
from studying systems at the critical transition between more
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straightforward order and chaos. This area, too, is currently the subject of
active research, and more interesting philosophical insights will
undoubtedly come from this research than from our own investigations
of systems already at supercritical stages.
Finally, we have played very fast with the debate surrounding topics
like qualia, free will, and so forth. It was never our purpose to come to
any great resolutions of these debates, but nonetheless it is clear that more
work needs to be done before it can really be accepted that the self model
approach has useful bearing on these problems. What discussion we have
undertaken, however, has at least suggested that these are areas where
something relevant might be said, where the view on offer may well have
some important impact.
20.5 New Directions, New Positions
Some of the new directions for research suggested by the material
we've covered here come not from shortcomings in our analyses but
rather from deliberate omissions. For instance, we've said nothing about
the ethical implications of the self model view. It is interesting, for
instance, that attributions of value to persons may partially reduce on this
account to attributions of value to particular patterns of activity
instantiated by material structures. This idea might form a useful
complement to the Psychological Principle of Sufficient Reason I've
described elsewhere. (Mulhauser 1993e) It may also bear on issues of both
intrinsic and instrumental value in environmental ethics and animal
rights.
We might also wonder about the implications of this kind of
materialist view of cognition for questions in aesthetics. To what extent,
for instance, are human perceptions of beauty predicated on
complementarity or contrast with materially instantiated patterns in their
self models? This question might also prompt us to wonder more about
the suggestion in Chapter 3 that human perceptions of logic may derive
from patterns contingently instantiated by their self models.
Another suggestion, with which we closed Chapter 3, might also
merit more attention. We noted that scientific explanations always at
some level come to describing hozv mechanisms operate but not why they
operate that way (instead of some other way). In seating philosophy of
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mind squarely within the boundaries of science, interesting philosophical
questions might be asked about the significance of this ultimate end to
scientific explanation. Even curious questions of theology might evolve
from the notion that our best scientific explanations of minds ultimately
reduce to descriptions of how they in fact are but not accounts of why they
are.
Not far from this, perhaps, is the idea on which we first touched in
the first section of the Introduction that if we assume a monist material
ontology, it is all the more amazing that we materially instantiated
consciousnesses sense or perceive anything at all! To suppose a separate
realm of mind or spirit is to lock up our awe safe from the grasp of
objective empirical inquiry, but to integrate that realm of mind or spirit
into one coherent materialist ontology is to take hold wholeheartedly,
with all our empirical capacity to hear and see and feel, of the utter
amazingness of those very capacities. To think of a "me" in a separate
mental realm who wonders about such things is not incredible, but to
think of a "me" in a strictly material realm leaves "me" dumbstruck!
20.6 Buying Philosophical Futures
Investigating issues like these with methods akin to those we've
employed here is, I believe, the future of philosophy of mind. Some
philosophers privately express the fear that the march of cognitive science
is slowly appropriating the territory formerly allotted to philosophical
inquiry; but if it is really doing this, I believe it is doing so only at the same
time that new territories are being opened for philosophy.
At least some of this new territory is given to philosophers
pursuing, as we have largely done here, what amounts to "theoretical
cognitive science", or theoretical AI. It is a job for philosophers to
synthesize plausible theoretical accounts from existing data and to offer
theoretical direction to the research projects of cognitive science and
artificial intelligence. It is a job for philosophers to integrate, as we have
tried to do here, information from a wide range of philosophical and
scientific fields. The Grand Unification Theory of Consciousness, if there
is ever to be such a thing, can no more emerge from and be couched in the
terms of just one philosophical or scientific specialty than the Grand
Unification Theory of physics can come from just the study of w-particles
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and the weak nuclear force. If philosophers do not take the initiative in
setting out the requirements for what must be explained by such theories
of consciousness and in verifying the consistency and plausibility of
candidate theories or bits of theories, then, I submit, no one will.
I hope the bits of theory and analysis offered here may be subjected
to this kind of assessment by other philosophers. And, as I expressed at
the end of the Introduction, I hope some of these ideas may yet find more
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